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INTRODUCTION 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES 
After gaining independence in 1991, Georgia and its leadership had to find their place in the 
international system. Against the background of domestic constraints and external 
challenges, the orientation of the country's foreign policy was not stable as the political elite 
struggled to balance between Russia and the West. After the 2003 Rose Revolution, 
especially as relations with Russia were souring, the Euro-Atlantic orientation, portrayed as 
a single and coherent strategy, became the cornerstone of the foreign policy as well as a 
model for domestic reforms. This promise of a prosperous future offered a new hope to the 
Georgian population and seemed unconditionally trusted by politicians in the West. 
Scepticism or critical thinking towards President Saakashvili and his government were 
equated to pro-Russian treason, creating a precarious situation where any government 
action had to be accepted as being in the interest of the population. 
The Euro-Atlantic orientation and impressive reforms emerged simultaneously with an 
outspoken rhetoric and active symbolism. References to Europe and the Euro-Atlantic 
structures became ubiquitous as European flags were brandished throughout the country, 
and almost all reforms and infrastructure programmes are promoted as being modelled 
along the ‘European standards’. In addition to the ruling political elite, opposition and civil 
society figures constantly referenced ‘Europe’, and to a smaller extent various Euro-Atlantic 
structures in their speeches and publications. This Euro-Atlantic promise, symbolism and 
obsession have galvanised some and aggravated others. The role of the ‘Europeanness’ of 
the Georgian nation plays a central role in this process and has puzzled many analysts and 
scholars. For example Pål Kolstø and Aleksander Rusetskii asked: ‘Why is this European 
identity so urgent?’1 Consequently, it led to the following general research question that 
drives this dissertation: ’To what ends have discourses of Euro-Atlanticism been 
instrumentalised in domestic and international affairs by the political elite in Georgia 
during the Saakashvili era?’ 
A survey of the academic literature and early empirical findings determined the iterative 
research model as the most appropriate approach, because the initial design had to be 
amended and refined in a continuous process. Although some earlier ideas and concepts 
had to be discarded during the course of the research and analysis, they nevertheless 
provided a valuable input to formulate the two final hypotheses.2 In order to bring some 
                                                      
1 Pål Kolstø and Aleksander Rusetskii, “Power differentials and identity formation: images of self and other on 
the Russian-Georgian boundary,” National Identities, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2012): 144. 
2 Although two different working hypotheses have been developed to guide the research, these should in no 
way be seen as the sole possible answers, which is only logical given the abductive reasoning throughout the 
research. For example, one interlocutor in Tbilisi thought that the Euro-Atlantic discourse was mainly based on 
the obsession of President Saakashvili with the West. However, analysing such hypothesis is far outside the 
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structure to the research question, it was necessary to split the discourse based on the 
audience (domestic and international) as the aims seem to be different. Secondly, it was 
equally important to understand that 'Euro-Atlantic discourse' entails two noteworthy 
components. The first relates to the Euro-Atlantic orientation and the strategy to assimilate 
Georgia into the Euro-Atlantic community. The second refers to Europeanness as a matter 
of identity and the feeling of commonality with Europe. This also explains the ambiguity one 
can often notice in the discourse of the Georgian leadership whether the Georgians are or 
will be European. 
Following the 2006 municipal elections Labour Party leader Shalva Natelashvili accused 
the OSCE of ‘legitimising rigged elections’ in Georgia3, and two years later claimed that 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair was part of the ‘group which gave full European legitimacy 
to the overthrow of the government in Georgia in 2003.’4 Coincidentally, a number of 
scholars have raised the relation between foreign policy and political legitimacy, and have 
applied it to the post-Soviet context. Anneke Hudalla asserted that post-Communist foreign 
policy is seldom based on a foreign policy cost-benefit analysis, but is rather used for 
domestic legitimation.5 Prior to embarking on a political career with Saakashvili United 
National Movement (UNM), scholar David Darchiashvili was even harsher, arguing that post-
Communist elite are tempted by the Euro-Atlantic community in order to live at the expense 
of someone else, to consolidate power, and to defeat opponents with foreign support.6 Also 
Silke Kleinhanβ contended that Georgia’s foreign policy has been used for domestic political 
reasons.7 Thus, a first hypothesis is that the Euro-Atlantic discourse is instrumentalised by 
the political elite in Georgia as a domestic legitimacy management strategy. The words 
‘strategy’ and ‘instrumentalising’ imply that there is a cognitive and intentional aspect to the 
mechanism of legitimation and de-legitimation. 
Georgia experienced relatively few short periods of independence, and moreover, was 
subject to foreign domination or patronage for most of its history. In fact, the combination 
of relative autonomy and foreign patronage spawned stability in Georgia and often served 
to safeguard against external security threats. Historically, the ruling elite looked for a 
patron to guarantee the independence and prosperous development of the country. After 
                                                                                                                                                                     
scope of political science or international relations. As the research needs to be framed and remain realistic, 
only the two abovementioned hypotheses are discussed. 
3 Labour Party Leader Shalva Natelashvili, 13 September 2006, Public TV. See similarly Shalva Natelashvili, 26 
March 2008, Caucasus Press. 
4 Labour Party Leader Shalva Natelashvili, 27 June 2007, Caucasus Press. Similarly also member of the PACE 
monitoring mission Mátyás Eörsi, Secretary General of the Council of Europe Davis and Swedish Foreign 
Minister Carl Bildt have been accused of lobbying Saakashvili’s ‘dictatorial regime’ (18 May 2009, Caucasus 
Press). 
5 Anneke Hudalla, Außenpolitik in den Zeiten der Transformation: Die Europapolitik der Tschechischen 
Republik 1993-2001 (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2003), 29. 
6 David Darchiashvili, “Georgien und die euroatlantischen Sicherheitsstrukturen,” in Diaspora, Öl und Rosen: 
zur Innenpolitischen Entwicklung in Armenien, Aserbaidschan und Georgien, ed. Walter Kaufmann (Berlin: 
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 2004), 53. 
7 Silke Kleinhanβ, Die Außenpolitik Georgiens: Ein 'Failing State’ zwischen internem Teilversagen und externen 
Chancen (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2008), 8. 
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the declaration of independence, the Euro-Atlantic Community appeared on the Georgian 
radar as a possible guarantor of peace and stability. Although many Georgians thought the 
West was ‘obliged’ to help their country,8 this did not materialise. After the Rose Revolution, 
the new government sought a more active engagement from the Euro-Atlantic Community. 
Thus, a second hypothesis is related to the foreign policy of small states and proposes that 
the Euro-Atlantic discourse is instrumentalised by the Georgian political elite to seek 
international legitimacy and to prove the country’s entitlement to patronage of the Euro-
Atlantic community. 
 
STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
Chapter I introduces the conceptual and theoretical framework which forms the backbone 
of this dissertation. The first segment is situated in the field of comparative politics and 
looks at political legitimacy, and more specifically at the role of identity and foreign policy as 
part of a legitimacy management strategy. The second part takes a look at the foreign policy 
of small states. Finally, also the methodology and limitations of the research are explained. 
The two following chapters aim to clarify the idea of Euro-Atlantic discourse. They 
elaborate on the distinction between becoming and being European, i.e. the differentiation 
between Euro-Atlanticism as an orientation or even ideology, and Europeanness as a feeling 
of identity. Chapter II situates the Euro-Atlantic orientation in a wider frame. As this 
orientation is presented as a continuation from the past, the history of relations with 
Europe and its self-location between Europe and Asia is explored. It also gives an overview 
and analysis of the Euro-Atlantic orientation and discourse since the 1991 independence, by 
highlighting changing trends in this aspect of foreign policy. Not only does the official 
position need to be understood, as lively debate exists among the various different political 
actors, and the population at large. 
The Europeanness of the Georgian state and nation are addressed in Chapter III. Far 
from determining whether or not the Georgians are European, the chapter surveys what it 
means for Georgia and the Georgians 'to be European' by situating the phenomenon within 
a wider historical context by linking it to Georgian identity. As different arguments are 
proposed for this Georgian Europeanness, these claims are evaluated against facts and 
academic literature in order to establish the extent this sense of Europeanness is justified, 
and thus, assess whether it is valid or manufactured as part of the identity construction 
process. Georgian Europeanness is also evaluated in relation to the non-European other, 
and the political importance and consequences for this. 
The two subsequent chapters pose arguments for the hypotheses. Chapter IV addresses 
the first hypothesis and demonstrates how the Euro-Atlantic discourse is employed 
                                                      
8 Ghia Nodia, “The Georgian perception of the West,” in Commonwealth and independence in post-Soviet 
Eurasia, ed. Bruno Coppieters, Alexei Zverev and Dmitri Trenin (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 20. 
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domestically by the political elite as a legitimacy management strategy by highlighting 
different patterns. These patterns are substantiated by numerous examples. The first 
section scrutinises the legitimation in terms of exercising power and a second focuses on 
legitimation of being in power. It also explores the interaction between legitimation and 
delegitimation as not only ruling elite, but also the opposition made use of this discourse. 
Finally, also the role of symbolism is highlighted. 
Chapter V develops the second hypothesis and explores the role of the Euro-Atlantic 
discourse towards the international audience. After an analysis of why Georgia sought to 
obtain Western patronage, it focuses on how the Saakashvili government strived to achieve 
this foreign policy goal. It argues that the Euro-Atlantic discourse has been used to create a 
culture of entitlement for unconditional support from the West. 
Finally, the Conclusions summarise the main findings and provide suggestions for further 
research. 
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CHAPTER I – CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
As the link between discourse and power9 is central to the research question, Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) provides the most obvious and rigorous theoretical and 
methodological basis for this research. CDA looks at the relationship between discourse 
practices, not only written and spoken language but also visual and symbolic (hermeneutic 
and semiotic) elements, and social practices and structures.10 Instead of focusing solely on 
theories and methods traditionally used in the social sciences, linguistics takes an equally 
important role in this process. CDA should not be perceived as an interdisciplinary vehicle 
with other social theories, methods and practice but as transdisciplinary.11 Thus, CDA is as 
much theory as method,12 and therefore it is more constructive to situate it as a 
'methodological or theoretical perspective,' a 'general epistemological perspective on social 
life containing both methodological and conceptual elements', an 'analytic mentality' or as 
'craft skill or form of scholarship'.13 It is also important to understand that CDA does not 
provide an 'ideal way' of conceptualising, but rather offers analytical tools for a critical 
assessment of discourse.14 By using CDA, as well as by focussing on concepts of identity and 
legitimacy, this research follows the constructivist epistemology and uses its specific 
analytical orientation and interpretative take on data.15 
                                                      
9 A number of scholars have pointed out that the main aim of CDA is to analyse the link between discourse and 
power. See for example Ruth Wodak, "What CDA is about – a summary of its history, important concepts and 
its developments," in Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer 
(London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2001), 2; Siegfried Jäger, "Discourse and knowledge: 
theoretical and methodological aspects of a critical discourse and dispositive analysis," in Methods of Critical 
Discourse Analysis, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: SAGE 
Publications, 2001), 33; or Teun A. van Dijk, "Multidisciplinary CDA: a plea for diversity," in Methods of Critical 
Discourse Analysis, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: SAGE 
Publications, 2001), 96. 
10 Teun A. van Dijk, “Multidisciplinary CDA: a plea for diversity,” 96. 
11 Norman Fairclough, "Critical discourse analysis in transdisciplinary research," in New agenda in (critical) 
discourse analysis: theory, methodology and interdisciplinarity, ed. Ruth Wodak (Philadelphia: John Benjamins 
Publishing Company, 2005), 53-70. 
12 Norman Fairclough, "Critical discourse analysis as a method in social scientific research," in Methods of 
Critical Discourse Analysis, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: SAGE 
Publications, 2001), 121. 
13 Pirjo Nikander, "Constructionism and discourse analysis," in Handbook of constructionist research, ed. James 
A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium (New York: The Guilford Press, 2008), 414. 
14 René Dirven, Frank Polzenhagen and Hans-Georg Wolf, "Cognitive Linguistics, Ideology, and Critical 
Discourse Analysis," in The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics, ed. Dirk Geeraerts and Hubert Cuyckens 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 1236. 
15 Nikander, 416. 
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Lively debate exists surrounding the appropriate use of Political Discourse Analysis.16 
However, scholars have thus far failed to offer any significant extension to the conventional 
wisdom of CDA and merely skirt the periphery of theories in the field of political science. 
Instead, publications on Political Discourse Analysis raise awareness on the most 
appropriate employment of CDA within the strata of political science. Indeed, CDA can 
create the link between politico-philosophical theoretical concepts and events and 
phenomena in the real political life. For example, the concept of legitimacy has been subject 
to notable scrutiny in the field of comparative politics, and several theoretical frameworks 
of legitimation have been created. However, few political scientists have rigorously tested 
the extent of how this abstract model functions in reality and how the political elite seek to 
achieve this legitimacy. Furthermore, CDA can bring new elements and insights to 
theoretical thinking in disciplines other than linguistics. According to Harvey, different 
disciplines should be open to the theoretical logics of others and to 'internalise' them17 or as 
Fairclough asserts, this transdisciplinary interaction can give rise to development of theory 
and method which shift the boundaries between different theories and methods.18 
CDA is not the first academic attempt to synthesise linguistics and social sciences, and 
was certainly not created in isolation. For example, the disciplines of sociolinguistics and 
critical linguistics were developed in the 1960s and 1970s respectively, but did not 
incorporate any links with concepts and ideas from the political science arena. This changed 
in the late 1970s, under the influence of critical theory – a neo-Marxist philosophy 
developed by the Frankfurt School in the 1930s – as a growing number of critical linguists 
assigned increasing substance to the concepts of social hierarchy and power. 
In addition to other theoretical and methodological frameworks, CDA possesses notable 
deficiencies. Despite Chouliaraki and Fairclough’s proclamations that CDA should bring 
social science and linguistics together and create a dialogue between them,19 this 
unfortunately is still not the case. Linguists continue to merely interpret texts, yet when 
they try to explain them they still fail to employ adequate political theory. In the event of a 
linguist and a political scientist exploring the subject of Euro-Atlantic discourse in Georgia, 
they would invariably formulate conflicting research questions and hypotheses, yet both 
would employ CDA as the preferred tool of analysis. Instead of collaborating with social 
scientists, all major publications on CDA seem to have been a collective effort of linguists 
and sociolinguists only, who far too infrequently broach the concepts and theories from the 
                                                      
16 See for example Michael L. Geis, The language of politics (New York: Springer, 1987); Ruth Wodak and 
Florian Menz, Sprache in der Politik – Politik in der Sprache. Analysen zum offentlichen Sprachgebrauch 
(Klagenfurt: Drava, 1990); John Wilson, Politically speaking (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990); Teun van Dijk, “What 
is Political Discourse Analysis?,” in Political linguistics, ed. Jan Blommaert and Chris Bulcaen (Amsterdam: 
Benjamins, 1997), 11-52. 
17 Harvey cited in Norman Fairclough, "Critical discourse analysis as a method in social scientific research," 121-
122. 
18 Fairclough cited in Norman Fairclough, "Critical discourse analysis as a method in social scientific research," 
122. 
19 Lilie Chouliaraki and Norman Fairclough, Discourse in late modernity: rethinking critical discourse analysis 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 6. 
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field of political sciences. Using the example of legitimacy again, linguists seldom explore the 
concept of legitimacy, what forms it takes, who gives legitimacy to whom, what is the 
interaction between legitimation and delegitimation and what are the different stages of 
legitimacy, mainly because this does not fall within their discipline. Few political scientists 
agree with linguist van Dijk's thought that 'legitimation may not be necessary in normal 
courses of events, in routines, and when no challenges to institutional power or authority 
are imminent'.20 CDA loses a lot of its practical use and merits due to overtheorising and 
complex linguistic jargon. A second criticism is directed at the political stance which is 
frequently posited by researchers.21 Teun van Dijk expresses pride that CDA is biased and 
has social responsibilities22 and argues that critical discourse scholars should be activists.23 
However, not all his colleagues agree and Ruth Wodak argues that CDA should not evaluate 
what is 'right' or 'wrong'.24 She asserts that the results of the research should be 'applied 
with the goal of changing certain discursive and social practices.'25 Although academia can 
and should have a role in society, the academic activist approach is not appropriate within a 
doctoral research project. Therefore, this dissertation aims to explore the phenomenon 
without making a judgment about the fairness of the Georgian political elite. 
Different scholars have different approaches and researchers employing CDA should 
develop their own approach based on the specific problem or object to be investigated. The 
following section surveys the work of two discourse analysts, whose work shares many 
similarities and as a result was useful for this research. 
The work of Teun van Dijk has been the most relevant in the context of this research. As 
a prolific writer on CDA, he has focused most of his career on the role of discourse in politics 
and ideology. Although he is not in favour of offering a ready-made 'method van Dijk' of 
conducting CDA, he does propose a specific model which he labels socio-cognitive discourse 
analysis.26 His research focused on racism and ideology, and showed that these were both 
social and cognitive phenomena.27 Van Dijk concentrates on the idea of text-context 
because contexts are said to constrain the properties of text and talk, meaning that what we 
say and how we say it, depends on such factors as who we are speaking to, when, where, 
and with what purpose.28 This idea is closely related to the standpoint theory, where the 
inter-subjectiveness of discourse is central. A large number of the strategies of political and 
ideological discourse raised by van Dijk occurred in the patterns encountered in this 
research project. For example in terms of argumentation, he underlines how politicians can 
                                                      
20 Teun van Dijk, Ideology: A multidisciplinary approach (London: SAGE Publications, 1998), 257. 
21 Ruth Wodak, "What CDA is about – a summary of its history, important concepts and its developments," 5. 
22 Van Dijk, “Multidisciplinary CDA: a plea for diversity,” 96. 
23 Teun A. van Dijk, "Principles of critical discourse analysis," in Discourse and Society, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1993), 253. 
24 Ruth Wodak, "The discourse-historical approach," in Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, ed. Ruth Wodak 
and Michael Meyer (London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2001), 65. 
25 Ibid., 70. 
26 Van Dijk, “Multidisciplinary CDA: a plea for diversity,” 95. 
27 Ibid., 97. 
28 Ibid., 108. 
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make comparisons, illustrations or examples, generalisations, having recourse to the fallacy 
of mentioning authorities to support their case ('usually organizations or people who are 
above the fray of party politics, or who are generally recognized experts or moral leaders').29 
With regards to rhetorical structures or figures of style, he highlights the use of 
euphemisms, hyperboles, and irony, as strategies to produce the effect of persuasion.30 
These strategies are also addressed in his 2006 paper, where he analyses manipulative 
discourse.31 Furthermore, he stresses strategies like populism, national self-glorification and 
a polarization between us and them (including a negative other-presentation and a positive 
self-presentation), vagueness, and victimisation.32 
A last scholar to be mentioned here is Ruth Wodak, who has employed CDA to explore 
issues of racism and anti-Semitism. Together with her colleagues she developed the 
discourse-historical approach, closely related to discourse socio-linguistics and influenced by 
van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach.33 With her words, 'the discourse-historical approach 
attempts to integrate a large quantity of available knowledge about the historical sources 
and the background of the social and political fields in which discursive "elements" are 
embedded.'34 Wodak explores the importance of not only analysing the discourse itself but 
to place it in a wider picture, by incorporating fieldwork and ethnography.35 Related to this, 
she attaches great importance to analysing and integrating the historical context into the 
interpretation of discourses and text.36 Finally, although the discourse strategies37 she 
surveys are similar to van Dijk’s assertions, they remain valid and are useful in analysing 
discourse. 
 
POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 
The concept of political legitimacy 
Despite the existence of vibrant debate on the concept of legitimacy for centuries, there 
exists no universally agreed theory. The word is not only used in the sense of the power 
relationship between those who rule and those who are ruled, but it can also refer to 
expectations, feelings, demands, the status of a child in legal terms, etc. Thus, the more 
specific concept of ‘political legitimacy’ is of relevance to this research. Still, even this term 
has been roundly criticised because one cannot identify purely political legitimacy and there 
                                                      
29 Teun A. van Dijk, "Politics, Ideology, and Discourse," in Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics (Oxford: 
Elsevier, 2006), 735-7. 
30 Ibid., 736-7. 
31 Teun A. van Dijk, "Discourse and manipulation," Discourse and Society, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2006): 359-383. 
32 Van Dijk, “Politics, Ideology, and Discourse,” 738-9. 
33 Wodak, “The discourse-historical approach,” 63-94. 
34 Ibid., 65. 
35 Ibid., 69. 
36 Ibid., 70. 
37 Ibid., 73. 
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is no purely political reason for legitimacy.38 Economic and social considerations also play a 
crucial role and frequently legitimacy is based on non-political motives such as habit or fear. 
Nevertheless, despite the existing criticism, the term ‘political legitimacy’ is more 
appropriate than the wider term ‘legitimacy of power’, as the focus of this research is on the 
politically related aspects of power and not on all forms of power relations (e.g. within 
companies, religious structures, etc). 
Rigorous debate exists regarding the nature of political legitimacy, depending on the 
interest of the scholar.39 Moral and political philosophers interpret legitimacy as the moral 
justifiability of power relations, according to rationally defensible normative principles.40 
The challenge with this abstract and idealistic view is that there are no universal principles 
of good or bad and that these may be historically variable. Secondly, most political and 
social scientists in the twentieth century (e.g. Robert Dahl, Karl Deutsch, David Easton, Carl 
Friedrich, Seymour Lipset, Lucian Pye, and John Schaar) started their discussions on the 
topic with Max Weber’s definition that power is legitimate if the relevant social agents 
believe it is legitimate.41 This view is more often than not about legitimacy-in-context, taking 
the beliefs and criteria for consent of a particular society at a particular time in history into 
account. A third view is advocated by legal experts, who equate legitimacy to legal validity, 
i.e. when power has been acquired and is exercised conform to established law.42 
Towards the end of the twentieth century, a plethora of scholars argued against both 
the normative perspective of the political philosophers as opposed to an empirical approach 
of the social scientists. Instead, they searched for a link between them. Thus, according to 
David Beetham, power can be said to be legitimate to the extent that it is ‘acquired and 
exercised according to justifiable rules, and with evidence of consent.’43 Still, although 
Weber’s approach may no longer be adequate for understanding legitimacy44 and be very 
much debated, Weber’s model remains the seminal theory. 
 
                                                      
38 See for example Rodney Baker, Political legitimacy and the state (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990): 20-44 or 
Allen Buchanan, “Political legitimacy and democracy,” Ethics, Vol. 112, No. 4 (2002): 689-719. 
39 See for example Matti Wiberg, Between apathy and revolution: explications of the conditions for political 
legitimacy (Turku: Turun Yliopisto, 1988), 3 or David Beetham, The legitimation of power (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Education, 1991), 3. 
40 Beetham, 5. See for example Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Hegel. 
41 Weber cited in Beetham, 11. 
42 Beetham, 4. 
43 Ibid., 3. 
44 Mattei Dogan, “Political legitimacy: new criteria and anachronistic theories,” International Social Science 
Journal, Vol. 60, No. 196 (2009): 209. 
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Legitimation and its mechanisms 
Legitimation and de-legitimation can be viewed as ‘the process by which the legitimacy of a 
subject changes over time.’45 Three different stages can be observed: gaining legitimacy, 
maintaining legitimacy, and losing legitimacy. The latter is often in combination with an 
attempt to restore legitimacy and is closely linked to delegitimation attempts by counter-
elites and political parties who also seek legitimacy. Several parameters are involved in the 
legitimation process and different scholars have come up with their own conceptualisations 
on the basis on their respective investigations. No framework offers a universally accepted 
theory, yet they do not contradict each other either. Beetham speaks of the three 
dimensions or criteria of legitimacy: conformity to rules, justifiability of the rules in terms of 
shared beliefs, and expressed consent. Matti Wiberg established a formula: ‘Some political 
entity X has political legitimacy in relation to some actors or criteria Y judged by Z to acts A 
at the time T on grounds G.’46 Fritz Scharpf developed the idea of the two dimensions of 
legitimacy, based on David Easton's political system theory, by differentiating methods of 
achieving legitimacy: input-legitimation (‘ruling through the people’ i.e. through democratic 
processes) and output-legitimation (‘ruling for the people’ i.e. in the interest of the 
population at large).47 However, they all remained on a rather abstract and philosophical 
level, without elaborating this process of legitimation. 
Mark Suchman further investigated the research on the mechanisms and strategies48 for 
gaining, maintaining and repairing legitimacy by clustering patterns. He demonstrated that 
legitimacy can be gained by conforming to the environment, by pro-actively selecting among 
different environments or by manipulating environmental structures and creating new 
audiences and legitimating beliefs.49 Strategies for maintaining legitimacy, which is 
frequently understood to be easier than gaining or repairing, fall under two groups. One 
aims at perceiving future changes and the other at protecting past accomplishments.50 
Finally, patterns for repairing legitimacy include offering normalising accounts (through 
denials, excuses, justifications and explanations), strategic restructuring, and avoiding 
panic.51 This normalising of accounts is similar to what Barry Schlenker called ‘impression 
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management’ or the presentational strategies of selecting arguments to minimize or avoid 
blame.52 
 
The link between identity, foreign policy and domestic political legitimacy 
As explained in the introduction, the Euro-Atlantic discourse can be split into a component 
on the Euro-Atlantic orientation, i.e. foreign policy and ideology for domestic reforms, and 
one on Europeanness, i.e. a marker of identity. Thus their link to legitimacy merits 
investigation. 
Robert Putnam (1988) argued that ‘domestic politics and international relations are 
often somehow entangled, but our theories have not yet sorted out the puzzling tangle.’53 
After quarter of a century and a plethora of publications scrutinising neoclassical realism, 
there is still no universally accepted theoretical framework. In examining the link between 
foreign policy and domestic legitimacy, the role of identity should not be overlooked. 
Every administration seeks to preserve legitimacy in an effort to remain in power, and as 
a result it must adapt its policies, including foreign policy. According to George Liska, 
aligning the country with other states can promote internal stability and increase legitimacy 
of the government. By entering into an alliance with respected powers, the domestic status 
and authority may be increased as the alliance certifies the leadership of that country as 
internationally acceptable and stable. Moreover, other alliance members will want regime 
stability of the other members and may provide outright subsidy or other forms of material 
support.54 Similarly, Stephen Walt has claimed that ‘alignment with similar states may 
enhance the legitimacy of a weak regime, by demonstrating that it is part of a large popular 
movement.’55 
Mette Skak asserted that governments have been known to compensate their own 
failure by engaging into active relations with richer countries in order to elicit development 
assistance to fulfil the obligations of the state. She claims that governments can pursue a 
foreign policy that distracts the attention from failures on the national level. This can be 
done by following a foreign policy that gives international prestige or finds an external 
scapegoat for domestic failure.56 
Alastair Johnston argues that foreign policy successes can have a stronger legitimating 
effect than wealth or economic issues. However, an action needs to be visible in order to 
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have a positive impact on legitimacy, and he claims that foreign policy successes are often 
more observable than the gradual and slow accumulation of wealth.57 Johnston focuses on 
the interaction between foreign policy and identity, and sees this combination as central to 
legitimation because foreign policy is a collected ‘discourse of danger’ that is politically, 
socially and cognitively essential to identity creation.58 This can be facilitated through 
positive processes such as reaffirming the values of the nation or invoking pride and self-
esteem of being a member of a highly regarded actor in the international system. Also 
negative processes are possible, such as invoking disdain, distrust and competition with the 
‘other’ by discounting the other or producing enemies.59 Therefore, he argues that when 
state elites come to believe their legitimacy is declining or under challenge, they resort to 
identity-enhancing strategies which in turn impact foreign policy.60 
Marianne Kneuer proposes two theories as to why foreign policy can have a strategic 
relevance for legitimation. She wrote: 
On the one hand, foreign policy is part of the output dimension, whereby outward-oriented 
political action can be symbolic, declaratory, or concrete. Moreover, foreign policy reinforces 
domestic economic or security aspects. On the other hand, foreign policy action impacts the 
third dimension of legitimacy: the “we-identity” and sense of belonging. This dimension is 
particularly relevant if participation and interest aggregation are partially or completely lacking. 
Therefore, authoritarian governments often revert to connecting directly to the public by 
appealing to national identity or by using the “national” interest argument, what Brooker calls 
the patriotic claim. […] Moreover, the “national identity/national interest” argument stimulates 
a certain degree of responsiveness as the government declares that it will act according to the 
assumed homogenous interests of the citizens.61 
Her research postulates three patterns or modes of seeking legitimacy through foreign 
policy, all of them having an identity dimension: the approach of maximum possible 
independency (‘proudly alone’), the approach of maximum possible integration (‘part of the 
game’), and the approach of ‘diversionary action’.62 Similar to Johnston, she claims that 
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national identity or national pride and the feeling of ‘grandeur’ or ‘international weight’ 
constitute an effective strategy for the establishment of internal cohesion.63 
According to Ilya Prizel, ‘all countries frequently use national identity to articulate their 
foreign policies and in turn, rely on foreign policy as a foundation of their legitimacy.’64 
National identity embodies the relations between the state and the others and thus includes 
concepts as threat, inferiority or superiority.65 This sensitises national interests that are 
translated into concrete actions for the foreign policy. For example, the Thatcher 
administration sought to preserve British integrity by blocking deeper European 
integration.66 At the same time foreign policy can also be studied as an identity-producing 
practice because it serves as a major means in the process of self-definition.67 Alla 
Kassianova asserts that ‘foreign policy provides a channel for engagement with the external 
environment, supplies evidence of the outside world’s perception and appraisal of the 
collectivity, and functions as an instrument for realisation of the self-image through 
objectives determined by interests, and as a way of testing its adequacy.’68 In other words, it 
is part of the process of differentiating the ‘self’ against the ‘others’. 
However, the link between the national identity and interests is not specific for foreign 
policy, but also applies to most other policy areas. In a democracy, holding and exercising 
power are considered legitimate when they comply with the individual and collective 
interests of the people being governed. Identity is core to such common belief and common 
interests,69 and therefore seen as a precondition or metacondition for legitimising a 
regime.70 Indeed, citizens will more easily acknowledge the authority of the state and accept 
certain legislation or pay taxes if they believe this is to the benefit of the nation.71 Some 
scholars have debated the indirect link between identity and legitimacy with concrete case 
studies.72 
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For the specific case of Georgia, Kornely Kakachia has argued that the country’s foreign 
policy is strongly identity driven73 and Kirill Reznikov has complained that the 
‘Europeanness’ has been used to build up a large geopolitical game against Russia.74 In this 
context, Walt’s claim that ideology is a source of legitimacy should also be included in the 
debate.75 Manuel Castells explored the concept of a ‘legitimizing identity’, which is 
‘introduced by the dominant institutions of society to extend and rationalize their 
domination vis à vis social actors, a theme that is at the heart of Sennett’s theory of 
authority and domination, but also fits with various theories of nationalism.’76 Significantly, 
national identity is an elite-led construction and this identity can have a legitimating effect 
on exactly the same elite. This implies that the elite itself can to a certain extent create its 
own legitimacy through identity construction. 
 
The influence of international legitimacy on domestic legitimacy 
As domestic legitimacy and international legitimacy have their own peculiarities, a 
differentiation should be made between internal and external legitimation processes. 
Nevertheless, there is a clear link between them and both have an influence on each other. 
Vibrant debate exists among scholars and politicians, who have argued that an 
administration must be viewed as legitimate by other governments.77 Klemens von 
Metternich argued that great powers could and should decide whether or not the ruler of 
any country is legitimate regardless of the majority in that nation.78 Surveying contemporary 
world politics, one can easily see this view is still popular. In February 2011 US Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton declared that Libyan President Muammar Gadhafi had ‘lost the 
legitimacy to rule’.79 Furthermore, soon after she also proclaimed to the international 
community that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had ‘lost legitimacy.’80 Whereas the US 
government may consider that these leaders are internationally no longer legitimate and 
use this to justify a possible military intervention, it has no authority to judge the domestic 
legitimacy as it is neither dominant nor subordinate in the domestic power relationship. 
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Still, whereas the population of Libya and Syria themselves should form their own opinion 
regarding the manner in which their leaders exercise power, they may be influenced by 
statements from sources external to the society, i.e. some may consider their leadership no 
longer legitimate because the US government said so and not because they do not justify 
the way power is exercised. Indeed, the loss of US confidence was interpreted as 
international approval for the delegitimation of these leaders and opened the way for 
publicly opposing rule in those countries. One could argue that also the opposite scenario is 
possible, i.e. if the international community acknowledges an administration as legitimate, 
such a position may have an influence on the domestic perception of legitimacy. Thus, it is 
in the interest of a country’s leadership to be seen as legitimate by the international 
community and implement a foreign policy aimed at achieving this. 
Not only holding legitimate power, but exercising power may be subject to external 
pressure. External actors can promote or demand certain reforms through the provision of 
funds and other channels of influence. The imposed conditionality may imply that the 
government of a sovereign state is for certain issues in the first place accountable to the 
foreign actors instead of to its own population. This can, for example, be the case with 
development programmes where conditionalities are imposed to disburse budget support. 
In the worst case, these conditions may actually not coincide with the priorities envisaged 
by the population. Some prescribe such discrepancies to economic or geopolitical interests 
by the donors of the international community, as well as ambitions to gain international 
credit by creating an image of generosity and compassion.81 External pressure may create a 
dilemma for the government which has to choose between following recommendations 
from outside – with a risk of a declining domestic legitimation – or act in accordance to 
popular wishes. Nevertheless, one may argue that the influence of external actors on the 
functioning of the government of a sovereign state is nevertheless rather limited.82 
In this context, it is useful to examine the implications of Europeanisation on domestic 
political legitimacy. According to Wade Jacoby, external actors such as the EU can provide 
financial means and political support to support reforms which may be difficult to accept for 
opposition or population.83 Similarly, Tanja Börzel and Yasemin Pamuk demonstrate with 
the example of the South Caucasian republics that domestic actors can instrumentalise EU 
policies and institutions to advance their own interests decoupling them from their 
normative content, i.e. bolstering their power.84 They give the example of the successful 
strategies of the leaderships of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to selectively adopt anti-
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corruption measures resulting in a stabilisation rather than a transformation of bad 
governance.85 
 
External actors as a blame-taker or scapegoat for domestic challenges 
Machiavelli maintained that ‘princes should delegate to others the enactment of unpopular 
measures and keep in their own hands the distribution of favors.’86 Indeed, unpopular 
measures can have a major impact on the legitimacy of the leadership. By explaining that a 
specific reform has been imposed, the unpopular measure may be interpreted as legitimate 
and not affect the popularity of the government in a negative way. This fits one of the three 
approaches in ‘blame management’ as described by Christopher Hood: impression 
management (selection of arguments to minimize or avoid blame), policy strategies 
(selection of policy positions to minimize or avoid blame), and agency strategies (selection 
of institutional arrangements to minimize or avoid blame, i.e. blame-shifting).87 
A number of scholars have scrutinised the role of supranational actors in blame-shifting, 
which is often made possible as these agents ‘lack both the capacity and the interest to shift 
it back’.88 An example that merits scrutiny, and that is relevant in this context is how 
domestic politics in EU member states or candidate countries have used the EU as a 
scapegoat or blame taker for failures and unpopular decisions towards certain societal 
groups.89 One can generalise two types of scenarios for invoking ‘Brussels’. In a first 
category, there is no disagreement but an incorrectly assumed tension between the 
preferences of the Member State government and the intentions of the European 
Commission. Although the specific action would most likely be carried out anyway, referring 
to the EU may cut the political cost for securing the specific outcome. This was the case with 
the reduction of the shipbuilding industry in the Sunderland yards in the UK under Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher or with the difficulties related to state aid to the Spanish air 
carrier Iberia in 1995.90 In a second category, member states may be subject to pressure 
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from the European Commission and non-compliance may lead to negative consequences for 
the country. The nature of annual state budgets serves as an appropriate example meriting 
deeper scrutiny. Whereas a national government may not favor cutting down its public 
spending, it may be forced to do so by the European Commission. However, in reality, it is 
not always clear to what extent the preferences of the national government really collide 
with those of the European Commission. Furthermore, one should not forget that the 
Commission cannot just impose its will or antagonize the member states, as it could itself 
easily by ‘punished’ in other integration areas.91 
Thus, the literature so far has primarily focused on the EU as a blame taker in EU 
member or candidate states, but not in other countries. Still, as part of its external action 
and development assistance, the EU may push forward certain policy reforms in third 
countries, which may not always be popular with the opposition or the population at large. 
 
Euro-Atlantic discourse as a legitimacy management strategy 
In addition to the vast array of literature dissecting the concept of legitimacy, political 
scientists mainly commence their analysis from the political-philosophical angle and as a 
result, they are limited in their theoretical thinking to the mechanisms used in legitimacy 
management strategies and thus do not look at how this process really works in practice. 
However, it is not the mere existence of a Euro-Atlantic orientation or a feeling of 
Europeanness that creates legitimacy. The population needs to be both aware of this and be 
amenable to it. For example, concrete achievements and successes can only have a 
legitimating effect when the population at large is conscious of them and sees them as 
favourable.92 Although some people may personally see or experience such successes, most 
often the majority of people will learn about them through discourse. A number of scholars 
have examined the role of language on legitimacy, but have investigated the phenomonen 
in great depth. Habermas claimed that 'language is also a medium of domination and social 
force. It serves to legitimize relations of organized power.'93 Similarly, Herman and Chomsky 
contended that 'one major function of dominant discourse is precisely to manufacture such 
consensus, acceptance and legitimacy of dominance.'94 Other scholars who have looked at 
the link between discourse and power/legitimacy include Michel Faucoult,95 Pierre 
Bourdieu, 96 and John Langshaw Austin.97 
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For this reason, Critical Discourse Analysis, which 'focuses on the discursive strategies 
that legitimate control,'98 provides the right approach for this research. Some critical 
discourse analysts have even looked very specifically at the discursive aspect of legitimation. 
(See for example Teun van Dijk, who dedicated eight pages to this in his book 'Ideology: a 
multidisciplinary approach.') 
In this regard, it is also useful to adopt the instrumentalist theory in identity studies. 
According to instrumentalism, the social construction of identity is not an aim on its own. 
Instead, it is more about the 'conscious manipulation of culture and kinship by the elites in 
their attempt to seek political gain.'99 Wendt explained that identity is 'a property of 
intentional actors that generates motivational and behavioural dispositions.'100 This is 
especially the case with ethnic and national identities, which are frequently invoked by 
elites in their political and social struggles.101 
 
SMALL STATES’ FOREIGN POLICY 
Small states have been studied since the early nineteenth century in Europe, especially by 
German-speaking scholars. Greater attention, particularly in the US, was given by Annette 
Baker Fox’s study, ‘The power of small states: diplomacy in World War II in 1959’. Numerous 
publications appeared in the 1960-70s and after a short period of lesser attention in the 
1980s, it again became a popular research topic as new small states appeared following the 
end of the Cold War.102 
 
Defining ‘small states’ 
A large segment of the literature on small states, mainly from the 1960-70s, has 
concentrated on definition, but no consensus has been reached and several scholars 
consider it a ‘loosely defined concept’.103 Although some have, as a result, doubted the 
usefulness of the analytical concept of small states,104 most still see a strong enough 
rationale to study them. Different quantitative and qualitative criteria have been used to 
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define small states, frequently subdividing them into micro-states, mini-territories and small 
islands. Moreover, the words ‘small’ and ‘weak’ are used interchangeably in this context. 
However, ‘small’ is an adjective describing (physical) size and does not indicate the capacity 
of a country to pursue its policies, which is better described by the adjective ‘weak’.105 Still, 
there are certain links between the two concepts, as small states often possess limited 
resources and thus have a reduced capacity in terms of funding diplomatic missions or 
developing up a sizable military. 
One strand of scholars has focused on state size and has used the state’s population as 
its principal criteria, employing a variety of cut-off points ranging from 1 to 15 million 
inhabitants.106 The advantage posed by this approach is that data is readily available, the 
dividing line between small and larger states can easily be set, and population size is said to 
correlate to other indicators of state size.107 However, others apply an ‘expanded concept of 
size’108 and in addition use other parameters, such as land area, economy, or military power, 
sometimes as a single dimension and sometimes in combination with others.109 
Others look beyond physical attributes and capabilities, but link it with the concept of 
power,110 which allows for a stronger empirical observation as its basis. As certain small 
states may display influence in the international system disproportionate to their physical 
size,111 they argue that ‘strength’ and in particular ‘relational strength’ (i.e. Percy Selwyn 
argued that states are large or small in relation to other states with which they have 
dealings)112 is a more relevant criteria and therefore equate ‘weak states’ to ‘small states’. 
Thus, Robert Rothstein categorised small powers as those who ‘feel that they are potentially 
or actually threatened by the policies of the Great Powers’113 and Vilnis Sveics similarly saw 
them as states which have their security threatened by a militarily more powerful great(er) 
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power.114 According to Robert Keohane, small states are those that cannot affect the 
international system.115 Some authors have gone further and defined small states based on 
the group-specific behavior.116 However, it is difficult to distinguish a behavior which is 
specific to small states and especially to link this behavior to their smallness. 
Finally, perception (i.e. a state is perceived and recognised to be a small state) and self-
perception have been suggested to define ‘smallness’,117 or that at least a psychological 
dimension should complement the objective criteria.118 Citing Jeanne Hey, ‘I know one 
when I see it.’119 However, focusing on a perception allows political motivations to shape 
the concept of the small state.120 
 
Foreign policy behaviour of small states 
Study on behavior of small states, particularly since the 1960s, has focused on foreign 
policy.121 The main characteristic of small states’ foreign policy, especially if one uses 
‘weakness’ as the main defining criterion of smallness, is the defensive ‘mindset’ and the 
focus on survival.122 Omer de Raeymaeker claimed that it aims at ‘withstanding pressure 
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from the great powers, at safeguarding their territorial integrity and independence, and at 
insuring the continued adhesion to national values and ideals’ because small powers ‘thirst 
for security’.123 However, the relative physical size and weakness of states should not only 
be interpreted solely from a security perspective, as ‘the most direct attraction that stronger 
states hold for the weaker is probably in response to trade and economic needs.’124 The 
current financial crisis has served to highlight the economic vulnerability of small states,125 
and the EBRD openly declared in 2010 that Georgia completely depended on funds 
allocated by international donors.126 
One option for the small state is to remain neutral or non-aligned. Sometimes there is 
no need to formally join an alliance or regional grouping, e.g. Norway and Iceland are not 
members of the EU but they ‘cherry-pick’ useful security benefits without having to pay the 
costs of full membership.127 However, this does not necessarily provide a security guarantee 
and history has shown that the neutrality or non-alignment of certain states has not always 
been respected. 
A second option is to align with one or more other states by entering into a strategic 
alliance. The literature distinguishes two types of alliances: bandwagoning and balancing. 
Walt defines balancing as allying with others against the prevailing threat and 
bandwagoning as aligning with the source of danger.128 Depending on the constellation, the 
small state may play an active role within the alliance or take on the role of a client under 
the protection of a stronger patron. According to Hans Morgenthau, alliances are ‘the 
historically most important manifestation of the balance of power.’129 Such balance of 
power would mean that there is an equilibrium on the international level with no country 
being able to dominate or threaten the fundamental interests of another. Stephen Walt did 
not agree with this view and interpreted alliances as a result of the ‘balance of threat’, 
especially for small states, which in general are ‘indifferent to the global balance of 
power.’130 He claimed that in order to avoid being dominated by those who can, it is safer to 
join with those who cannot readily dominate their allies.131 George Liska agreed that 
superior power does not attract, because the weaker state naturally fears that its identity 
might be abridged.132 
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It may be a bit too simplistic to evaluate alliance formation purely in terms of balance of 
power or balance of threat, as other considerations may also contribute. Alliances can also 
be the result of shared political, cultural or other traits.133 There are different explanations 
for the hypothesis of ‘ideological solidarity’ (to use Morgenthau’s term). It can be seen as a 
way of defending one’s own political principles, states may fear less to be dominated or 
attacked by other states with similar traits, alignment with similar states can increase 
domestic legitimacy, or ideology may even prescribe the alignment.134 The literature on 
alliances does not seem to question the honesty of the different partners in an alliance. It 
does not consider the possibility of a 'camouflage'-strategy where a country's leadership 
only pretends to adhere to certain policy principles of an allied patron.135 
No alliance is everlasting, and especially small states are ‘prone to switch allies, if their 
survival is threatened.’136 The availability of other patrons with equal opportunities for 
support and protection can lead to mobility between alternate patrons,137 and as a result 
smaller and weaker states may seek their advantages in the rivalries among great powers.138 
Also regime change can lead to a change in alliance relationships. Therefore, alliances may 
be reluctant to accept a country that seems unreliable, e.g. due to a lack of democracy.139 
Although the literature mentions joining international organisations as a third option of 
foreign policy behavior of small states since the creation of the UN after the end of the 
Second World War, it is difficult to fully distinguish it from alliances. For example, Alyson 
Bailes and Baldur Thorhallsson classify NATO and EU both as ‘institutions’ and ‘regional 
groupings’.140 
 
Luring the Euro-Atlantic community into support and patronage 
Scholars have developed a plethora of theories to examining the formulation of foreign 
policy orientation of small states. A sizable contingent only looks at the formulation and not 
at the implementation of the foreign policy orientation. Nevertheless, when a small state 
decides its independence and economic prosperity will be best guaranteed by joining an 
alliance or seeking patronage from a greater power, there are no guarantees it will achieve 
this goal. As a result, the smaller state must find a way to induce its larger partner to 
commit to the alliance. 
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A number of authors have argued that environment and external aspects are more 
significant than domestic and internal factors or skilful behavior,141 but others have 
challenged this view.142 Whereas this primacy of external dynamics may indeed be true, it 
does not mean that small states are, or should be passive. On the contrary, they can lure the 
patron into providing support. For example, as Marshall Singer noted, some small states 
exploit their importance to other countries through their ‘attractive power’ and accordingly 
enhance their foreign policy success.143 Moreover, Alan Chong highlighted the significance 
of compensatory informational and symbolic power, consisting of intellectual and 
propagandistic skills among the human resources of the foreign policy apparatus that are 
disproportionate to the physical size of the state.144 He saw attempting to enlarge their 
importance to the international community as part of the art of survival for small states.145 
Stephen Walt is one of the few scholars who investigated this aspect of small state 
behavior in greater detail. He unpacked the concept of ‘political penetration’ which he 
coined as the covert and indirect manipulation of one states’ political system by another,146 
an idea which had been raised by James Rosenau already.147 Walt scrutinised the different 
forms of lobbying and propaganda employed to manipulate foreign governments148 and 
emphasised the importance of showing action translating the own preferences in terms of 
interests of alliance members or possible patrons.149 He believed such behavior could 
preserve or enhance an existing alliance, but rarely create one.150 Michael Handel also cited 
this political penetration, but raised other options for the weak state as well.151 For 
example, when great powers have given verbally ambiguous commitments but not 
formalized this, the weak state will unilaterally clarify such commitments in such a way as to 
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favor its own interests. Handel argues that great powers can only do very little about this, 
and as result usually do not react.152 A third option is by inducing the greater power to 
station troops and maintain bases on its territory, with the intention to have the troops of 
the greater power to act as a ‘trip wire’.153 Finally, weak states can seek a greater 
commitment from the stronger state by creating a reputation as a ‘bastion of democracy’ or 
a staunch resister of aggression.154 Similarly, Bailes and Thorhallsson highlighted additional 
support options for small states, such as projecting an image of harmlessness and 
helpfulness, signaling loyalty to actual or potential protector states, conveying loyalty and 
belonging or the aspiration to belong to a regional or functional grouping (e.g. EU or NATO), 
making common causes with other small states on a shared issue.155 
Although critical discourse analysts may not often have applied their approach to the 
field of international relations, there is undoubtedly a basis that can be successfully 
employed. CDA surveys the relationship between discourse and power, which is not only a 
matter of sociology or political science, but also applicable in the international arena. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, Criticial Discourse Analysis is not a method but 
rather an approach to research by employing a range of theories and methods in a 
transdisciplinary manner. As Teun van Dijk explained: 'CDA does not provide a ready-made, 
how-to-do approach to social analysis, but emphasizes that for each study a thorough 
theoretical analysis of a social issue must be made, so as to be able to select which 
discourse and social structures to analyse and to relate.'156 Thus, as CDA possesses a variety 
of subdisciplines with each respective sector having its own theories and methods, there is 
no universal method (both in terms of data collection and analysis) to be applied. Instead, 
the method depends on the object and target of the enquiry, i.e. the method should be 
problem-oriented.157 Despite there being no standard method, the research of other 
scholars can generate a plethora of valuable ideas. For example, as the research focus of 
Ruth Wodak and Teun van Dijk is complimentary to this research, relevant methods and 
other useful elements can be applied. 
Ruth Wodak has argued that the approach in CDA should be abductive, i.e. 'a constant 
movement back and forth between theory and empirical data is necessary.'158 Thus, an 
iterative research process was applied in order to foster a dialogue between theoretical 
thinking in the field of comparative politics / International Relations and the specific data 
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gathered for the purpose of this research. Furthermore, the different stages of the research 
process should not be seen as completely separate phases which require one to be finalized 
before the next can take place. Just as is the case with Grounded Theory, CDA does not 
require data collection to be completely finished before the analysis can start.159 On the 
contrary, based on the analysis of the initial data gathering, indicators are found for 
particular concepts which can be expanded into categories and can provide the basis for 
some more detailed and advanced data collection.160 
According to Jaeger, the first step is to locate the object to be investigated.161 All too 
often this may seem very obvious and therefore not receive enough attention, but lead to a 
very narrow view. In the case of this research, Euro-Atlantic discourse should not only 
review the use of the words 'Europe' or 'Euro-Atlantic', but also the use of 'EU', 'NATO', 
'OSCE', 'Council of Europe' merits suitable analysis. 
Prior to the data gathering element of this project, the collective literature of Georgia’s 
foreign policy, historical relations with Europe, Georgian identity, and dynamics in Georgian 
domestic politics with regards to the Euro-Atlantic orientation (including general trends of 
Euro-Atlantic discourse before 2003) was surveyed. The aim was to accomplish a rigorous 
understanding of the topic and to frame the research question within the debate. 
Consequently, the second and third chapter of this dissertation do not analyse discourse as 
such, but rather form the basis for examining the discourse specific aspects of the following 
two chapters and are mainly based on a literature review and process tracing, combined 
with some quantitative methods to gain an understanding of public opinion. This assertion 
compliments Wodak's view that the historical context always needs to be analysed and 
integrated into the interpretation of discourses.162 Wodak advocates for integrating 
background information, such as the social and political fields in which the discourse is 
embedded,163 and van Dijk similarly argues that the text needs to be seen in its context,164 
as the latter constrain the properties of text and talk.165  
In most cases where CDA is used, the data collection is noticeably limited because it 
normally only explains a phenomenon in a specific context.166 This research intends to show 
that there is a strategy, i.e. a systematic nature to the use of Euro-Atlantic discourse for 
specific purposes. Therefore, a large pool of data is a prerequisite to effectively demonstrate 
this. Thus, during the empirical research, predominately qualitative data was collected. As 
the focus of the study is to analyze the role of Euro-Atlantic discourse, the main data 
consists of speeches, as well as interviews and other articles in the media. Domestic news 
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sources from the period November 2003 to November 2012 in the Georgian (and to a more 
limited extent foreign) printed and electronic media were surveyed. Here the daily news 
summary compiled by the EU Delegation to Georgia (with distribution not restricted to 
European institutions and using only open sources) provided a wealth of information, which 
was cross-referenced against the original sources as much as possible (i.e. all news items in 
the printed and electronic press were checked.) Data were categorised in order to break 
down the volume into an overseeable number of subgroups, which facilitated the analysis. 
For example, the hundreds of examples of Euro-Atlantic discourse having a legitimating 
effect were grouped according to commonalities, which then formed the basis to observe 
specific trends and patterns. 
Wodak argues that fieldwork and ethnography should be incorporated before further 
analysis and theorising are possible.167 In line with this view, more than twenty semi-
structured elite and expert interviews were carried out in Tbilisi when most printed and 
digital data had been collected, and as its analysis had to a large extent materialized already. 
These interviews generated original insights with regards to the question of the Georgian 
identity, helping to frame the research, filling factual gaps and offering leads to interesting 
cases where the instrumentalisation for legitimacy purposes was very clear. Moreover, the 
interviews served as a sounding board and reality check to secure feedback on the 
preliminary conclusions from in-country experts and stakeholders, but did not provide many 
new insights. The interlocutors were former and incumbent government officials as well as 
leading researchers in the country, including former President Eduard Shevardnadze. All 
discussions were cordial and professional, with most interviewees being interested in the 
topic and proactively offering their viewpoint. One exception, however, was former Minister 
Bendukidze, whose rude and vulgar language gave an extra emotional touch to his personal 
views and ideology. Documentation of all interviews has been retained. Finally, a variety of 
statistical data was sourced in order to assess public opinion towards and the interpretation 
of Europe and Europeanness. During the entire process, a research assistant in Tbilisi helped 
finding and translating sources in Georgian and setting up interviews. His role was limited to 
facilitating data gathering, and he did not play an active role in the analysis. 
The analysis of data for providing arguments for the two hypotheses (i.e. more 
specifically chapters four and five) interprets the discourse at the micro, meso and macro 
level. It therefore does not only examine linguistic aspects but also focuses on how power 
relations are enforced through the production and consumption of text and on their relation 
with wider trends within society. For the discursive analysis on the textual level, the work of 
van Dijk was most beneficial, and encouraged the search for comparisons, generalisations, 
euphemism, hyperboles, etc. In this regard, it is important to understand that CDA is a 
process, ‘in flux’ and can never be complete, because from purely a linguistic perspective, 
there are numerous dimensions and types of structure of discourse and going through all of 
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them would not be feasible.168 Thus, only those linguistic aspects that are relevant for the 
object being studied were employed. For example, the paraverbal, phonological, syntactic, 
semantic aspects of the discourse were not considered. 
An advanced draft was shared with a number of scholars specialising on Georgia. Their 
comments helped to fine-tune some of the arguments. The final stage was a linguistic check 
by a native English speaker. 
 
LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
Despite the capacity to gather an overwhelming amount of insightful and relevant data 
through literature, press overviews, speeches and interviews in English, Russian, German 
and French, there still exists a margin for overlooking some sources, especially those in 
Georgian. This may have offered additional insights on the question of the location of the 
self-identity, but would most likely only have a limited impact on the hypotheses. They 
might, however, have helped in identifying more of the code-switching of Euro Atlantic 
discourse domestically and internationally, which would be an even stronger indication of 
the instrumentalisation of the Euro-Atlantic discourse. Furthermore, Critical Discourse 
Analysis is heavily reliant on linguistic means and its theoretical and methodological basis 
has mainly been fashioned by linguists. They have argued that linguistic expertise is a 
prerequisite for the successful employment of CDA.169 Thus, not having a linguistic 
background may indeed be a disadvantage, but at the same time one could argue that also 
expertise in the social sciences is required, which most linguist may not have either. 
The focus of this research project has already been outlined, but it would also be 
worthwhile explaining what this dissertation is not about. First of all, the aim of the research 
is not to criticize Georgia's Europeanness, but rather to argument its constructivist 
character. It also does not judge the Saakashvili government or its instrumentalisation and 
manipulation of Euro-Atlantic discourse, but only seeks to use the Georgian case as a clear 
example of a phenomenon which can be observed in other countries as well. Secondly, 
although the next chapter examines the evolution of relations between Georgia and the 
Euro-Atlantic Community, this dissertation does not provide a historical account of events or 
instruments for cooperation between Georgia and the Euro-Atlantic structures. It also does 
not analyse the success of the Europeanization process or the prospects for membership to 
the EU or NATO. Further, this research topic has solely been approached from a Georgian 
perspective and, with few exceptions, a survey of the attitude or reaction of the Euro-
Atlantic community is not addressed. This is mainly because the Euro-Atlantic institutions 
have remained markedly passive with regards to the instrumentalisation of this discourse. 
Moreover, because of the professional relationship with the European Commission the 
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authors’ views may not be perceived as neutral. Finally, whereas the instrumentalisation of 
the Euro-Atlantic discourse for reshaping the identity and for seeking domestic legitimacy 
and foreign patronage are assessed, the effectiveness or efficiency of these strategies is not 
measured. 
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CHAPTER II – GEORGIA AND ITS EURO-ATLANTIC 
ORIENTATION 
 
GEORGIA – A SMALL COUNTRY IN A HOSTILE REGION 
Georgia, with its 69,700 km2, is one of the three countries in the Caucasus region that 
regained independence with the collapse of the Soviet Union – the other two being 
Azerbaijan and Armenia. Throughout history the region has been wedged between regional 
superpowers and is still surrounded by the successor states of three former empires: Russia, 
Turkey, and Iran. The Caucasus is located between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, 
therewith constituting the bridge between Europe and Asia (East-West link) and between 
Russia and the Middle East (North-South link). As a result, for at least two millennia it played 
a central role for important trade routes, such as the famous Silk Road. After the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the end of isolation, this potential has been rediscovered and now the 
region is at the heart of transport corridors and pipeline politics. 
 
Map 1 – Georgia, its territorial divisions, and its neighbors 
In terms of geography, climate, vegetation and bio-diversity, there is an enormous 
variety in the Caucasus which is hardly surpassed in any other part of the world within such 
a small territory. The region is also known for its ethno-linguistic mosaic. Although Georgia 
cannot compete with neighbouring Dagestan, which counts no less than 28 indigenous 
ethnic groups, the country is still home to a wide array of different ethnic backgrounds. 
According to the General Population Census of 2002, the composition was 80% Georgian, 
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6% Armenian, 6% Azeri, 2% Abkhaz, 2% Russian, 2% Ossetian and 2% other minorities.170 
With the exception of the Muslim Azeris and part of the Ajarians, the Apostolic Armenians 
and some other religious minorities, the bulk of the country’s population professes Georgian 
Orthodox Christianity. Whereas most anthropologists until a century ago considered the 
different regional groups (e.g. Imeretian, Gurian, Kartlian, Kakhetian or Ajarian) as distinct 
ethnicities, there is now general agreement that they are all Georgian as they only have 
regional but mutually intelligible dialects. Also the Mingrelians and Svanetians with their 
own distinct languages are considered and consider themselves to be a constituent part of 
the Georgian nation. Georgian, which is claimed by some to have existed in written form 
since the third century BCE, belongs to the Kartvelian group of the Caucasian language family 
and bears little resemblance to other languages. Still, over the course of the centuries and 
under influence of foreign rulers and patrons, the vocabulary has been enriched with and 
influenced by idioms from Persian, Ottoman Turkish, Russian and English origin. 
The history of this new republic has been marked by major socio-economic challenges, 
secessionist problems and confrontational political rivalries. As a result of the increased 
nationalism and some negatively perceived changes with regards to the rights of ethnic 
minorities, bloody secessionist wars erupted in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia, the first president, came to power in November 1990 thanks to his 
nationalist rhetoric but was unable to gather international recognition for Georgian 
independence or to get popular support for certain reforms that were interpreted as anti-
democratic. After a two-week civil war, Gamsakhurdia was ousted in January 1992. Eduard 
Shevardnadze, having garnered impressive international experience and credibility as Soviet 
Minister of Foreign Affairs under Gorbachev, returned to his native Georgia to become the 
new head of state. Although he pacified the country by ending the violence of the two 
secessionist wars and a Zviadist uprising,171 he was not able to bring a mutually acceptable 
solution to the conflicts. He was equally unsuccessful in bringing the Autonomous Republic 
of Ajara, the local fiefdom of Aslan Abashidze, under central republican control. As in other 
former Soviet republics, economic decline was devastating, poverty increased, energy 
sufficiency was permanently challenged, and corruption turned rampant across all levels of 
society. Although foreign assistance was directed towards supporting reforms and 
development, the amounts were very modest in comparison to the needs and especially 
when judged against current financial support. Public dissatisfaction rose as Shevardnadze 
was unable or unwilling to end the corrupt practices of his entourage. Following rigged 
parliamentary elections in November 2003, this discontent culminated into street protests 
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which eventually toppled the Shevardnadze regime in the ‘Rose Revolution’. A triumvirate 
of politicians, who had learned their political skills under Shevardnadze, assumed the 
leadership of the country: Mikheil Saakashvili was elected President, Nino Burjanadze 
became Parliamentary Speaker, and Zurab Zhvania assumed the newly created post of 
Prime Minister.172 The initial success of their far-reaching reforms, including a near-
complete eradication of petty corruption and the creation of a completely new police force, 
were possible thanks to both the domestic political will and an unprecedented amount of 
foreign assistance. These reforms surpassed the expectations of most analysts and 
population. However, with time, popular dissatisfaction towards the neo-liberal and 
libertarian reforms and the 'know-it-all' attitude of the leadership grew, and several sacked 
government officials embarked on a mission to establish their own political parties, with the 
aim of criticising and competing with the ruling elite.173 None of these nascent parties were 
successful in garnering substantial popular support, until Bidzina Ivanishvili was able to unite 
most of them. They staged numerous street protests and demonstrations and the 
subsequent violent crack-down of such protests in 2007 and 2011 angered the population at 
large, and created fertile ground for the opposition to expand its base. 
 
HISTORY OF GEORGIA’S EUROPEAN ORIENTATION BEFORE THE 1991 INDEPENDENCE 
To gain a sufficiently deep understanding of the current Euro-Atlantic orientation and 
discourse, it should to be framed within a wider historical context. Extensive research on 
Georgia’s historical relations with Europe has been carried about by several scholars.174 
 
Links between Georgia and Europe in antiquity and Middle Ages 
As early as the sixth century BCE, permanent Greek settlements appeared on the eastern 
Black Sea shores. Their presence focused on trade and only much later political and cultural 
ideas were incorporated as well. The early Kingdoms of Kolkhis (western Georgian) and 
Kartli (eastern Georgia) were initially vassals to the Persian Achaemenids. They became 
                                                      
172 Under Shevardnadze rule, Mikheil Saakashvili was a Member of Parliament for the Citizens Union of Georgia 
(1995-2000), Chairman of the Committee for Constitutional and Legal Affairs and the Law (1995-1998), 
Chairman of the Citizen’s Union parliamentary group (1998-1999), and Minister of Justice (2000-2001); Nino 
Burjanadze was a Member of Parliament for the Citizens Union of Georgia (1995-2002) as well as 
Parliamentary Chairperson (2001-2003); and Zurab Zhvania was a Member of Parliament for the Citizens Union 
of Georgia (1992-2001) and Parliamentary Chairperson (1995-2001). 
173 The main examples are Georgia’s Way (created by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Salome Zourabichvili), 
the Democratic Movement – United Georgia (created by former parliamentary chairperson Nino Burjanadze), 
the Movement for United Georgia (created by former Minister of Defense Irakli Okruashvili and later joined by 
former Ombudsman Sozar Subari), the Movement for Fair Georgia (created by former Prime Minister Zurab 
Noghaideli), or Our Georgia – Free Democrats (created by former Chairman of the Government in exile of 
Abkhazia and Ambassador to the UN Irakli Alasania). 
174 See for example Dzhuansher Vateishvili, Gruziya i evropeyskie strany: ocherki istorii vzaimootnosheniy XIII-
XIX veka (RAN: Institut Vseobshey Istorii, 2003) and Adrian Brisku, “Albanian and Georgian Discourses on 
Europe: From Berlin 1878 to Tbilisi 2008” (PhD diss., Florence: European University Institute, 2009). 
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independent at the end of the fifth century and retained a high degree of relative 
independence until they were overrun by Roman General Pompey in 65 BCE. Kolkhis heavily 
depended politically on Rome but was never formally a Roman province. The Kartlian rulers 
entered at times into a military union with Rome and at other moments openly opposed it. 
The Georgians gradually adopted Christianity in the first centuries AD and this religion 
started to play a major role in the formation of alliances. Lazika, the successor state of 
Kolkhis, turned into a vassal of the Byzantine Empire and acted as a buffer against the 
Sassanid Persians. Kartli became a Sassanid vassal, but when Zoroastrianism was spreading 
and imposed upon them, its rulers looked for support from Christian Byzantium, with whom 
they already shared trade relations. Kartli was conquered by the Arabs in 645, but regained 
independence in 830 with support from the Byzantine Empire. Gradually, a process of 
uniting the Georgian lands took place and was completed in 1008. The country expanded its 
territory, repelled Seljuk attacks, became fully independent from Byzantium, and flourished 
during a golden age. At a time when Latin Christian monarchies were forging alliances 
through marriages, the Georgian Bagrationi dynasty engaged with the rulers of the Kievan 
Rus, Suzdal, Byzantium, Alania and later even the (Muslim) Rum Sultanate in a similar 
manner.175 Furthermore, a number of Georgians held high positions within the Byzantine 
administration, army and society.176 This golden age ended abruptly with the Mongol 
invasions in 1220. In the aftermath of these events, the country split into several kingdoms 
and principalities under Ottoman (Abkhazia, Imereti, Samegrelo, Guria, and Svaneti in the 
west) and Persian (Kartli and Kakheti in the east) control. 
The pope and his allies not only feared the expansion of the Muslim Turks, but also 
dismissed Byzantium and the Orthodox Christian Church. The Byzantine Emperor was 
nominally an ally of Latin Europe in countering the Muslim threat, but simultaneously had 
territorial aspirations extending as far as the Adriatic Sea region. Regardless of these 
conflicted Latin-Byzantine relations, contacts existed between Georgia and the Latin 
Christian states, especially in the field of trade.177 There also exists notable evidence of 
correspondence between the Catholic pope and the Orthodox Georgian kings and queens, 
                                                      
175 For example, Mariam, the aunt of David IV ‘Aghmashenebeli’ (popularly seen as the greatest and most 
successful ruler in Georgian history) was queen of Byzantium; the daughter of Giorgi VIII was betrothed to 
Byzantine Emperor Constantine XI but killed in the siege of Constantinople in 1453. Many other Georgian 
rulers had a wife coming from a family within the Byzantine or Trebizond leadership, e.g. Mirian III of Iberia 
(292 – 342), Vakhtang I ‘Gorgasali’ of Iberia (466 – 499; his mother was Persian), Bagrat IV of Georgia (1027 – 
1072), David IV ‘Narin’ of Georgia and later of Imereti (1245 – 1293), Demetre II of Georgia (1270 – 1289), 
Bagrat V of Georgia (1360 – 1393). Giorgi III of Georgia (1156 – 1184) married the daughter of Khuddan, King of 
Alania, while his sisters married the Sultan of Rum and the Prince of Kiev. Tamar the Great (1184 – 1213), one 
of the most famous rulers in Georgian history, was first married to a prince of Rus (Suzdal-Novgorod) and later 
to an Alan prince; her sister Rusudan was married to a son of the Byzantine Emperor. Queen Rusudan (1223-
1245), the daughter of Tamar, was married to the Seljuk prince Muhammad Mughis ud-din Turkan Shah; their 
daughter Tamar was married to the Seljuk Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Kaykhusraw II. 
176 Heinrich Gelzer cited in Vateishvili, 31. 
177 Vateishvili, 35. 
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in which the latter explain their military plans against the Turks, but did not receive the 
requested support from the Pope. 
 
A repositioning towards the Orient after the fall of Byzantium 
Byzantium was the crucial link for Georgia with the rest of the Christian world, including 
with the Christianitas or Latin Europe. Thus, when Constantinople was defeated in 1453, the 
Georgians found themselves surrounded by Muslim neighbours and lost their direct 
connection with the rest of the Christian world. For most of the following three centuries, 
the western Georgian kingdoms and principalities fell under Ottoman influence and the 
eastern ones under Safavid Persian influence. Nevertheless, trade with Europe continued at 
a smaller scale and under challenging circumstances.178 Thus, the Georgian royalty pursued 
an opportunistic yet pragmatic foreign policy. On one side, they sent letters and Embassies 
to Europe to seek military support to overthrow the Ottoman Empire and on the other side, 
the Georgian rulers also turned for support to Muslim Middle Eastern states hostile to the 
Ottoman sultan, such as the Aq Qoyunlu or the Mamluks.179 Simultaneously, intermarriages 
of Georgian royalty and nobility with the Ottoman and Persian ruling families were common 
practice and many Georgians held leading positions in the army and administration of these 
Empires. 
 
Russia as a new conduit to Europe and European ideas 
As Latin Europe did not want to extend its patronage, the rulers of the Georgian kingdoms 
and principalities intensified their contacts with the growing Orthodox Christian power in 
the north. Travel for diplomatic and religious missions and correspondence with Europe no 
longer ran through the hostile Ottoman territory, but via Russia. As early as 1587, Russian 
Tsar Fyodor I promised protection to King Aleksandre II of Kakhetia. Besides one instance of 
minor military assistance in 1592, there were few concrete benefits from these alliances. 
Gradually relations with Russia intensified through diplomatic missions180 and in 1658 
Kakhetian King Teimuraz visited Moscow. His grandson Heraclius lived in the Russian capital 
under the patronage of the Russian tsar for twenty years, and participated in military 
campaigns against European states. Imeretian King Archil and his entourage found refuge in 
Russia in the late seventeenth century. His son Aleksandre was a General Field Marshal in 
the Russian armed forces and formed part of the Grand Embassy of Peter the Great to 
                                                      
178 Ibid., 63. 
179 The Georgian rulers in the mid-fifteenth century had close ties and an agreement with Uzun Hassan, Sultan 
of the Aq Qoyunlu (a Turkic dynasty in region of modern-day Iran), to get a passage to free Jerusalem. The 
Georgian Embassy of 1460-61 to Europe even carried a letter of support of Uzun Hassan. Another Embassy 
went to Egypt in 1492 and asked for military support from Mamluk Sultan Al-Ashraf Sayf al-Din Qa'it Bay. 
180 Georgian diplomatic missions were sent to Russia in 1588-89, 1635-40, 1687, 1738-40, etc. Also Russia sent 
different Embassies to the Georgian Kings (See for example W.E.D. Allen, Russian Embassies to the Georgian 
Kings, 1589-1605. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.) 
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Western Europe (1697-98). Thus, Russia became a vehicle to Europe and a way to resist to 
Islamisation. 
In 1712, viceroy Vakhtang was to be crowned as King of Kartli by the Persian Shah under 
the condition he converted to Islam. Not willing to comply with this demand and feeling 
strongly about his Christian faith, he tried to secure the support from Russia. However, 
Russia had just lost the Russo-Ottoman War and was experiencing difficulties in the Great 
Northern War against Sweden. Thus, Vakhtang sent a diplomatic mission led by Sulkhan-
Saba Orbeliani to Europe to ask French King Louis XIV and Pope Clement XI to take Georgia 
under the patronage of the Catholic states. Orbeliani converted to Catholicism and called 
upon the Georgians to follow his example. In 1716, Orbeliani returned to Georgia with 
nothing more than the blessing from the Pope and the moral support from the French King. 
Vakhtang and an entourage of some 1200 people then migrated to Russia upon the 
invitation of Peter the Great. From then onwards, relations between Russia and the 
Georgian rulers developed at a rapid pace: more Georgians arrived, a separate Georgian 
battalion was set up in the Russian Army and cultural-academic ties expanded. As had been 
the case with previous patrons, the Georgian elite intermarried with the Russian royalty and 
noblesse, and occupied high official positions. 
A major milestone in the Russian orientation of the Georgian rulers was the Treaty of 
Georgievsk (24 July 1783) between Empress Catherine the Great and King Erekle II of Kartli-
Kakheti. According to this treaty, the Russian Empress became the suzerain over the King of 
Kartli-Kakheti, but simultaneously guaranteed internal sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
and promised to provide military assistance in case of external attacks.181 However, instead 
of being a protectorate, the different Georgian kingdoms and principalities were 
incorporated into the Russian Empire in the period 1801-29. In the following decades the 
Georgian aristocracy and to a lesser extent the Georgian population as a whole increasingly 
integrated into the Russian Empire and all aspects of its political, economic, and cultural life. 
In general, it is reasonable to conclude that the idea of the West only played a 
peripheral role in Georgian political discourse until the nineteenth century, as the focus was 
the Russia-Iran-Turkey triangle.182 The Europeanization of the Russian Empire, which had 
already started in the early eighteenth century with Peter the Great, directly affected the 
non-ethnic Russian citizens. For example, three years after the 1861 Emancipation Reforms, 
Georgian peasants were also freed from serfdom. Furthermore, many Georgians studied 
and were very active in the academic world of St Petersburg. Returning home after having 
received Russian education, many of these people were not only taking leading roles among 
                                                      
181 It implied that the external relations of Kartli-Kakheti had to be agreed with the Russian Tsar, which was not 
always strictly respected. For example, after Kartli-Kakheti was attacked in 1785 by the Avar Khanate (under 
Ottoman protection), Russia was not able to send troops. Thus one year later, a non-aggression pact was 
signed with the Ottoman Empire without seeking Russian approval first. (David Marshall Lang, The last years of 
Georgian monarchy: 1658-1832 (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1957), 207.) 
182 Ghia Nodia, “The Georgian Perception of the West,” in Commonwealth and Independence in Post-Soviet 
Eurasia, ed. Bruno Coppieters, Alexei Zverev and Dmitri Trenin (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 15. 
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the intellectual elite but also in the political life in Georgia, bringing with them the modern 
European ideas of nation and Enlightenment. This generation of young Georgian students 
from the 1860s onwards was nicknamed tergdaleulni,183 literally meaning ‘those who drank 
from the Terek’ (i.e. those who crossed the Terek river into Russia to study).184 This led to 
the creation of three distinct generations or dasebi of politically or nationally active 
people.185 The pirveli dasi (first generation) consisted mainly of the tergdaleulni. Despite 
their admiration for the ideas of nation and Enlightenment, they found Europe to be 
unreliable and untrustworthy.186 They saw the Russian Empire as an important power in 
Europe and considered it to be a guarantor of peace and stability in Georgia against the 
Ottoman and Persian threats.187 Indeed, Russia was successful in gaining back the previously 
lost Georgian lands, forcing the Ottoman Empire to return the Batumi region in 1878. Thus, 
the pirveli dasi struck a delicate line between the promotion of cultural nationalism and 
remaining loyal to Russian imperial interests.188 The more populist meore dasi (second 
generation) was attracted to European socialist ideas but preferred connections to Russia 
over links with Europe.189 The Marxist mesame dasi (third generation) would gradually 
change the political orientation of the elite and contended that a Russian version of the 
European socialist modernity would not work out. Clearly, only the mesame dasi hinted at a 
future where Europe would play a bigger role than Russia.190 
 
Towards an independent Georgian republic through European modernist ideas 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century and more prominently with the decline of the 
Russian Empire after the revolution and the Russian defeat by Japan in 1905, this promotion 
of cultural nationalism moved towards a quest for political nationalism and autonomy. As a 
consequence, several political parties emerged in the early twentieth century, each with 
their own distinct ideas and ambitions for the future. Simultaneously, the elite was 
increasingly looking at the Great Powers of Europe for support in achieving and maintaining 
                                                      
183 As Pål Kolstø and Aleksander Rusetskii point out, the tergdaleulni can be seen as the counterpart to the 
zapadniki in Russia (Pål Kolstø and Aleksander Rusetskii, "Power differentials and identity formation: Images of 
self and other on the Russian-Georgian boundary," National Identities, Vol. 14, No (2012), 140.) 
184 For an interesting overview of the origins and image of the tergdaleulni, see Oliver Reisner, "Travelling 
between two worlds – the Tergdaleulebi, their identity conflict and national life," in Identity Studies, Vol. 1 
(2009), 36-50. 
185 Interestingly, opposition politician Jondi Baghaturia calls his party ‘dasi’ as well to signal a continuation from 
those times. 
186 See for example Ilia Chavchavadze cited in Brisku, 53. 
187 Brisku, 51. 
188 Ibid., 50. 
189 Ibid., 63. 
190 A good discussion of the European orientation of the mesame dasi can be found in Stephen Jones, Socialism 
in Georgian colors: the European Road to Social Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 49-
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their status as a nation-state, but remained too cautious to put absolute trust in them as 
they found these European countries mainly acted out of their own interest.191 
The Social Democratic Party (SDP) consisted primarily of the working class, peasants and 
intellectuals from lower noble families (aznauri), mainly from the Western Georgian region 
of Guria, from the mesame dasi. As the SDP was basically a local committee of the Russian 
Social Democratic Worker’s Party (RSDWP), its leader Noe Zhordania initially considered 
that ‘cultural autonomy was unquestionable for all whereas territorial autonomy was 
doubtful.’192 Later, the SDP would split into a moderate Menshevik and a radical Bolshevik 
faction, just like the RSDWP in Russia. The Georgian Revolutionary Socialist Federalist Party 
(GRSFP) and the National Democratic Party (NDP), the two other main parties, argued 
openly in favour of Georgian independence.193 The GRSFP was founded in Geneva by 
Georgian immigrants living in Europe and had close ties to the meore dasi. The NDP saw its 
ideology closer to Chavchavadze’s liberal nationalism and thus closer to the pirveli dasi. 
With the revolutions in 1917 and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, the South 
Caucasian leaderships made use of the weakened situation and position of the former 
Russian Empire to proclaim the independent Democratic Federative Republic of 
Transcaucasia in April 1918. Five weeks later the Republic was abolished due to diverging 
interests and three new republics declared independence: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
Menshevik leader Noe Zhordania, who had previously been sceptical of an independent 
Georgia, became the first president. Georgia immediately became a German protectorate in 
order to avoid being turned into a Turkish colony and soon German troops arrived in the 
new republic. However, as Germany lost the First World War, it retreated from Georgia a 
few months later. 
With Russia almost absent from the scene until 1920, some European countries started 
playing a significant role in the Caucasus.194 The Georgian independence fell within the 
jurisdiction of the Paris Peace Conference and after the de facto recognition by the Great 
Powers of Europe in 1920, it was recognized de jure by a number of European states in 
January 1921.195 The Georgian leadership saw the chance to request European protection 
again, especially as there were already British troops in the region. However, as Bolshevik 
forces were moving to conquer the Caucasus, the British forces left and in February 1921 
this short-lived independence came to an end. With this defeat, many Mensheviks migrated 
to Western Europe, where they continued their struggle for Georgian independence. 
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Georgia’s approach towards Europe during the Soviet era 
Although Europe indeed did not get actively involved in Georgia's domestic and 
international situation, the loss of independence can to a large extent be ascribed to the 
rivalries between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks within Georgia.196 Georgia was 
brought back into the Russian orbit as an effect of Bolshevism and some Georgian 
Bolsheviks were actually central in shaping the Soviet Union, such as Stalin, Orjonikidze, and 
Beria. Still, this did not mean that all ties between Georgia and Europe were immediately 
broken, as direct trade relations between the two partially continued. Furthermore, some 
leaders in the Georgian Bolshevist Party, such as Budu Mdivani and Philipe Makharadze, had 
a different opinion and were in favour of a more open society and more independent links 
with Europe, i.e. not exclusively through Moscow. Others, like Stalin or Orjonikidze, thought 
that repression was the only way forward.197 Intellectuals, writers and journalists were still 
discussing Georgian nationalism openly, but moved back from the political front to the 
cultural front.198 Gradually, the political discourse with regards to Europe changed and 
under Stalin’s rule became fully dominated and controlled by the central power of the 
Communist Party in Moscow. Stalin believed that time had come for the Soviet Union to 
show the way to Europe, as the European ideas of modernism had become outdated.199 This 
needs to be seen in the light of a very antagonistic discourse of 'us' versus 'them'. 
After the Second World War, when the pro-European elite in Georgia had been 
marginalised, Europe was generally portrayed as weak and under the control of the United 
States. Propaganda against the ‘American imperialists’ and their alleged negative effect on 
Europe became stronger, including in the Georgian SSR.200 For example, D. Zavrov saw 
European economic integration as a re-armament process with the aim of militarily 
confronting the Communist bloc.201 A. Khelashvili claimed the European Common Market 
was negatively affecting the working classes and saw European integration as a big and 
dangerous misfortune for Europe, whose neo-colonialism was headed by the Catholic 
Church.202 However, in the 1970s the image of a weak and US-controlled Europe changed 
and turned more positive in the 1980s. 
Several dissidents had raised environmental issues in the 1970s and 1980s, but glasnost 
and perestroika transformed these groups and gave rise to the creation of hundreds of 
different – often national – movements throughout the Soviet Union, including in Georgia. 
These reforms also created the basis for a new and more cooperative approach towards 
Europe. Already during the late 1980s, Irakli Tsereteli, one of the leaders of the national 
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liberation movement in Georgia, raised the idea of joining NATO and even called for NATO 
to intervene after the Tbilisi tragedy of 9 April 1989,203 but his calls were not taken very 
seriously.204 This period could be seen as one of ‘radical infantilism’ with naïve policies, no 
realistic ideas but just lots of expectations.205 According to Merab Mamardashvili, Europe 
again became the perfect point of reference and ‘regulatory political ideal’.206 In October 
1990, the first multi-party elections in the entire Soviet Union took place in Georgia and 
were won by Gamsakhurdia, a dissident and former political prisoner who had already from 
a young age called for the end of the ‘Soviet occupation’. 
 
THE EURO-ATLANTIC ASPIRATION AND ORIENTATION SINCE INDEPENDENCE 
After seven decades of Soviet rule and similar to the period between 1918 and 1921, 
Georgia did not only have to regain independence but also to find support to guarantee its 
lasting effect. This happened at a time when the political and security system in the West 
was in a transformation itself and when globalisation increased the need for transnational 
cooperation structures. When the Warsaw Pact collapsed, the original raison d’être of NATO 
had ceased to exist and as a result the Alliance was looking towards more cooperation with 
the countries to its East. Not much later, the EU emerged as a new body out of three 
decades of closer cooperation and integration among twelve European countries. 
The foreign policy of Georgia has undergone different stages throughout the past two 
decades and has been meticulously analysed and discussed by a large number of scholars,207 
who generally agree on different stages: the romantic phase (1990-91), the realistic phase 
(1992-94), the phase of a new Western orientation (1995-2003) and the phase of enforced 
Western orientation (since 2003).208 The following discussion neither follows nor contradicts 
this periodisation, as the focus is not on foreign policy in general but more specifically on 
the Euro-Atlantic component of the foreign policy. Clearly, all three Georgian presidents 
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since independence have been Western oriented, but their approach and success have 
differed tremendously, possibly due to their different understanding of the West. 
During the initial years of the post-Soviet era and to a large extent even now, the 
concepts of the ‘West’, ‘Europe’ and ‘democracy’ have been used interchangeably and seem 
to be considered almost as synonyms. It is not always clear if this is due to a lack of 
knowledge by the Georgian elite themselves or if this is done deliberately. For example, 
when talking about Europe, one may find references to cooperation with the US and with 
NATO. Another important aspect is that Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic orientation is portrayed as a 
single and fully coherent foreign policy direction. Integration with NATO and with the EU as 
well as with other Euro-Atlantic bodies is depicted as going hand in hand and directly 
influencing each other. For example, President Saakashvili in 2004 said that NATO 
membership would be ‘kind of a ticket to become a member of the EU.’209 In reality, the 
different Euro-Atlantic bodies have their own peculiarities and missions. Whereas NATO and 
OSCE are focused on security-related matters, the EU is a regional integration project with 
its roots in economic interests, and the Council of Europe focuses on democracy, rule of law 
and human rights. One might even argue that there is a different ideology guiding these 
organisations and that priorities between these bodies do not always fully match. This 
differentiation is not made in the rhetoric by the Georgian political elite, as they have all too 
often portrayed an increase in democracy as the main avenue for cooperation with NATO210 
or the restoration of territorial integrity a main reason for cooperation with the EU.211 
 
Euro-Atlantic orientation and discourse under Gamsakhurdia 
According to Ghia Nodia, the uncontested legitimacy of the call for independence was 
rooted in the particular historic vision and cultural orientation.212 Indeed, Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia thought the ‘spiritual mission’ of his country was based on Georgia’s role in 
antiquity and Christianity.213 As soon as he declared Georgian independence on 9 April 1991, 
he called upon the international community, but especially on the Western states, to 
recognize and support the new republic. President Gamsakhurdia even spoke about joining 
NATO and therewith not only shocked the Soviet Union but also the West.214 NATO 
membership was not an ideological dream of the Georgian government or its population, 
but rather a question of guaranteeing the existence of the Georgian state and not being 
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ruled by Russia.215 Gamsakhurdia apparently sincerely believed the West would indeed 
support Georgia’s independence from Russia.216 He felt the Christian West was obliged to 
provide such support as it had failed to do so in 1921 against the Bolsheviks and because he 
considered Georgia to be an inherent part of the Christian West.217 Some feel that 
Gamsakhurdia was just paying lip service to the West, but did not really share the European 
values.218 Indeed, the reality turned out to be quite different and Gamsakhurdia isolated his 
country – partially through his undiplomatic and provocative attitude – from both the West 
and Russia. Contrary to his intentions, he not only did not receive the required international 
support to guarantee Georgia’s freedom, but was even unable to win recognition of 
Georgia’s independence. Consequently, he felt let down by the West and changed focus to 
the solidarity and bond among the different nations and ethnic groups of the Caucasus. Due 
to his radical ethnic nationalist policies, many domestic opponents called him a ‘dictator’ 
and ‘fascist’ and saw themselves as ‘real’ pro-Western democrats instead.219 Some of them 
called for Georgia to join NATO immediately and believed they actually had a realistic 
chance.220 
David Aphrasidze sees Georgia’s limited experience in conducting external relations as 
one of the main causes for the ‘weak’ and ‘incompetent’ approach towards foreign policy 
and Western orientation under Gamsakhurdia.221 As this competence was only very limited 
for Georgia as a part of the Soviet Union, an entirely new state structure, specifically a 
foreign ministry, had to be established. Aphrasidze furthermore claims that emotionality 
and idealism indicated the lack of experience of the Georgian elite in separating desires 
from reality.222 
 
Euro-Atlantic orientation and discourse under Shevardnadze 
The triumvirate of Kitovani, Ioseliani and Sigua which ruled the country in the first months 
after ousting Gamsakhurdia did not enjoy any international recognition and legitimacy. They 
therefore invited former Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze, famous for 
his statement in 1976 that 'for Georgians, the sun rises not in the east, but in the north – in 
Russia',223 to return to Tbilisi to lead his country. Many saw this move as an opportunity to 
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revive the old dream of Western protection and start a new stage in foreign policy. Due to 
his role in the demise of the Soviet Union, many Georgians thought that now the West had 
the ‘moral obligation’ to support Georgian independence.224 Very soon after the return of 
Shevardnadze to Georgia the country was recognised by the international community, it 
joined the OSCE in 1992, humanitarian and development projects were established with 
Western funding (including from the EU). Still, the Euro-Atlantic community did not have a 
strong political dialogue with Georgia and definitely did not wish to get involved in territorial 
disputes, with the exception of the OSCE in the case of South Ossetia. Several factors may 
have contributed to such an approach: the Euro-Atlantic structures and the EU were going 
through major changes, they did not see their interests in the Caucasus as threatened, and 
they pursued a Russia-First policy. Thus, the Georgian leadership set up a balanced multi-
vector foreign policy and not only established good relations with the West to resist 
pressure from Russia but even aimed at nurturing its ties with Iran, especially in the field of 
energy. Still, due to the challenging internal situation and conflicts, Georgia was urged to 
join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and to sign up to the Collective Security 
Treaty. 
Since the expected support and desired patronage from the West did not materialise 
and due to the precarious domestic situation, especially with regards to territorial 
questions, Georgian foreign policy took one step back and Georgian-Russian relations 
intensified in 1994-95. Shevardnadze looked at increased security cooperation with Russia 
and openly rejected possible NATO membership.225 Still, Georgia did not receive much 
support from its northern neighbour in return. Shevardnadze was seen as a traitor to the 
Soviet Union, and the Georgian population had shown a strong anti-Russian attitude in 
previous years.226 
Although Shevardnadze would continue to play a delicate balancing act between Russia 
and the West until 1997, the Euro-Atlantic orientation and especially cooperation with 
NATO became a key component of the domestic reforms and foreign policy from 1995 
onwards. Georgia had joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992 and the 
Partnership for Peace programme in 1994, but the first real concrete projects only started in 
1996 and gradually increased year after year. In the following years Georgia also developed 
its first military and security strategies, with help from the West. With regards to the EU, 
relations focussed on assistance but not yet on a real political dialogue. 
Several possible reasons can be found for this renewed Western orientation while 
maintaining a balanced position. The West had started to show more interest in the 
Caucasus, for example through NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme, through 
interventions by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, but maybe even 
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more importantly through a growing engagement of western oil firms in the exploration and 
exploitation of the hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian. Russia from its side experienced 
major domestic and economic problems and was not capable of providing security 
guarantees to Georgia. Concurrently, the Georgian domestic political situation had partially 
stabilised and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became better functioning.227 Internal 
developments, especially related to the different factions within the Shevardnadze-created 
Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG), played a notable role. Besides the group of ex-communists, 
one of the strongest factions was that of the so-called ‘young reformers,’ headed by Speaker 
of Parliament Zurab Zhvania and which included main pro-European modernisers like 
Mikheil Saakashvili, Giorgi Baramidze, or Zurab Noghaideli. 
A major change occurred in 1997, when the balanced foreign policy returned to a 
pronounced pro-Western and anti-Russian orientation. Georgia, together with Ukraine, 
Azerbaijan and Moldova, set up a forum for countries critical of Russia called GUAM. The 
GUAM members had a clear intention to use their geographical location in the East-West 
corridor, especially with regards to the transit of oil and gas. Also the year 1999 brought 
several new elements to this outspoken pro-Western orientation: Georgia left the Collective 
Security Treaty, Shevardnadze for the first time spoke about NATO membership and 
expressed support for the Alliance’s engagement in Kosovo, at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul 
Russia had to agree to close its military bases on Georgian territory, Georgia became a 
member of the Council of Europe, and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the 
European Union entered into force. One year later, the clearly pro-Western foreign policy 
concept Georgia and the World: a Vision and Strategy for the Future was adopted. However, 
it is not clear to what extent the rhetoric and policy matched the real intentions, as concrete 
steps securing such integration remained largely unfulfilled. The late 1990s were clearly a 
period when Russia was not able to reassert its influence over the CIS countries and had to 
make major concessions, especially in the field of security. 
President Shevardnadze announced that his country would file an application at the 
Prague Summit of 2002228 with the intention of NATO accession in 2005.229 His ministers 
were more cautious about this ambitious timeline though. For example, Foreign Minister 
Menagarishvili thought the situation in Georgia did not allow for its entrance into NATO230 
and Defence Minister Tevzadze claimed that NATO membership was jeopardized due to the 
lack of funds for priority training programmes.231 Although President Shevardnadze saw the 
EU as the ‘ultimate harbour’232 for Georgia, the question of joining the EU was a bit more 
difficult; not because of a lack of willingness but rather because of the difficulty in 
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understanding which conditions would have to be met.233 Therefore, EU membership was 
not even seen in the very far future.234 Still, speculations on admission to the EU were made 
by the Georgian leadership in the early 2000s, including claims that this would ‘not be an 
excessively long term prospect.’235 This pro-Western discourse should be seen in light of the 
changing domestic political situation. The European modernizers were getting stronger and 
were demanding President Shevardnadze to give up his balanced approach and to make 
work of the Euro-Atlantic orientation. In late 2002 and early 2003, different draft resolutions 
and documents circulated in Parliament on the integration with the EU236 and Parliamentary 
Speaker Nino Burjanadze talked about a possible statement on Georgia’s intention to 
become an ‘EU associated member’.237 Finally, a resolution ‘on speeding up Georgia’s full 
integration into the European Union’ was adopted in parliament at the end of March 
2003.238 Although the pro-European rhetoric increased, especially in the months before the 
Rose Revolution, no major progress was made.239 
After the Rose Revolution, acting President Burjanadze already set the tone for the 
future foreign policy and underlined the wish to join NATO and the ‘European family’240 as 
they were seen as ‘guarantors of Georgia’s security and territorial integrity’.241 Nevertheless, 
she simultaneously underlined the importance of strengthening good neighbourly relations 
with Russia.242 
 
Euro-Atlantic orientation and discourse under Saakashvili 
EU and NATO membership as imminent opportunities (2004-2005) 
Mikheil Saakashvili, who aspires to be remembered as ‘somebody who made Georgia a 
modern European state,’243 had been one of the ‘young reformers’ under Shevardnadze and 
was a leading figure behind the Rose Revolution. His rhetoric often leaned close to that of 
Zurab Zhvania, especially when he said in Moscow in February 2004: ‘I am not a pro-Russian 
president, but nor am I pro-American. I am a Georgian president, and, therefore, I am 
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European.’244 He made it clear from the beginning he would aim to establish closer ties with 
the EU and the US as he believed the West was the only guarantor of Georgia’s security.245 
During his inaugural speech as the third president of Georgia, the European flag was raised 
along with the new Georgian flag, while a choir sang the European Anthem. These symbolic 
gestures were clear indications of where he wished to position Georgia. Furthermore, a 
special State Ministry for Euro-Atlantic Integration was established. His arguments for 
Georgia's aspiration to integrate into NATO and the European structures seem to be heavily 
inspired by, and similar to, those of the pro-European social democrats of the early 
twentieth century, e.g. that this desire is ‘historically substantiated’.246 Although he kept on 
repeating his mantra of integrating with the European community, he stressed the need to 
establish normal and friendly relations with Georgia’s northern neighbour.247 He stressed 
that the European integration process would ‘never, in any form, harm Russia’s interests’.248 
In this initial period after the Rose Revolution, there existed a palpable euphoria about the 
massive international support and the feeling that Georgia would soon become a full-
fledged member of the Euro-Atlantic community, signified by Saakashvili’s statement in late 
2004: 
Today we have great international support. Now the NATO Secretary-General says that Georgia 
has got a chance to join NATO. He has said this for the first time, by the way. For the first time, 
the EU has recognized that we have a chance of joining the EU after some time. This may happen 
quite soon, maybe in seven, eight or nine years, which is quick taking into account that some 
countries needed many more years to pass this road.249 
The entire Georgian government seemed intent on streamlining all aspects of their work 
with European and NATO standards of practice. This was performed with the intention of 
integrating with the Euro-Atlantic community, whether it involved the foreign ministry,250 
the judicial system,251 the railways,252 the border guards,253 or even the airport landing 
systems254 and immigration desks255 to name a few. In some cases it is not possible to see 
what the ‘standards’ are, such as in the stated intention of ‘meeting European standards of 
foreign policy and security issues.’256 Thus, this slogan appeared to be a synonym for top-
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end quality, exactly as is the case with the concept of ‘evroremont’257 in the former Soviet 
space. 
The authorities appeared confident of becoming fully compliant by 2007258 and join 
NATO by 2008.259 Although NATO membership was clearly a priority, and frequently arose in 
speeches and interviews, it did not receive as much attention as EU membership. It is not 
clear if EU integration was interpreted as being more important, or perhaps it seemed to be 
an already accomplished fact that Georgia would join the Alliance. During his first months in 
office, Saakashvili promised his country would join the EU ‘in the very near future’260 as 
'Europe is demonstrating that we are the next phase of Europe's enlargement.’261 In the 
presence of European Commission President Prodi, Saakashvili even said his country would 
be ready for membership ‘in three years, or in four years at the most.’262 One year later, he 
claimed that the country would ‘join the EU sooner than man will travel to Mars, and man 
will travel there very soon.’263 The eastward expansion and more particularly the accession 
of the Baltic States gave the Georgians a feeling that this enlargement could continue and 
include their own country. There was also a notion that the possible future membership of 
Turkey in the EU would ensure that Georgia would ‘automatically’ follow.264 Moreover, 
many of these ambitious statements on EU membership were made in the presence of 
European leaders, whose absence of reaction was roundly interpreted as tacit approval. 
After all, not speaking in favour of the Georgian cause was not fashionable and often 
interpreted in Western political circles as being pro-Russian. Other signs of interest or 
sympathy were interpreted as outright and unconditional support as well. For example, 
after addressing the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and 
Defence Policy of the European Parliament, Saakashvili told reporters: 
I was told that the committee has never been so full. This means that today Europe is talking 
about Georgia's membership of the EU. There have never been so many publications [about 
Georgia in Europe]. Romania and Bulgaria are going to join in 2007. This means that we will have 
a real possibility – if the country consolidates – either to catch up with them or to fall behind by 
three years at the most. This is a reality.265 
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Such rhetoric of imminent EU membership was used by a vast proportion of the 
administration, with only a few (such as Foreign Minister Zourabichvili266) speaking in a 
more cautious manner. 
In the initial years following the Rose Revolution, Saakashvili and his team were freely 
able to determine their policies. The domestic political opposition was negligible, support 
from the West seemed unconditional, and Russia took a waiting position. 
 
Cooling of euphoria and shift from EU to NATO (2005-2008) 
It took less than two years for this euphoria to cool, and although the tone of the foreign 
policy agenda did not change, the rhetoric did. Whereas President Saakashvili initially 
proclaimed daily that his country was on the way to joining the EU, this remarkably changed 
in the summer of 2005. Towards the end of that year, a major change in terms of Euro-
Atlantic discourse could be observed with a clear shift of focus from EU to NATO. In early 
2006, Saakashvili even publicly declared that he did not expect Georgia to be accepted into 
the EU in the nearest future.267 Still, the EU was not forgotten and the leadership still spoke 
about the aspirations to become European and about integrating into an enlarged 
Europe.268 Also references to carrying out reforms according to European standards 
remained popular.269 Especially in his campaign leading up to the January 2008 presidential 
elections, Saakashvili made a plethora of references to creating a European democracy, but 
cautioned that Georgia would not accede to the EU during the next presidential term.270 
In early 2006 NATO membership became the central theme in the foreign policy 
rhetoric. In November of that year, the Georgian leadership appeared convinced that the 
country would be invited to become of member of the alliance in 2008271 and referred to 
this as Georgia's return to its ‘natural place’.272 Passing the Individual Partnership Action 
Plan (IPAP)273 and being offered the Intensified Dialogue (ID) brought real hopes of joining 
the alliance soon, and the feeling was strengthened by some hints of a concrete entry 
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date.274 This was interpreted as a guarantee of an ‘irreversible process’ of joining NATO 
because such Intensified Dialogue had been 'the milestone when the Czech Republic was 
sure it would join the alliance'.275 However, the unresolved conflicts over Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia remained a major obstacle, and several Georgian politicians openly claimed 
that membership without a solution to the separatist conflicts would be impossible.276 The 
ruling elite successfully manipulated the lack of coherence among the Western leaders on 
Georgia’s membership to the Alliance. Whereas critical statements from European 
politicians and high-ranked NATO officials did not receive much visibility in the Georgian 
media,277 ambiguous statements were portrayed as demonstrably positive and interpreted 
as concrete promises of membership.278 Moreover, encouraging statements were given 
extensive publicity.279 Towards the end of 2007 and especially in the run-up to the January 
2008 presidential elections, the Georgian leadership was relentlessly claiming that the 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) would be offered at the Bucharest Summit in 2008, and 
viewed it as a purely political decision from the NATO member states, some of which they 
claimed were under huge pressure from Russia.280 This phase would continue even after the 
failure to receive an invitation to the MAP in April 2008 and after the August 2008 War. 
The rhetoric with regards to Russia started changing gradually from late 2005, when the 
first calls for leaving the CIS were voiced. Whereas Saakashvili and his administration had 
almost exclusively spoken in a positive tone about the northern neighbour in the first year 
after the Rose Revolution, the messages now fluctuated. From one side there were 
prevalent accusations about Russia’s negative role and the need for Georgia to get out of its 
grip. There were constant calls from the Georgian leadership towards the Euro-Atlantic 
community to assist in countering the Russian pressure and alleged negative influence. At 
the same time, the authorities expressed the message that a dialogue should be found, and 
that joining NATO was not to be interpreted as a slight against Russia. 
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Thus it can be concluded that during the period between late 2005 and April 2008, the 
focus shifted from EU to NATO, and moreover, the rhetoric vis-à-vis Russia turned 
progressively harsher. Furthermore, this change redirected the focus away from socio-
economic conditions, towards security issues and the restoration of territorial integrity. The 
causes were manifold and relate mainly to the changed internal political system and more 
realistic assumptions of the Georgian leadership. Firstly, despite the EU and its member 
states becoming increasingly supportive of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions, the concrete 
actions and support did not meet the expectations of the Georgian enthusiasm. In addition, 
although European leaders welcomed and applauded Georgia’s Western course, they failed 
to adequately acknowledge Georgia’s prospects for EU membership. Furthermore, the EU 
structures failed to offer any specific framework or tools and instruments to work on 
possible accession of Georgia.281 Arguably, the Georgian government had come to realise 
that the country’s integration with the EU was just a remote and distant prospect.282 The 
inclusion of Georgia in the European Neighbourhood Programme (ENP) and the adoption of 
the ENP Action Plan in November 2006 led to a renewed discourse on EU approximation but 
not on EU membership. The prevalence of NATO importance is even testified by the opinion 
that the implementation of the ENP Action Plan would have ‘tremendous importance for 
Georgia’s integration into NATO.’283 
Secondly, the prospect of joining NATO turned out not to be as evident as initially 
thought, and required increased efforts from the administration. In June 2005, NATO 
Secretary-General De Hoop Scheffer openly declared that Georgia and Ukraine were 
obviously not ready for membership and that words alone about a desire to become a NATO 
member were not enough.284 Regardless of the criticism raised by NATO officials,285 
Saakashvili still claimed as early as November 2005 that all the conditions set by NATO had 
been fulfilled286 and that his country would join in 2008.287 It is likely that the leadership 
understood that it had to take a step backwards in its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, and take a 
more staged and realistic approach with concrete fulfilment of conditions and 
requirements. 
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Thirdly, hopes for building up friendly relations with Russia did not materialize and 
influenced other components of the foreign policy. Whereas the Georgian authorities had 
called for an open dialogue on equal level with their northern neighbour, the reaction from 
Moscow was less constructive. Gazprom’s sudden increase in gas prices for Georgia in late 
2005 and the Russian ban on Georgian wine and mineral water a few months later were 
clear indications of deteriorating relations, and catalysts for further worsening. This 
situation further aggravated in September 2006 when four Russian officers were accused of 
espionage, which also intensified the anti-Russian schizophrenia of the Saakashvili 
government labelling anyone not in favour of the United National Movement as a ‘Russian 
spy’. 
The sudden and suspicious death of Zurab Zhvania in February 2005 may have 
exacerbated tensions on the domestic and international level. Having been a prominent pro-
European driving force in the Shevardnadze era and having taken a leading role in the Euro-
Atlantic orientation, Zhvania was a strategic and moderate thinker, and understood the 
significance of a balanced approach towards Russia. In the first year after the Rose 
Revolution, Zhvania had been a stabilising factor between the moderate group and the 
hardliners in government. Subsequent to his death this balance broke and some hardliners, 
such as Minister of Defence Okruashvili, became more vocal. 
 
Shift backwards from NATO to EU (2009-2012) 
A third phase started in early 2009, but was partially shaped during the previous year. 
Whereas NATO membership remained high on the agenda, the focus of the discourse 
shifted more towards integration with the EU and membership of this union – although not 
seen as an immediate prospect. Especially the achievements (e.g. visa facilitation 
agreement) and prospects for other agreements (DCFTA and Association Agreement, often 
falsely represented as Associate Membership) were all too often highlighted. The rhetoric 
moved away from security and territorial integrity towards socio-economic policy agendas, 
as the population largely accepted that the territories could not be returned in the short 
term and because people cared more about the lack of progress in their living conditions. 
Although the administration frequently spoke of reforms in the social sectors and 
sometimes even in the agriculture sector, very little materialised as the ruling elite failed to 
abandon its neo-liberal ideas. Still, as criticism was mounting against the neo-liberal 
approach, which was increasingly viewed as inconsistent with the economic models of the 
European countries, the Georgian government propagated a symbiosis of the European and 
Singapore model (i.e. ‘Europe’s Singapore’288), especially during the second half of 2010. 
Despite Singapore, Hong Kong and Dubai having been referred to as examples of economic 
development, a new narrative advocating the European model for political development 
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and democratic values, and the Singaporean model for economic development was 
propagated, but without acknowledging the incompatibility of the two models. 
Although it may be difficult to prove a concrete causal link to the origins of this change 
in foreign policy priority and discourse, there are different facts that appear to have 
contributed to it. Firstly, whereas the Georgian leadership had hoped to receive an 
invitation for the Membership Action Plan at the Bucharest Summit, this did not happen. 
The Georgian authorities, convinced that Russia had put pressure on some member states, 
claimed that it was a matter of time and that during one of the following ministerial 
meetings a final and more positive decision would be taken on the matter. However, the 
following months did not fulfil this hope and certain member states openly stated that 
Tbilisi was not ready for membership.289 Also more voices cited the need to resolve the 
territorial conflicts before joining the alliance would be possible. However, the Georgian 
leadership, totally ignoring the changed environment, argued that Germany had also joined 
NATO when part of its territory was occupied by the USSR.290 A second factor was the 
August 2008 War, where Georgia did not receive the support from the Euro-Atlantic 
partners it had hoped for. Saakashvili linked this immediately to the fact the MAP had not 
been offered and called it a ‘strategic mistake’ which allowed Russia to invade.291 Finally, the 
change from a republican to a democrat president in the US led to a different US foreign 
policy towards Georgia. Georgia tried to elicit sympathy from the US by increasing its 
military contingent in Afghanistan and by offering to open a military base on Georgian 
territory. The latter proposal was turned down by the US leadership.292 
Interestingly, Georgia still rushed to secure the status of Associate Partner of the 
Western European Union (WEU) in November 2010, although the member states had 
announced half a year earlier already that the union would be dissolved in June 2011. It is 
not clear though, why such a move occurred.293 
 
PUBLIC OPINION AND EURO-ATLANTIC SCEPTICISM IN GEORGIA 
Although twenty eight states constitute the European Union, not all political parties and 
citizens are supportive of this membership, most often nurtured by economic, cultural and 
institutional factors.294 The concept of Euroscepticism as ‘the opposition to the process of 
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European integration’295 is multifaceted, as seen in the example of the UK with low support 
for a monetary union but high support for further enlargement.296 Euroscepticism is most 
often seen from an EU-centric perspective, i.e. scholars nearly exclusively look at this 
phenomenon within EU member states or candidate members at best. Then again, 
Euroscepticism is more relevant to EU member states than to its neighbours. Although the 
academic literature does not have a concept of ‘NATO-scepticism’, there are several articles 
looking at the dynamics of approval for NATO membership.297 Indeed, certain political 
parties, civil society organisations and some of the population at large do not approve their 
country’s membership of the alliance and disapprove the involvement in military action. 
A quick and superficial look at the media and political rhetoric in Georgia would give the 
impression there are no alternative views to the Euro-Atlantic orientation and that there is 
no place for Euro-Atlantic scepticism. In 2005, Saakashvili even reasoned in a radical manner 
during his annual address to Parliament that any party not being in favour of the Euro-
Atlantic orientation should be banned.298 Still, since EU membership was presented as an 
ambition of the Georgian leadership, it should be beneficial to survey the nature of support 
or aversion to this goal among opposition parties and the wider public in the country. 
Similarly, a closer analysis of the support for NATO membership may lead to some 
interesting conclusions. 
 
Defining Euro-Atlanticism 
The Georgian authorities present the Euro-Atlantic orientation as a comprehensive and 
coherent approach to securing the country’s position within the international system and 
carrying out domestic reforms,299 creating the impression that all constituent components 
of ‘the West’ agree on each and every field of policy-making. As will be discussed in the next 
section, the public perception of the EU and NATO, and what it can do for Georgia is very 
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similar. Moreover, the Georgian population does not appear to think that socio-economic 
policies and the understanding of democracy in the US and Europe differ. Nevertheless, 
some scholars will oppose such generalizations. Although not everyone may agree with him, 
but Robert Kagan wrote: 
It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, 
or even that they occupy the same world. […] When it comes to setting national priorities, 
determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing foreign and defense 
policies, the United States and Europe have parted ways.300 
In terms of international relations, he asserted that ‘Americans generally interpret the 
world as divided between good and evil, between friends and enemies, while Europeans see 
a more complex picture.’301 The elite around Saakashvili leans more towards the American 
perspective, and divide the people and countries into friends and enemies (i.e. either pro-
Georgian or pro-Russian), as illustrated by the words of State Minister Iakobashvili on the 
eve of the first anniversary of the August 2008 war: ‘I think that there are no sceptically 
disposed politicians left in Europe. There are those, who know the truth; those, who know 
the truth but do not want to understand it about it and those, who simply work for Russian 
special services – I do not mean only politicians; there are also journalists and experts 
among them.’302 
Also with regards to domestic policies and the understanding of the concept of 
‘democracy’, there are major differences in terms of the American and the European 
approach. Whereas the US is more individualist-oriented, Europe places high importance on 
social cohesion and solidarity. This can clearly be seen in the criticism of Republican 
presidential candidate Mitt Romney that his Democrat competitor Barrack Obama sought to 
convert the US into a ‘European-style welfare state.’303 It is doubtful that many Georgians 
would understand what was meant by this condemnation. Marina Mushkelishvili claimed 
that the ruling elite used and promoted the ‘liberal’ (mostly American) model of democracy, 
i.e. not very much in line with the European understanding of democracy.304 Many others 
have argued that reforms in Georgia are more American than European.305 There are indeed 
some signs that the American model of reforms is preferred: prison statistics are more 
similar to those in the US than in European countries. Libertarian and neo-liberal ideas are 
at the basis of socio-economic reforms such as the adoption of the Act of Economic 
Freedom, thus following an anti-regulatory economic policy and rejecting the idea that the 
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state should provide public goods such as education and health and.306 This discrepancy 
between discourse and real EU approximation is an important aspect in terms of legitimacy 
construction, as will be discussed further on. 
The Saakashvili administration did not hide its preference for ties with the US over the 
EU. The Eastern Partnership initiative, albeit advantageous for Georgia, was initially not 
viewed as ‘historically important’ as the United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic 
Partnership.307 
Finally, the Georgian authorities appear to understand Euro-Atlantic integration as a 
teleological aim.308 They were so much focusing on joining the different institutions that 
they disregarded the essentials of such membership, i.e. the process which should entail 
fundamental reforms in the country instead of glamorous infrastructure projects. 
 
Perceptions and associations with regards to the Euro-Atlantic community 
The Soviet ideology depicted NATO as some kind of ‘axis of evil’ avant la lettre, led by the US 
and supported by the ‘European puppets’, persistently quarrelling amongst themselves. The 
West in general was portrayed as a despicable capitalist and materialist society with no 
moral standards or values. According to George Khutsishvili, a real revolution took place in 
the Georgian mindset on 9 April 1989; from one day to the other, NATO and the West were 
no longer seen as the enemy but as a potential protector.309 Still, due to the lack of any 
reliable statistical data from the Soviet era, it is difficult to reconstruct the public perception 
of Europe and NATO, and therefore, assess to what extent the population at large was 
successfully influenced by anti-Western propaganda. One may often hear from Georgians 
nowadays that they never supported the Soviet system and always aimed at pursuing an 
independent European course. There also exists the question as to what extent this is the 
result of a reinterpretation of history and refocusing of orientations. 
There is inadequate literature exploring the nature of the post-Soviet perception of 
Europe and NATO among the Georgian population or the associations they make when 
hearing these words either. In an article published some months before the Rose 
Revolution, Stephen Jones wrote: ‘For most Georgians, the West means eventual prosperity, 
democracy, independence, security, and recognition of Georgia’s rightful place in the 
‘civilized world’ – despite the West’s reluctance to take a stand against Russian interference 
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in Georgian affaires and the continuing economic crisis and corruption.’310 He also 
addressed the negative perceptions, such as the opinion poll which showed that 49 per cent 
of respondents believed the main purpose of Western assistance was ‘to make Georgia 
dependent on the West.’311 Moreover, a number of Georgian scholars have given their view 
on how their nation perceives the West. Perhaps outdated, two articles from the late 1990s 
of political philosopher Ghia Nodia remain very insightful.312 The author claims that in those 
first years of independence that the West was an ‘imagined space’, as the perception of 
both leadership and population often different greatly from reality.313 He also claimed the 
West was seen as the ‘embodiment of freedom and fairness’.314 A few years later, Zurab 
Davitashvili shared his views and explained that for Georgians, ‘the West is not a 
geographical concept, but a synonym for progress and modernisation.’315 However, he also 
pondered a number of shortcomings, such as the common view that ‘Western companies 
are robbing the country’ or that ‘the western lifestyle contradicts the national traditions and 
is unacceptable for the Georgian people, and the integration with the West is equivalent to 
the degeneration of the nation.’316 Marina Mushkelishvili contended that the West has been 
an external example of the desirable ‘good life’, which includes democracy, market 
economy, prosperity, etc.317 Similarly, David Aphrasidze has argued that the Western 
orientation of Georgia has been linked with the banal idea that this will bring a better life.318 
Zurab Karumidze is of the opinion that the words ‘NATO’ and ‘Europe’ are 
mythologized.319 There is clearly a chance that Georgians may idealise the West and create 
an image of how they wish life to be for themselves, i.e. in the mind of many Georgians 
‘Europe’ is a romantic idea. Thus, there is a big chance for a mismatch between expectations 
or perceptions and the reality, especially among those Georgians who have never been to 
Europe or the US. According to Marina Muskhelishvili, the population at large clearly does 
not have an accurate picture and does not understand the differences between the 
different bodies of the Euro-Atlantic architecture,320 which could make the 
instrumentalisation and even manipulation of related political messages easier. This lack of 
understanding is exemplified by a 2009 public opinion poll where the two areas which 
would gain most benefit of all from EU membership were seen as national security and 
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territorial integrity.321 In reality, however, the EU is only marginally involved in such matters 
and the example of Cyprus has shown that EU membership does not necessarily imply 
conflict resolution. 
The origins of such associations and expectations from closer cooperation or integration 
with EU and NATO are possibly linked to the rhetoric from the political elite. The media, 
largely in the hands of the political elite,322 are the one of the main sources of information. 
For example, President Saakashvili assured the population that joining the EU means ‘final 
guarantees of our security, rapid economic development and a high level of social 
protection’323 and ‘much higher living standards for each Georgian, […] completely new 
security and political guarantees for Georgia.’324 He has also referred to other countries, 
e.g.: 
At present, Estonia's per capita budget is 12 or 13 times greater than Georgia's. The minimum 
pension in Estonia is 240 Lari [compared to 20 Lari in Georgia at the same time], even though 10 
years ago we both had similar standards of living. This shows what can be achieved by pursuing 
freedom, full independence, integration into Europe and Euro-Atlantic partnership.325 
The expectation that the West would get military involved in restoring Georgia’s 
territory has been partially contrived by the elite, as there are only few statements from 
Western leaders that they would unconditionally support Georgia.326 For example, President 
Saakashvili articulated about NATO membership: ‘This means that Georgia’s borders will be 
NATO’s borders and these borders will be defended not by our tanks and planes, but it will 
be defended by several thousands of western planes.’327 Deputy Foreign Minister Valeri 
Chechelashvili also created the expectation of European support to solving the conflicts: 
‘Europe is expressing readiness to participate more actively in resolving the conflicts on 
Georgian territory and that is already apparent from Europe's actions, which give us a lot of 
hope.’328 In 2007, State Minister Baramidze said that ‘NATO can do a lot of good for the 
security of Georgia and the restoration of its territorial integrity.’329 Some weeks before the 
August 2008 War President Saakashvili was very suggestive when he announced that ‘The 
future of the new world order or at least new European order is being decided in Georgia. It 
is good news that Europe has already realized that.’330 Similarly, Foreign Minister 
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Tkeshelashvili asserted: ‘We have provided information to our European colleagues 
regarding this issue. They realize how dangerous this process may be not only for Georgia 
but for Europe too.’331 In addition, audiovisual tools have been used to influence public 
opinion, such as a video clip where the harvest of a farmer is protected from bad weather 
thanks to a NATO flag.332 
Many Georgians label the EU as weak and soft, especially with regards to Russia. This 
view may be stimulated by the rhetoric of the ruling elite, whose patronising attitude is 
described in another section. Unfortunately, as expectations are created – often by the 
political elite – and not met by the West, this could nurture anti-NATO and anti-EU feeling. 
Such feelings can also be reinforced by rhetoric of the EU itself. In Georgian, the wording 
‘expressing concern’ (sheshpotebis gamotkma) does not only represent a worry but is much 
stronger and implies concrete action. As there is no action, many have come to react with 
sarcasm when the EU expresses concern over a certain situation in the country.333 Thus, 
‘euro’ has become an adjective hinting at something positive, but often with a sarcastic 
undertone.334 
 
Public support for the Euro-Atlantic integration 
Although President Saakashvili claims that ‘all Georgians […] associate their future with 
Europe,’335 a closer look at public opinion is required to get a more accurate understanding 
of popular attitudes. Several opinion polls have been conducted since the late 1990s, which 
in general show a consistently positive attitude towards NATO membership. Support stood 
at 62.0% in 2002, at 56.4% in 2003 and at 62.8% in 2006.336 During the 5 January 2008 
plebiscite, an overwhelming 79.7% of voting citizens answered positively on this matter.337 
Furthermore, following the August 2008 War, support for NATO membership remained very 
strong as can be seen from the chart below based on research from the International 
Republic Institute (IRI).338 Similar results were also presented by the National Democratic 
Institute (NDI).339 
Public support for EU membership is even larger and stood at 69.5% in 2002, at 72.2% in 
2003 and at 74.0% in 2006.340 A strong upward trend in the approval ratings continued in 
2009 and 2011, at 81% and 88% respectively.341 In 2011, one third of Georgians believed 
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their country would join the EU within five years and 19% believed this goal would be 
realised within five to ten years.342 Some 68% of the population viewed the European model 
of economic policy as the most suitable for Georgia, and 62% openly criticised the Singapore 
model.343 Apart from indicating public opinion, these figures also suggest that the 
population at large is capable of differentiating between the various models and their 
consequences. 
 
Figure 1 – Popular opinion towards NATO membership 
(Source: International Republican Institute – IRI Georgian public opinion poll) 
 
Anti-Western views 
The driving forces behind the quest for independence were the nationalist movements, 
which often underlined the specific Caucasian identity of the Georgian nation. Whereas 
many of the political leaders of the late 1980s and early 1990s were looking at support from 
the West to secure independence, they did not consider themselves to be ‘European’ and 
even looked down at certain aspects of the European or Western lifestyle. For example, 
Guram Sharadze, leader of the nationalist movement ‘Faith, Fatherland and Language’ was 
acerbic in his criticism of Western influences. With regards to the demand of the Council of 
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Europe to allow the Meskhetians to return to Georgia,344 Sharadze went as far as suggesting 
that it would be better to leave the organisation than letting them return.345 Other 
examples of outspoken anti-Western politicians are Gubaz Sanikidze from the National 
Forum party or Zviad Dzidziguri from the Conservative Party of Georgia. As part of these 
nationalist and traditionalist tendencies, the role of the Georgian Orthodox Church merits 
mention. Thanks to the regained popularity of religion within Georgian society subsequent 
to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the influence of the Church, which is opposed to 
Western cultural influences, should not be underestimated. For example, in January 2010 
the Patriarchate and some religious organisations sent an appeal to the Council of Europe to 
protest a bill legalizing sexual minorities.346 Other illustrations are how Patriarch Ilia II called 
on the Georgians not to send their children abroad for education, as ‘in most of the cases it 
will harm the child’347 or how the People’s Orthodox Movement put forward the initiative to 
rename Europe Square back into Square of the Hundred Thousand Martyrs.348 Half of the 
Georgian population displays concern about a possible Westernisation of the Georgian 
culture. According to the Caucasus Barometer of 2009 carried out by the Caucasus Research 
Resource Centers, 50% of respondents agreed that the Georgian way of life needs to be 
protected against European influences, and only 31% disagreed.349 
Some politicians directed robust criticism towards Europe and the US and denounced 
the ‘double standards’350 and ‘indifferent stance’ of the West,351 especially as they deemed 
Georgia did not receive the support it deserved. The protectionist entrepreneur and founder 
of the party 'Industry will save Georgia' Gogi Topadze considers that the Western partners 
rarely offer satisfactory assistance to Georgia in time of need, and provides the August 2008 
War as an example. He believes that the US and EU considered Georgia to be their ‘slave’ 
and use it ‘in their own interests’.352 Labour Party leader Shalva Natelashvili claims that the 
West does not support Georgia, and uses Saakashvili as ‘a microphone who says whatever 
he is instructed to say’.353 Natelashvili still remains hopeful that ‘the authorities, the Venice 
Commission and other corrupt rats from Europe or from the US’ will change their 
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attitude.354 Oppositional Irina Sarishvili thinks that the US wants to use the favourable 
geographical position of Georgia against Russia.355 In addition, Levan Gachechiladze from 
the New Conservative Party has slammed Western attitudes towards his country: 
I do not care what the Americans think and I do not care what the Europeans think. We should 
build the Georgian state. I want to tell you that our struggle, the struggle of the Georgian people 
is not simply against the Saakashvili regime. This is against the geopolitics of the world. This is 
against the American interests and the interests of other countries.356 
Still, regardless of their criticism towards the West, all these opposition leaders actively seek 
Western support, and frequently travel to Europe and the US to elicit understanding and 
sympathy. 
An important aspect of this anti-Western discourse is related to the feeling that the 
West legitimated the Saakashvili government. Some opposition parties accused the West of 
encouraging the authorities to take ‘violent steps’ against the opposition357 and for giving 
too much political credit to the Georgian president.358 The Labour Party was particularly 
vocal in this regard. Its leadership rebuked the ‘European friends who received this dictator 
[President Saakashvili], patted him on the head and encouraged him in his bloody 
pursuits,’359 and criticized ‘the old prostitute’ Europe for giving ‘praises to dictator 
Saakashvili’ and encouraging ‘his criminal activities just like they did with Franco, Mussolini 
and Hitler.’360 Party leader Natelashvili also spoke negatively about the EU Delegation to 
Georgia, calling for it to be ‘a real delegation of the EU to Georgia and not a body accredited 
to Mikheil Saakashvili’.361 There existed comparable feelings towards the PACE co-
rapporteur, who allegedly ‘leaves Georgia with his pockets filled with bribes and writes 
positive reports on the elections.’362 
Thus, a clear distinction should be made in this anti-Western rhetoric between those 
who object to Western influences on the Georgian identity and mentality on the one hand 
and those who criticise the West – often with the aim of gaining political capital – for its 
attitude towards the domestic political situation and reforms in Georgia on the other. At the 
same time, one could also question if there really are any consistent anti-Western 
movements in the country, as they all seek some form of engagement with the West. For 
example, notwithstanding the heavy criticism at the address of Europe and Euro-Atlantic 
institutions, even the Labour Party aims at integrating into the EU and NATO.363 
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Through this perceived improper attitude and association to negative events, the West 
risks losing part of its positive image. According to David Zurabishvili, the ‘wrong decision’ of 
the West to cooperate with a ‘weakened Saakashvili’ and preferring the ‘habitual evil to 
uncertainty’ has ‘shattered the Georgian people’s confidence in the West.’364 When support 
for NATO membership dropped from 82% to 62% in just a few months in early 2008, 
Gamkrelidze claimed it was ‘directly linked with Saakashvili, it is directly linked with the 
current regime and injustice imposed by this regime and people think: does NATO mean 
having injustice here?’365 
 
Opponents of NATO membership 
The vast majority of political parties are in favour of NATO membership, albeit most often 
insisting simultaneously that this should go hand in hand with establishing friendly relations 
with Russia.366 Still, a smaller number of parties, politicians and public movements have 
openly questioned Georgia’s NATO ambitions, and suggested neutrality as a better and 
viable option. The Traditionalists’ Union fears that not only would Georgia lose the 
breakaway territories, but it would also engineer a dangerous position between the West 
and the Islamic world if conflict develops.367 The Imedi party favours neutrality368 as 
‘Georgia’s admission into NATO will complete the country’s disintegration as NATO’s 
ideology is alien to Georgians’369 and lead to the ‘final loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.’370 
Still, party leader Irina Sarishvili remains convinced that the country will be admitted to the 
alliance regardless of whether it manages to meet all requirements as this membership 
would benefit the US.371 She is also convinced that the population at large is not in favour of 
NATO membership and that the 2008 plebiscite on the issue had been rigged.372 
Furthermore, the Labour Party is an interesting case in this respect. Whereas there have 
been many statements against joining the Alliance,373 party leader Shalva Natelashvili has 
claimed during pre-election times that he would not change the foreign policy course of 
integrating with NATO if he were to become president.374 Another relevant case is that of 
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365 Presidential candidate Davit Gamkrelidze, 10 January 2008, Civil Ge. 
366 See for example presidential candidate Levan Gachechiladze, 3 December 2007, Civil Ge; Salome 
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374 Presidential candidate Shalva Natelashvili, 11 December 2007, Interfax. 
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the Georgian Party, which is in favour of integrating with the EU but is a bit more ambiguous 
about relations with NATO.375 Although such a position in itself is not strange, the irony is 
that one of its most prominent members is former Defence Minister Okruashvili, whose 
main ambition for two years was to work to obtain NATO membership. Other movements 
that oppose NATO membership include the Union of Georgian Traditionalists,376 
Samegrelo,377 the Congress of Georgian Diasporas in Moscow,378 and even members of the 
ruling party have called for the abandonment of the NATO membership plans, in favour of 
the declaration of Georgia as a neutral state, e.g. Gocha Pipia in 2006.379 Of course, most of 
these politicians use this attitude towards NATO as part of their attempt to find their place 
within the political system. However, none of them have received considerable popular 
support. 
Discussions are not only limited to NATO membership. The Labour Party protested 
against the opening of NATO corners in educational establishments across Georgia, as they 
considered it of no use and would consume considerable sums of money.380 In addition, 
‘Free Georgia’ stood against the development of such information centres, labelling them a 
‘bolshevist method of propaganda which is inacceptable’.381 Finally, Georgia’s participation 
in ISAF is not uncontested either. The Georgian Party called on the Georgian government to 
revise the advisability of Georgia’s participation in ISAF.382 Shalva Natelashvili has been 
more direct in calling for the withdrawal of the Georgian military contingent383 and advised 
that instead of sending Georgian troops, Saakashvili should ‘send his own two millionaire 
brothers to Afghanistan.’384 
 
Patronising the patron: the pro-European EU-sceptics 
Very few parties and politicians have spoken out against closer integration with Europe in 
line with their anti-Western and nationalistic views. Paradoxically, the staunchest Euro- and 
EU-sceptics can be found within the ranks of Saakashvili’s United National Movement 
(UNM). Indeed, the discourse of the UNM members is often contradictory and deserves 
more rigorous analysis. Although they have spoken of the EU as the future for Georgia, it is 
                                                      
375 As reported on 12 October 2010 by Imedi TV and Black Sea Press. 
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difficult to understand how their traditionalist and libertarian approaches are compatible 
with the European orientation and the mainstream political thinking in Europe. In some 
cases, they have strongly criticised and patronised the EU, which raises the question to what 
extent they are really committed to their own European orientation and why they are still 
trying to get political and financial support from the EU.385 In the early months after 
Shevardnadze’s ousting and the adoption of a Euro-Atlantic course as main political 
orientation, a group of outspoken libertarian and neo-liberal EU-sceptics appeared among 
the ranks of the government and gained a strong position in policy-making. In June 2004 
Kakha Bendukidze was appointed the new economy minister, allegedly with major Western 
support.386 Bendukidze, who had become on oligarch in Russia through lucrative business 
deals and good relations with the Kremlin, returned to Georgia to participate in politics after 
the Rose Revolution, and is undoubtedly the most prominent EU-sceptic in the country.387 
As a radical libertarian, he has proposed such measures as transferring all Georgian forests 
into private possession or abolishing the national bank.388 
Bendukidze did not voice criticism towards the EU during his first months in office but 
used the Euro-Atlantic discourse like anyone else in government. He suggested that Georgia 
should have a tax system similar to the European one, but with lower rates389 and presented 
a concept of reforms in order to accelerate the integration with the European 
community.390 He also initiated discussions on a Free Trade Agreement with the EU, but is 
critical that the European leadership have opted for a Deep and Comprehensive FTA, 
implying more internal regulations and a high compliance cost.391 Apart from his blunt, but 
honest statements, which allegedly shocked both European partners as well as many 
Georgians,392 Bendukidze is fervently against Georgia joining the ‘European sclerotic 
civilization’ and argues that its overregulation kills economic growth.393 He has also claimed 
that the EU is a body without a long life and that it is a huge bureaucratic machine which 
                                                      
385 E.g. lack of political will to implement reforms in the field of food safety, unilaterally change the ENP action 
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386 Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania, 1 June 2004, Imedi TV. 
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suppresses economic freedom while attempting to preserve civil freedom.394 Under 
Bendukidze’s influence, the country’s leadership was no longer using Europe as the sole 
benchmark, but also Hong Kong and Singapore became a model. Although Georgia’s GDP 
growth has been steady at 5-10%, it is not enough to make the country a leading world 
country, and according to Bendukidze’s calculations it would still take ‘70 years to approach 
Europe’.395 Bendukidze was very clear when in November 2011 he explained his views on 
Europe:  
Psychologically and politically we are already part of Europe. Europe which respects human 
rights and principles of movement of capital, however, there is also other Europe, which is a 
bureaucratic creature and in which prescribes tax tariffs and sizes of cucumbers. And I do not 
want this Europe at all. This Europe is in agony. I do not want Europe where problems of small 
Greece bring such a huge crisis.396 
Although, since February 2009, Bendukidze may be officially out of politics, a 
considerable number of his team and followers continued to have a notable influence on 
social and economic policies until the defeat of the United National Movement (UNM) in 
October 2012. Examples include Vakhtang Lezhava (chief advisor to the Prime Minister), 
Lado Gurgenidze (former Prime Minister) and Davit Kezerashvili (former Defense Minister 
and close ally of President Saakashvili). Moreover, a number of masterminds behind the 
Rose Revolution and influential government officials share the same ideas and ideology. 
Many met each other at the libertarian-oriented Liberty Institute,397 such as former 
chairman of the Defense and Security Committee of the Parliament Givi Targamadze, former 
Secretary of the National Security Council Giga Bokeria, Republican Party politician David 
Zurabishvili, former Prime Minister Vano Merabishvili, Tbilisi Mayor Giorgi Ugulava and 
scholars Zurab Jafaridze and Levan Ramishvili. The latter, who has been seen as one of the 
ideologists of the UNM, said that ‘integration with the EU is a ticket on the Titanic’398 and 
that ‘the danger is that European laws will mask ugly Soviet practices,’ i.e. re-introducing 
corruption.399 Even Saakashvili himself does not hide his neo-liberal ideology.400 Still, the 
Georgian authorities were not always consistent with their views on limiting the role of the 
state either. For example, President Saakashvili ordered the minister of agriculture to 
interfere in bread prices401 and the government set minimum prices for grapes and created 
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a state enterprise GruzVinProm – mind the Russian name – after the Russian embargo on 
Georgian wine. 
Libertarian and neo-liberal ideas are not only present in politics, but also play a role in 
civil society. The ‘Coalition for a European Georgia’402 was purportedly inaugurated by a 
group of libertarians and neo-liberals with the aim of dominating the national platform of 
the Eastern Partnership civil society forum403 and trying to derail it from discussions on true 
Europeanisation.404 Furthermore, several universities have a libertarian background, such as 
the Free University of Tbilisi, founded by Kakha Bendukidze. The popular ‘Tabula’ magazine 
is greatly funded through advertisements from companies headed by libertarian 
businessmen405 and is edited by Levan Ramishvili together with Giga Bokeria's wife. Some of 
these ‘European’-inspired bodies have actively engaged in criticising the EU. For example, a 
study calling for the EU to reshape its ‘bad’ approach towards free trade agreement with 
Georgia, and ‘open negotiations without further delay since Georgia has more than satisfied 
the relevant subset of preconditions’,406 was under strong Libertarian influence. One of its 
authors was Gia Jandieri, the Vice-President of the Tbilisi-based libertarian think-tank New 
Economic School-Georgia. 
The Georgian leadership has not tried to hide its distrust and dissatisfaction with the EU 
and some of its member states, and on the contrary openly criticized it on many occasions, 
often showing a lack of diplomatic skill and loyalty. For example, Saakashvili has said that 
Europe ‘needs changes,’407 expressed his dissatisfaction with the slow European 
bureaucracy with regards to development programmes,408 grumbled that although the EU 
had made a lot of promises, only little has materialized,409 complained that EU statements 
are ‘late’410 and that it does not have the courage and capability to react openly to events in 
Georgia.411 Criticism has been even harsher towards certain specific EU member states that 
do not unconditionally support Georgia and prefer to balance their relations with Russia. A 
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good example is how President Saakashvili objected to the visit of Dmitry Medvedev to 
Germany in November 2009: 
How can it be that they are receiving the Russian president in Berlin and marking the fall of the 
Berlin Wall together with him like he was a big democrat? In fact, Erich Honecker did not do a 
tenth of what they [Russia] are doing here. And Honecker was ultimately arrested by the 
Europeans after they looked for him around the whole world. And they followed that man into 
the grave, and quite deservedly so.412 
In a similar manner, the French authorities – who played a crucial role in ending the August 
2008 War – have been roundly condemned for supplying military-technical equipment to 
Russia.413 Moreover, President Saakashvili believes that the August 2008 War would not 
have happened if these countries had not prevented an invitation for Georgia to join NATO 
at the Bucharest Summit and therewith puts the blame on them.414 A similar attitude 
towards the US administration has only occurred in exceptional cases, most likely because 
the US and French had completely different opinions on Georgia's NATO membership. 
In many cases, the Georgian leadership has spoken in a patronising manner about and to 
the EU, and especially about how it should deal with its external relations. The case of EU-
Belarus relations is a remarkable one. Whereas the Saakashvili was initially vocal about the 
need for a democratic change in Minsk,415 this attitude completely changed towards the end 
of 2007, and became even more pronounced after the August 2008 War. The EU and its 
member states issued critical statements after the 2010 Presidential elections in Belarus,416 
but Saakashvili congratulated Lukashenko with his victory.417 Whereas the EU has imposed 
sanctions on Belarus, the Georgian leadership has accused the EU (as well as the US) of 
applying double standards with regards to Belarus and Russia,418 and openly opposed 
Belarus’ isolation calling it ‘counterproductive for Europe's long-term development.’419 
President Saakashvili pontificated at the EU, that it should hold dialogue and interact with 
Belarus to give it the opportunity to resolve problems.420 Although such statements may 
seem strange at first sight, they may be linked to Georgia's gratefulness to the Belarusian 
leadership for not recognising Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence, despite strong 
Russian pressure. In another case, Saakashvili voiced his opinion that certain domestic 
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problems in Ukraine are linked to the failure of the EU to develop a clear-cut policy on the 
country.421 
 
The role of civil society
422
 
Although the link between civil society and Europeanisation is not central to this research,423 
it is nevertheless appropriate to mention it briefly because civil society plays a significant 
role in Georgian political life and is often directly linked to political actors and processes. 
Furthermore, the strength of civil society in itself can also be an indicator of ‘Europeanness’ 
as social dialogue and discussion with civil society are an important component in decision-
making in the EU. NGOs played a part in the Rose Revolution (e.g. Kmara, Liberty 
Institute)424 and some libertarian-oriented organizations and think thanks had a strong 
influence in the business environment and among political circles (e.g. Liberty Institute and 
Free University). Several NGOs even have a reference to the Euro-Atlantic community in 
their name, such as ‘Georgia in NATO,’ ‘European Initiative for Georgia,’ ‘European House’ 
or the NGO coalition ‘For the European Georgia’. Such names may be chosen intentionally 
to reflect the alleged orientation and priority, but may have been done with the purpose of 
attracting the attention of western donors. 
Further to acting as an additional source of information to the general public, civil 
society can and does play a role in strengthening or objecting the government’s 
instrumentalisation of European discourse. This is linked to the fact that part of civil society 
aims at pushing forward further reforms which are not necessarily in line with government 
priorities, and another part of civil society – especially the media425 – being controlled or 
under direct influence and instructions of the government.426 Thus, political forces in the 
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country can use civil society to push forward certain ideas and shape public opinion on 
politically sensitive topics or reforms with negative consequences for the population. A good 
example is that of the Natakhtari slaughter house,427 where several scholars shared their 
analysis on the hike of meat prices and its causes in public fora, objecting views the EU is to 
be blamed.428 On the other spectrum was the Coalition for the European Georgia, which 
supported the position of the Georgian government: 
The Coalition for the European Georgia considers that compliance with the EU requirements has 
a direct bearing on the increase of meat prices. Any references to the ‘monopolist players’ on 
the newly-emerged slaughterhouse market are mere attempts to delude the population. We 
welcome the honest statement made on the subject by the Vice – Prime Minister of Georgia 
which means that the government recognizes its responsibility. [...] Otherwise, should the EU 
regulations cause negative effects, as was the case with meat prices, the European Commission 
will always evade responsibility in the manner, in which this was done by [Project Manager 
dealing with agriculture in the EU Delegation to Georgia] Juan Echanove.429 
                                                                                                                                                                     
restricting monopolist activity of governmental clans, restoring antimonopoly legislation and reopen 
antimonopoly service (18 October 2010 and 26 July 2011, Caucasus Press.) Some even went as far as 
threatening with sanctions from the EU. For example, Chairperson of the Free Trade Union of Teachers and 
Scientists Manana Gurchumelidze claimed that the EU would not sign a free trade agreement with Georgia and 
annul the GSP+ scheme if the labour code were not revised (19 May 2010, Caucasus Press). 
427 The case of the Natakhtari slaughter house is elaborated under the second pattern as a legitimation 
mechanism for exercising power in Chapter IV. 
428 See for example Avto Silagadze and Paata Sheshelidze, 17 June, 2011, Caucasus Press or Levan Kalandadze, 
23 June 2011, Caucasus Press. 
429 Statement by part of the Members of the Coalition for the European Georgia, 2 July 2011. 
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CHAPTER III – THE GEORGIAN EUROPEANNESS 
 
During his speech at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe at the occasion of 
the discussions on Georgia’s accession to the Council of Europe in 1999, Georgian Speaker 
of Parliament Zurab Zhvania pronounced the dictum which has become a phrase of 
historical importance to his country and its people: ‘I am Georgian, therefore I am 
European.’430 
The Europeanness of Georgia and its people is all too often portrayed as an absolute 
truth,431 particularly towards the outside world. Some Georgians, especially the elite 
surrounding President Saakashvili, may perceive questioning this axiom as an insult and as 
heresy committed by pro-Russian traitors who do not wish to see a prosperous future for 
Georgia. For example, in 2006, President Saakashvili made this point clear when he said: 
‘Serious forces are working against Georgia. Their goal is to throw dirt at Georgia and to 
picture it as a country populated by uncivilized, non-European people.’432 Similarly, he 
claimed: 'Very influential, well-funded and important forces are busy blackening Georgia's 
name and presenting it as an unstable, dangerous, unreliable, un-European, uncivilized and 
uncultured country. We are a European, cultured, highly civilized country with a great 
future.'433 
Although the Georgian elite may speak a lot about their Europeanness, they do not 
explain what this entails. The words of Zurab Zhvania may be a nice catch-phrase, but he 
never elaborated on the meaning and intention of his words. Before looking at its 
instrumentalisation, one needs to understand what this 'Europeanness' or 'being European' 
refers to though. Therefore, this chapter analyses what it means for Georgia and the 
Georgians to 'be European' by putting this phenomenon in a wider historical context and by 
seeking its relation to the Georgian identity, the latter being a process in flux on its own. 
Thus, in the context of this research, it is not so important to see how Europe looked at 
itself, but rather how the Georgians define Europe and more importantly their own 
belonging to it. The markers of Europeanness were gathered on the basis of the initial 
literature review and the analysis of Euro-Atlantic discourse. 
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PROJECTIONS OF GEORGIAN EUROPEANNESS BEFORE 1991 
The elite around President Saakashvili portray the Europeanness of the Georgians to be 
some kind of a primordialist 'given'.434 It is nevertheless important to see how this 
identification and perception of a connection with Europe has changed over time. 
There is no evidence that the Georgian elite or population at large felt European or part 
of the European political and cultural space before the mid-nineteenth century, just like in 
the majority of societies in European countries. On the contrary, there are strong indications 
that they did not consider themselves European. During antiquity, the Georgians lived in the 
periphery of the Greco-Roman world.435 Historians Nodar Lomouri and Dzhuansher 
Vateishvili argue that the Hellenization and Greco-Roman influences did not have a major 
impact on the wider Georgian population,436 and there are no indications as to the extent of 
how Georgians identified themselves with the Greco-Roman civilisation and culture. In fact, 
there exists little evidence of a feeling of unity and oneness, and definitely no notion of a 
common (European) identity in the Roman Empire.437 When the Georgians were living 
under Byzantine, Ottoman and Persian rule and influence, there was limited contact with 
Europe. 
The situation changed in the mid-nineteenth century, when the Georgian elite 
developed the concept of Georgian cultural nationalism, i.e. at a time when the concepts of 
patriotism and nation-state were popular in Europe. As the Georgian identity was being 
defined, the question of its Europeanness – in past, present and future – played an 
important if not crucial role. Most of the tergdaleulebi did not appear to consider Georgia to 
be European in the past or present, but there existed a variety of views about the future. 
For example, Ilia Chavchavadze, the father of Georgian nationalism, claimed the country 
was part of ‘Western Asia’438 and disconnected from the ‘European construction’.439 As he 
was convinced Europe had a detrimental effect on the peculiarities of the authentic 
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Georgian culture,440 he took a conservative approach in maintaining Georgian traditions. 
Noe Zhordania from his side agreed that in the past Georgian culture had been greatly 
influenced by Eastern civilisations, which kept it outside of the European sphere.441 
Although he found Georgia ‘did not even have an idea of European culture,’ he was of the 
opinion this would change in the future.442 
A major boost to the pro-European course was given by the tsisperkhantselni (the Blue 
Horn: 1915 – 1931), a group of mainly literary figures educated in Western Europe. Although 
they saw Georgian culture as both Eastern and Western, they perceived the Asian traditions 
as a ‘nightmare’443 and found that ‘old, fat and cretin Asia weighed on the shoulders of 
Georgia.’444 Thus, the time had come to pursue the ‘new road towards Europe’445 and even 
to return to Asia ‘as a conqueror.’446 The movement aimed at promoting a pro-European 
orientation and took a leading role in introducing new European ideas into the Georgian 
culture with the aim of ‘returning’ to the European space.447 For them, it was clear that 
Georgia had strong ties with the Greek civilisation in antiquity, which served as a proof that 
Georgia had previously existed within the European cultural space, and even waited 
patiently in ‘hot Asia’ for two thousand years because they had been ‘chosen by Europe.’448 
Also other non-tsisperkhantselni intellectuals were fanatically pro-European, such as 
historian Geronti Kikodze.449 Still, not everybody shared the view of European superiority 
and the need to embrace European ideas unconditionally. The motto of literary critic 
Vakhtang Kotetishvili was ‘return, back to Asia, in order to move forward’ as Europeanness 
had taken the shape of a psychosis, making everyone insane, and would probably just erase 
the Georgians.450 Thus, as Adrian Brisku concludes, in the late nineteenth century 
Georgianness was viewed as something authentic but having more in common with the 
Eastern cultural space. This view became extremely debated in the last years of the 
nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth century.451 
Both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks wanted to westernise the country, which they saw are 
‘oriental’, by introducing Marxism. The loss of Georgian statehood in 1921 and the 
subsequent incorporation into the Soviet Union brought about a transformation of the 
rhetoric on Georgia’s Europeanness and its perception of Europe. The disappointment of 
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Europe’s indifference towards the fate of the small Christian nation became a major 
frustration and the intellectuals calling for a ‘return to the East’ stepped up their rhetoric in 
the 1920s and 30s.452 Aleksandre Manvelishvili situated Georgia within ‘Outer Asia’ and 
found that its culture was richer because it possessed both Eastern and Western 
elements.453 His colleague Akaki Papava found Georgian culture to be more influenced by 
the East than by the West, and thought that Georgia could play the crucial role of bringing 
Europe and Asia closer together and better understand each other.454 Other intellectuals 
were much more pessimistic and thought that Georgia would never be able to be an integral 
part of Europe, with Nikoloz Mitsishvili as the best example. He found that although 
Georgians had oriented themselves to Europe for 2000 years, ‘Europe as an idea was 
over,’455 and that Orbeliani had been ‘poisoned by European cynicism.’456 His conclusion 
therefore was that ‘every conscious Georgian needs to direct the mission of our culture 
towards the red Asia.’457 Seit Devdariania called those who believed Georgia could gain 
progress from joining Europe ‘fanatics’458 and Beno Gordeziani criticised pre-independence 
discourses (mainly from the tsisperkhantselni who had focused on the European Symbolist 
movement) for exaggerating the importance of European culture.459 Gordeziani even called 
for a reorientation towards the East ‘if the Georgian soul wanted to flourish with full power,’ 
as the ‘roots of the Georgian culture are in Asia’.460 
After the Second World War, the idea of Georgia’s Europeanness gradually re-emerged 
and several intellectuals perceived the Georgian people as intrinsically Western. Scholars 
such as Ivane Javakhishvili, Simon Janashia and Niko Berdzenishvili wrote about the Western 
nature of Georgia, and observed resemblances in history which came to be known as 
‘parallel evolution’. More specifically, they pointed at similarities between Georgia and 
Europe in terms of land ownership, social structures and existence of major feudal 
entities.461 Mikhako Tsereteli claimed that Georgian culture had even made a contribution 
to European culture as many Greek words allegedly have Georgian roots.462 Only few still 
defended the ‘return to the East’-discourse which had dominated the interwar period. One 
of these was Konstantine Gamsakhurdia, who had been a pro-European in the early 
twentieth century but turned rather cynical of Europe.463 
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In the 1980s, this trend of interpreting Georgianness as part of the wider European 
civilization continued, but their own authenticity became increasingly important. Guram 
Asatiani saw Georgian culture as a synthesis of Eastern and Western cultures with its own 
authentic traits, and noticed that Georgians were embarrassed about these Eastern features 
when they spoke with Europeans.464 
Thus, one can conclude that the feeling of Europeanness only emerged in the late 
nineteenth century and was an elite-driven phenomenon. 
 
PERCEPTION OF GEORGIA’S EUROPEANNESS IN THE REST OF THE WORLD 
Opposing views on Georgia’s Europeanness existed in the past and this subjective location is 
still visible in contemporary classifications. Georgia is part of Western Asia according to the 
UN classification of world regions,465 of South-western Asia according to the CIA World 
Factbook466 and the Oxford Reference Online,467 or of Asia according to National 
Geographic.468 The BBC on the other hand places the country in Europe469 and the Merriam-
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary in South-Eastern Europe.470 
For much of recorded history, Georgia was far-off and outside of the ‘mental map’ of 
Europe. The Latin world had only limited information about the Georgians, who were not 
even part of the Christianitas, the community of people adhering and obeying to the Roman 
Catholic pope. As Georgians were only independent for short periods, European rulers and 
intellectuals generally lump them together with the Ottoman or Persian Empires, with which 
they did not feel themselves to have much in common. For example, Immanuel Kant 
discussed Georgia in his chapter on ‘Turkish Asia’.471 Also the Russian Empire, which 
incorporated the Georgian territories in the early nineteenth century, was not even seen as 
periphery to Europe. Although Russian music, literature and science even contributed to the 
European civilization in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the masses of the 
Russian population were still seen as Asiatic.472 They were put on equal footage with the 
‘barbarous’ Turks or Tatars or even with the ‘New World’.473 According to William Parker, 
‘for centuries, at least from the western point of view, the frontiers between Sweden, 
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Poland and Austria on the one hand, and Russia and Turkey on the other, formed the 
eastern boundary of the European community.’474 
The limited cases where information or knowledge specifically related to the Georgians 
was published came either from travellers, from people who had spoken to travellers or 
from people with connections to Georgians. As a result, these accounts were biased and 
inaccurate as they relied on little factual substance or analysis. Regardless of the 
contradictions between the different publications of the time, the common view was that 
Georgia was part of Asia, but this may be because Georgia was under Ottoman and Persian 
occupation at that time. For example, in 1705 Nicolaes Witsen, a friend of King Archil of 
Imereti, wrote that the Georgians are ‘friendly Asians.’475 A more negative picture was given 
in the Thesaurus Geographicus of 1709: 
But altho’ Christianity be professed among them, the Men are of so rude and vicious a Nature, 
that they neither by Ingenuity and Labour perform any Mechanick Works, nor cultivate the Soil 
so as to produce any quantities of their Native Commodities, whereby to invite Strangers thither 
for Trade, nor indeed is it quite safe for a Stranger to Travel among them. [...] The Chief Traffick 
of the Country is in Boys and Girls, a barbarous Trade!476 
During the last two decades, an increasing number of Western (mainly American and 
‘new’ European) political leaders have propagated the view that Georgia is a European 
country.477 It is not clear, however, if they say this out of a conviction that Georgia is indeed 
on the path of democratic reforms or if opposition to Russia is the real marker of this 
common ‘Europeanness’. Still, no Western leader seems to have expressed the opinion that 
Georgians are Asians, as was a common perception before. Also for this phenomenon, it is 
not clear if indeed nobody thinks this way or if it is just not popular to say so. 
In the past two decades, Europe has become almost shorthand for the ‘European 
Union’. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, a considerable part of the population within the EU 
may have considered that the degree of commonality with Eastern Europe was too small to 
be able to speak of a common Europe. Two decades later, the acceptance level is much 
higher and the younger generation might not even question the Europeanness of the 
countries that joined the EU during the last enlargement phase. A similar situation could be 
the case with Georgia’s Europeanness too. 
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EUROPEANNESS AS MARKER OF GEORGIAN AND SUPRANATIONAL IDENTITY 
Identity is multi-dimensional, because belonging to a group can be based on diverse 
markers, e.g. sex, race, religion, city, region, country, or supranational entity. Different 
conceptualisations for this interaction, compatibility and complementarity between the 
various identities have been proposed, such as the ‘marble cake’ (intertwined identities) or 
the ‘Russian doll’ (multiple layers).478 In the Georgian case, the Europeanness is present in 
both the national and in the supranational levels of identity, clearly intertwining them. 
 
Europeanness as a parameter of Georgian identity 
Although a major debate could be held about the Georgian identity and whether this 
constitutes an ethnic479 or national identity,480 it is not relevant in this context. More 
important is the fact that an increasing number of modern-day Western scholars agree that 
such identities are social constructs. The Georgian elite interpret Georgian identity as a 
matter of common history and common culture. The Georgian population, however, seems 
to view it more as an issue of common destiny based on common values. Whereas few 
scholars have written about the common destiny as a marker of group identity,481 it is 
central to this research. Although historical arguments may be found for Georgia’s relations 
with Europe, the European orientation is not so much rooted in history, but rather in the 
desire to achieve comparable democratic standards and living conditions as the West. 
 
Europeanness as a supranational identity 
Although the notions of supranational and transnational identity are often used 
interchangeably, they are entirely different. Supranational identity refers to the feeling of a 
regional commonality beyond national borders (e.g. European identity or homo sovieticus), 
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and transnational identity is more linked with the multiple identities as a result of migration 
(e.g. African American or Pakistani UK-resident). The supranational layer of identity has 
increasingly gained importance and relevance due to the emerging international 
interdependence, the connection of supranational political structures, and growing trade, 
mobility and communication. Indeed, globalisation is not exclusively linked to economic 
processes, but also to social, cultural and political changes. 
As regional power blocks are set up, there is a need for each country and its population 
to share the same commitment and loyalty. This can be facilitated by fostering a 
supranational identity, which is not intended to replace the different national identities, but 
rather constitutes an additional layer which may even reinforce or cross-cut the national 
identities.482 Thus, most scholars concur that the European identity is created ‘from above’ 
by the elite – just like any other supranational identity – and is very EU-centric, i.e. identity-
building linked to polity-building.483 Some claim that the promotion of a European 
consciousness and the creation of a European identity have even been crucial policy goals of 
the EU.484 Indeed, large scale European public relations campaigns have been held, several 
European symbols (e.g. flag, hymn, currency) have been introduced, and since the 
Maastricht Treaty, European citizenship is a new type of supranational legal status. Crucial 
to identity is that people indeed identify themselves this way. However, this feeling of 
Europeanness is not too strong. According to a 2012 Eurobarometer opinion poll, some 58% 
of the population of the EU indeed feel European.485 At the same time, several authors do 
not agree that a European identity even exists. Instead, they consider Europeanness to be 
rather a new identity element that re-defines other pre-existing layers of identity and gives 
a new meaning to them.486 
There are many similarities with the markers commonly found in national identities 
(history, religion, political institutions, etc) and the idea of Europeanness is also mainly 
based on the exclusion of the out-group. Respondents to a 2010 Eurobarometer survey gave 
an interesting insight on their views of what constitutes the European identity: democratic 
values (41%), geography (25%), a high level of social protection (24%), common history 
(24%), common culture (23%), etc.487 With the exception of a common language – although 
there are close ethno-linguistic ties – one could say there is indeed a European cultural 
identity. However, there is no common political identity in Europe which is most visible in 
divergent opinions in foreign policy. This has been the case with different attitudes towards 
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military engagement in Afghanistan, Iraq, or even relations with Russia. Then again, if one 
considers that identities are constructed and that it took a long time to create national 
identities, one should not be amazed that the European identity, which is less than half a 
century old, is not very strong yet. 
The Georgians used to be part of a Soviet supranational identity or homo sovieticus488 
and wish to get rid of this by replacing it with something else. When looking at the 
geographical and geopolitical situation of the country, three main options arise: Georgians 
can try to integrate in the wider Europe, associate itself with the post-Soviet past and 
heritage, or turn towards renewed commonalities with the Middle East. Most Georgians 
now look negatively at the Soviet past and Russia, but similarly, the Muslim aspect of the 
Middle East is not favoured.489 Thus, attempting to be amalgamated with Europe remains 
the most favourable option. The Georgian political philosopher Ghia Nodia sees this 
Europeannes as a larger ‘framework’ identity for the Georgians.490 However, although a 
European supranational identity does exist to a certain extent, the ‘Europeanness’ of the 
Georgians is diffirent from the EU-related European identity. Whereas this latter European 
identity was engineered to increase the legitimacy of the European Union (i.e. identity to 
legitimate the existence of a polity), the Georgians try to find arguments to become part of 
the European Union (i.e. identity to legitimate membership of the polity). 
 
MARKERS OF GEORGIAN EUROPEANNESS 
Defining ‘Europe’ and ‘European’ has been a hotly debated and contested topic for a 
number of centuries. These two concepts have altered over time and even now their 
meaning is still changing and different people can give a diverse interpretation to them.491 
Initially, the word ‘Europe’ had a purely geographical meaning, and although there was only 
a limited knowledge of the vastness of the world, a natural border was found to separate it 
from other continents. During the Middle Ages, the concept of Europe was employed in a 
political sense but still referred to a geographical territory. For example, Charlemagne was 
called rex or pater Europae (king or father of Europe) and Europae veneranda apex (the 
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revered crown of Europe).492 According to William Parker, the confusion intensified as 
Europe began to express a distinctive culture or community of fluctuating extent.493 From 
the fourteenth century onwards and especially following the Turkish expansion, a growing 
identification of Europe with Christendom was present alongside the geographical and 
political term.494 Still, it was not until the sixteenth century that the concept of Europe was 
used in everyday language and indicated some form of internal cohesion and collectivity, 
which was a kind of myth constructed by the political and intellectual elite of that time.495 
During the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, Europe was often perceived as a 
civilization, as can be seen in the works of Montesquieu, Voltaire, Baudeau or Smith. 
As mentioned above, the main question here is not how Europe looked at itself, but 
rather how the Georgians define Europe and more importantly their own belonging to it. At 
his inauguration as President in 2008, Mikheil Saakashvili said: ‘Georgia is forever yoked to 
Europe. We are joined by a common and unbreakable bond – one based on culture – on our 
shared history and identity – and on a common set of values that has at its heart, the 
celebration of peace, and the establishment of fair and prosperous societies.’496 
Furthermore, he claims ‘Georgians, by their nature, by their culture, by their political 
behaviour, are Europeans.’497 The Netherlands-born First Lady Sandra Roelofs had some 
more arguments: 
First of all, we are an old European country, let’s start in this way. We are already involved in 
Europe, I mean, we are participating in the Eurovision Song Festival, European football 
championships and so on. And we are of course a member of the Council of Europe but we will 
have a facilitated visa access to the European Union. […] Before being part of the Soviet Union, 
they [the Georgians] were part of a bigger European family and throughout our history, I mean; 
we were part of the Hellenic world and even of the Roman Empire. I mean, we are feeling our 
mentality is very close to the European one. We had property rights in the Middle Ages like 
Europe had itself.498 
Although the number of claims of this Europeanness based on historical, cultural, 
geographical, religious or value-based substantiations is high, only little detail is given to 
provide evidence for such assertions. The following sections nevertheless attempt to 
analyse them. 
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The geophysical or natural border 
According to Tamaz Gamkrelidze, a renowned Georgian linguist and former Member of 
Parliament (1992-2005), ‘the European part of the "Eurasian" continent comprises "Western 
Europe", "Eastern Europe" (with boundaries running along the Urals and the Caspian Sea) 
and South East Europe, comprising Georgia and the other countries of the South Caucasus.’ 
He employs the claim that the ancient Greeks identified the boundary between Europe and 
Asia along the Phasis or modern-day Rioni River, but he does not give a reference to any 
specific author. Thus, he argues ‘it may be assumed […] that according to ancient beliefs, a 
major part of Georgia […] lay in the European part of the Eurasian continent.’499 
Gamkrelidze continued that ‘this situation is more or less reflected in a 1575 ‘Map of 
Europe’ created by the famous cartographer Ortelius.’500 Another popular view in Georgia is 
that the boundary runs along the Mtkvari River to the Surami range and then follows the 
Qvirila River to its mouth at the Black Sea, close to Poti. According to this position, the 
northern part of Georgia lies in Europe and the southern part in Asia, with Tbilisi being 
divided over the two continents in analogy to Istanbul. 
The geographical south-western border of Europe with Asia was already clearly defined 
in antiquity by geophysical features and has hardly ever since been questioned. It runs over 
the Aegean Sea, the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, the Bosporus and the Black Sea. 
Different opinions have existed and still exist about the continuation to the north or east of 
the Black Sea, and have led to debates for at least two and a half millennia. It is exactly this 
part of the border which is of relevance when determining whether Georgia falls 
geographically in Europe or Asia. 
As a matter of fact, very few sources remaining of the ancient Greeks mention the Phasis 
River (Rioni) as the border between Europe and Asia.501 Such a version would indeed imply 
that the ancient Georgian kingdom of Kolkhis (roughly one quarter and not ‘a major part’ of 
modern-day Georgia as Gamkrelidze alleges) was considered to be part of Europe, and the 
other Georgian tribes belonged to Asia. The problem with such version is that it does not 
define how the Europe-Asia border continues after the spring of the Rioni River in the 
mountains. However, contrary to Gamkrelidze’s claim, the Tanais River (modern-day Don 
River) was commonly accepted as the natural boundary by Greek and Roman authors from 
the fifth or sixth century BCE onwards,502 with only few exceptions.503 As most of these 
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authors had never travelled so far, William Parker claims that ‘this classical boundary lay 
across part of the world about which very little was known and where fantasy took the place 
of fact.’504 Indeed, none provide a justification for their definition of the border, and the 
famous historian and traveller Herodotus even admitted: ‘I cannot guess […] why the 
boundary lines set for it are […] the Colchian Phasis River (though some say that the 
Maeetian Tanaïs river and the Cimmerian Ferries are boundaries).’505 The Don River 
remained the commonly accepted boundary for historians, geographers, cartographers and 
travellers up till the eighteenth century.506 Also Abraham Ortelius used the Don as the 
boundary and clearly put the Caucasus region entirely in Asia.507 As explorers gathered more 
information about the world, they also 'refined' the border: different versions of the 
Europe-Asia border north of the Don were developed, but no common agreement was 
reached.508 
As geographical knowledge of Russia increased, several attempts were made to 
determine a new and more accurate boundary, and consequently other versions 
appeared.509 In 1650 Nicolas Sanson drew the border more westward along the Dniepr, the 
Ladoga and Onega lakes and further north to the White Sea.510 Three decades later Gerard 
Valck went more eastward and used the Main Caucasus Range to the Caspian Sea and then 
north via the rivers Ural, Tobol, Irtysh and Ob.511 Of more importance was the desire of Tsar 
Peter I to find a natural border that would place Russia geographically in Europe as he was 
politically Europeanising his empire. After his participation in several expeditions to explore 
                                                                                                                                                                     
preface), Diodorus Siculus (Bibliotheca Historica, II, 2, 1), Paulus Orosius (Hist. I, ii, 4), Lucius Ampelius (Liber 
Memorialis VI, 2), or Ammanius Marcellinus (Res Gestae a fine Corneli Taciti, XXII, 8, 27 and XXXI, 2, 13 Res 
Gestae a fine Corneli Taciti, XXII, 8, 27 and XXXI, 2, 13). 
503 Procopius of Caesarea referred to both Phasis and Tanais (Aed. 4.1, 4.8-9) and Vibius Sequester mentioned 
the Hypanis (modern day Kuban) as the boundary (Geogr. 77). 
504 Parker, 279. 
505 Hdt. 4.45.2. 
506 See for example Cosmas Indicopleustes (Christian Topography), Wilhelm von Rubruk (as quoted in 
Anastasius van den Wyngaert (ed.) Itinera et relations fratrum minorum saeculi XIII et XIV, Firenze, 1929, 196), 
Maciej Miechowita (Tractatus de duabus Sarmatiis, Asiana et Europiana et de contentis in eis, I, 1), Baron 
Sigismund von Herberstein (Rerum Moscoviticarum Commentarii (Basileae : Ioannem Oporinum, 1556), 65), or 
Philipp Clüver (Philippus Cluverius, Introductio in Universam Geographiam, (Gvelpherbyti [Wolfenbüttel]: 
Impensis heredum Conradi Bunonis, 1667), 510). See also maps by Fra Mauro (mappamundi or Fra Mauro map 
from around 1450; this map already takes the Don-Volga as the border), Gerardus Mercator (Atlas sive 
Cosmographicae, Duisburg, 1595), Nicolas Visscher (“Nova Europae descriptio”, 1631), Per G. de L'Isle & Tobias 
Conrad Lotter, (Mappa Totius Mundi, Augsburg: Matthaeus Albrecht Lotter, 1771). 
507 Abraham Ortelius (Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, map ‘EVROPAE’: sheet 5, 1570). The same applies for his 
subsequent version of this map of Europe of 1572 or the Typus Orbis Terrarum of 1575. 
508 (i) Drawing a straight line from the source of the Don to the city of Arkhangelsk at the White Sea (e.g. Pope 
Pius II, Ortelius, Purchas, Brietus); (ii) Drawing a straight line to the source of the Dvina and further following 
this river until it flows into the White Sea (e.g. Thevet, Quade, Merula, Wisotzki, Heylyn); (iii) Don-Volga-Kama-
Ob with straight lines between them (e.g. Clüver); (iv) Don-Volga-Pechora with straight lines between them 
(e.g. Visscher); or (v) Don-Ob with a straight line between them (e.g. Robbe, Duval, Moreri).015 284491 
509 A good overview of Russia's location on the Europe-Asia boundary can be found in Mark Bassin, "Russia 
between Europe and Asia: The ideological construction of geographical space," Slavic Review 50 (1991): 1-17. 
510 Nicolas Sanson, Cartes Générales de Toutes les Parties du Monde (Paris: Pierre Mariette, 1658), Carte 3: 
“Asie”. 
511 Gerard Valck, map “Europa” (Amsterdam: 1680). 
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the Russian Empire, Philip von Strahlenberg512 devoted 22 pages to this issue in his book Das 
Nord und Ostliche Theil von Europa und Asia. He drew the border along the Don, Volga and 
further north along the Ural Mountains.513 Although the Ural was gradually taken over by 
other scholars both in Russia and outside as the new commonly accepted version,514 there 
was no agreement how the border ran from the Urals towards the Black Sea. Different 
authors came up with their own versions, but none seem to have gone more south than the 
Main Caucasus Range.515 A 1752 map of Europe from the hand of the Georgian historian and 
geographer Vakhushti Bagrationi shows the Kuma-Manych Depression as the border, 
therewith clearly placing Georgia in Asia. In the nineteenth century, there was a growing 
trend of regarding Europe and Asia as one continent,516 which was given the name ‘Eurasia’ 
by Eduard Suess in 1885.517 Alexander Von Humboldt indeed found that in this specific 
region ‘Europe and Asia flow into each other through flat steppes’518 and Dmitriy Mendeleev 
thought that ‘the division between Europe and Asia is in all relations artificial’.519 
Based on the above, one can conclude that geographers have looked at finding 
geophysical features to determine a dividing line between Europe and Asia. In the absence 
of a clear divide, it is a matter of convention – i.e. also a social construct, often based on 
(geo)political considerations – and different versions have existed throughout history 
without reaching consensus. With the exception of some Greek authors before the sixth 
century BCE who indeed included the north-western quarter of the territory of 
contemporary Georgia into Europe, all other versions in the geographical sense clearly 
exclude it completely. The argument used by Gamkrelidze and likeminded scholars is based 
on a very selective and even inaccurate reading of the literature or maps. Still, 
contemporary geographers do not see the use of defining a natural border between Europe 
and Asia, but prefer to consider the Eurasian continent as a whole. Furthermore, a 
geophysical border would only mean that a territory is or is not part of Europe and would 
not have any link with the Europeanness of the people inhabiting it. 
 
                                                      
512 Born as Philip Johan Tabbert in 1676, this Swedish officer, cartographer, geographer, and linguist of German 
origin was taken prisoner at the Battle of Poltava in 1709 and sent into exile to Siberia. He obtained 
authorization to return to Sweden after the Nishtadt Peace Treaty of 1721. 
513 Philip von Strahlenberg, Das Nord und Ostliche Theil von Europa und Asia (Stockholm: Philip von 
Strahlenberg, 1730), 91-112. 
514 See for example Peter Simon Pallas “Reise durch verschiedene Provinzen des Russischen Reiches”, 
Petersburg, 1771-1773, Vol I, p 364 and Vol 2, p 312; Emmanuel Kant (Wisotzki p 424-5…….); Malte-Brun, M. 
“Précis de la Géographie Universelle » Paris, 1811, pp 2-3 ; C. Ritter, “Vorlesungen”, pp 64-65 
515 Different versions include: (i) the Caucasian Mountains (Von Strahlenberg, Mentelle, Malte Brun, 
Antonovskij and Zhulkovskij); (ii) the Erheni hills to the Caucasian mountains (Hahn); (iii) the Kuma-Manych 
Depression (Malte Brun, Reclus, Wisotzki), (iv) the Terek and Kuban Rivers (Philippson). Still, not all scholars 
were convinced the Ural was the natural boundary. Michail Lomonosov continued to use the Don, and Johann 
Georg Gmelin went further and drew the line along the Yenissey. 
516 Parker, 288. 
517 Eduard Suess, Das Antlitz der Erde Vol. 1 (Prague: F. Tempsky, 1885), 768. 
518 Alexander Von Humboldt, Kosmos Vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1869), 171. 
519 Dmitriy Ivanovich Mendeleev, K poznaniyu Rossii (Saint Petersburg: Typogr. Frolovoy, 1906), 143. 
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Europe as a political entity in history 
The Georgian leadership frequently called for a ‘return to Europe,’520 a ‘return to the 
European home,’521 a ‘return to the European family,’522 and even a very enigmatic ‘return 
to the European institutions.’523 President Saakashvili expressed the view that ‘the Georgian 
nation is one of the most distinguished and ancient members of this [European] family’524 
and that ‘Georgia’s aspiration to return to the European family is conditioned by historical 
reasons,’525 i.e. as it was allegedly part of ‘Ancient Europe’.526 Even stronger, ‘we would in 
fact deny our history if we felt or acted otherwise.’527 A few days after his election as 
president in January 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili told that ‘there is a view that there are old 
Europeans, that is Western Europe, and new Europeans, that is countries such as Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Hungary. However, there are also ancient Europeans. That is what 
we, Georgians, are.’528 One year later, while pointing at the Simon Janashia State Museum 
where 1.8 million year old skulls unearthed in Dmanisi (in south-eastern Georgia) are 
exhibited, he clarified his point: ‘There is old Europe and new Europe, but there is also 
ancient Europe. There are ancient Europeans across the street in the museum; you can go 
and see for yourselves what Georgia's role was then.’529 This archaeological find was also 
the source of inspiration for the slogan on the website and publications of the Department 
of Tourism: ‘Georgia, Europe Started Here.’530 There were other claims of Georgia’s 
importance for Europe during later stages of history as well, such as the participation of the 
Nobel brothers in 1883 in the construction of the Batumi oil terminal and the Baku-Batumi 
railway.531 Furthermore, it is common belief that in the period from the ninth till the twelfth 
century ‘Georgia was defending the security of Europe from the southeast,’532 that the 
evolution of the Georgian society followed the classical feudalism of Central and Western 
                                                      
520 See for example Giga Bokeria, one of the leaders of the parliamentary majority, 19 October 2007, Civil Ge. 
521 See for example President Mikheil Saakashvili, 12 March 2007, Imedi TV or 18 November 2010, Rustavi-2. 
522 See for example President Mikheil Saakashvili, 28 January 2004, Imedi TV or 26 February 2010, Rustavi-2. 
523 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 15 July 2010, Rustavi-2. 
524 President Mikheil Saakashvili, May 26 May 2005, Imedi TV. 
525 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 25 February 2011, 
(http://www.president.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=EN&sec_id=228&info_id=6167) 
526 See for example President Mikheil Saakashvili, 15 March 2007, Caucasus Press or 19 November 2010, 
Rustavi-2. 
527 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 22 September 2006 (available on 
http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/61/pdfs/georgia-e.pdf) 
528 President-elect Mikheil Saakashvili, 15 January 2004, Rustavi-2. 
529 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 28 September 2005, Rustavi-2. 
530 Department of Tourism, “Portal of Georgia Travel”, Department of Tourism, http://www.georgia.travel/, 
(accessed February 23, 2011). 
531 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 17 May 2007, Caucasus Press. 
532 Kakha Gogolashvili, 14 April 2004, 24 Hours. 
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France533 and that similar traditions of private property and individualism are proof that 
Georgia was part of Europe.534 
The historical argument of Georgian Europeanness and the desire to ‘return to Europe’ 
were not new. They may actually have been based on a similar claim which could be heard a 
century ago from the pro-European tsisperkhantselni movement. For example, Grigol 
Robakidze thought that due to the heroism of the Georgian people, Europe survived from 
the brutality of the Mongols535 and welcomed a European delegation to his country in 1920 
by saying that Georgians had been waiting for this moment for two thousand years.536 
Shalva Nutsubidze claimed that the Renaissance reached Europe from the East and had 
passed through Georgia two centuries earlier already.537 
Saakashvili’s claim that Georgians are ‘Ancient Europeans’, just like the hominids who 
lived in the region some 1.8 million years ago, should be seen in the context of the internal 
political developments at the time of the Rose Revolution but does not hold sense from the 
paleontological point of view. The Homo erectus georgicus, whose bones were was 
excavated in Dmanisi, is an extinct species and its link with the modern human species is not 
clear. Thus, they may be as much ‘Ancient Americans’ or ‘Ancient Asians’ as ‘Ancient 
Europeans’. 
Kolkhis and Kartli were rather unreliable allies of the Roman Empire.538 They were never 
Roman provinces administered by a governor sent from Rome, unlike a big part of the 
Middle East or even Armenia. Thus, these Georgian kingdoms became part of the wider 
Roman world, but merely as a periphery and did not participate very actively in the political, 
economic and cultural life of the Empire. At the same time, strong ties existed with 
neighbouring Persia as well. 
In the Carolingian era, Europe was a political concept with the territorial ambitions of 
the Roman Empire. The Byzantine Emperor had territorial aspirations vis-à-vis Latin Europe 
and there were strong religious rivalries with the Pope. Although contacts between Georgia 
and the Latin Christian states in Europe were nurtured, there was not much political 
interaction. Medieval sources acknowledge Georgian participation in the Crusades539 and 
100 to 300 Frankish crusaders fighting in the 1121 Didgori battle, where the Seljuk Turks 
                                                      
533 Ghia Nodia, “Obraz Zapada v Gruzinskom Soznanii,” in Mezhdunarodniy opyt razresheniya etnicheskikh 
konfliktov, Etnicheskiye i regionalniye konflikty v Yevrasii, Kniga 3, eds. Bruno Coppieters, Eric Remacle and 
Alexei Zverev (Moscow: Ves Mir, 1997), 156. 
534 Ghia Nodia, “Georgia’s Identity Crisis,” Journal of Democracy 6.1 (1995): 107. 
535 See for example Grigol Abashidze cited in Brisku, 80 or Grigol Robakidze cited in Brisku, 179. 
536 Grigol Robakidze cited in Brisku, 79. 
537 See for example Shalva Nutsubidze cited in Brisku, 178. See also David Lashkaradze, Problemy evropeizma v 
gruzinskoj literature: ot Teymuraza pervogo do Nikoloza Baratashvili. Tbilisi: Mecniereba, 1987. 
538 See for example the revolts of King Farnabas in 36 BCE and King Parsman II in 134 AD or the Kolkhian 
resistance supported by the Persian Sassanids and different tribes from the North Caucasus in the early third 
century. 
539 References to Georgian participation in the Crusades are quite scanty. Only two known sources speak of a 
Georgian regiment participating in the siege of Jerusalem of 1099. It is unlikely that Georgians participated 
during the rule of Queen Tamar in 13th century, due to her peace agreement with Saladin. 
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suffered their final defeat in Georgia. The fall of Byzantium in 1453 and the strengthening of 
the Ottoman Empire made the channels of communication with Latin Europe even more 
challenging. Nevertheless, sporadic contacts did exist through diplomatic missions and some 
minor trade continued. As for the Mongols, indeed Western Europe was spared from their 
invasions, but it is hard to follow the logic that this was thanks to the Georgians who were 
actually defeated themselves. With regards to property rights and similarities with feudal 
institutions, Marc Bloch has pointed out that analogies can be found in many other places 
outside of Europe, including even in Japan.540 
A major turning point came in the late sixteenth century, when Russia began to act as a 
channel and proxy for contacts between Europe and the Georgian kingdoms and 
principalities. Russia was only peripheral to Europe itself, but after Tsar Peter I attempted to 
Europeanise his Empire in the early eighteenth century, Russia was gradually accepted as a 
member of the European community and became intensively involved with the European 
political constellation. The large Georgian community in Russia, either in exile or for trade-
related reasons, was undergoing the same process of Europeanization and gradually passed 
this on to their fellow Georgians. This trend of contact with Europe via Russia continued 
after the annexation of the Georgian territory by Russia, and even during the Soviet era 
(Stalin, Beria, Ordjonikidze, etc). Clearly, this was the era when the closest contacts with 
Europe were nurtured. 
Already in the early twentieth century, Carl Bechhofer analysed and disputed the 
historical European claims of the tsisperkhantselni, concluding this is merely a ‘romantic 
hypothesis for which it would be difficult to find historical evidence.’541 More recently, 
Stephen Jones has argued that this ‘identification with Europe is illustrated by rather slim 
historical pickings’ and ‘weak historical evidence.’542 Moreover, such claims fail to elicit 
much support in contemporary historiography. Historical facts are all too often rewritten, 
re-interpreted or manipulated by politicians in order to give support to their interests and 
policies. Being part of the periphery in antiquity, seeking military support and patronage, 
establishing trade relations all indicate that contacts indeed existed, but do not imply that 
Georgia was part of the mental map of Europe. In fact, Georgians simultaneously 
maintained contacts with their non-Christian neighbours and even held key positions in the 
Russian army fighting against the Europeans.543 The Georgian leadership is undoubtedly 
aware of the lack of real historical ties between Georgia and Europe. President Saakashvili 
even admitted that ‘the whole history of Georgia is of Georgian kings writing to Western 
                                                      
540 Marc Bloch, Feudal Society II: Social Classes and Political Organization (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005), 
167.  
541 Carl Eric Bechhofer Roberts, In Denikin’s Russia and the Caucasus (London: W. Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., 1921), 
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542 Jones, “The role of cultural paradigms in Georgian foreign policy,” 91. 
543 For example: Alexander Bagrationi, son of King Archil of Imereti, was a General-Marshal in the Russian army 
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kings for help, or for understanding. And sometimes not even getting a response.’544 Indeed, 
whenever Georgia had the choice in history, it always opted for leaning more to the West, 
but this has always been with little success. Nevertheless, there is often an obvious 
discrepancy between the knowledge and the political rhetoric on the history of Georgian-
European relations. Thus, as Oliver Reisner has claimed, Georgian politicians ‘manipulate 
history for their narrow purposes.’545 In fact, the Georgian elite have been 'reifying' the term 
Europe, because the Europe Georgia wants to join refers to a concept originating in the 
nineteenth century. 
 
Europe as a religious entity 
According to Ghia Nodia and Stephen Jones, Christianity is one of the most important 
components of Georgian national identity546 and David Aphrasidze claims that ‘Christianity’ 
has been geographically and political-culturally equated to ‘the West’.547 Very often, religion 
and history are inextricably linked, such as when Saakashvili spoke of the ‘ancient Christian 
country’ which should ‘regain its place in Europe’.548 It is not so clear whether the Georgian 
Orthodox Patriarch fully agrees with this. While celebrating the accession to the Council of 
Europe in April 1999 at the Georgian parliament, he reminded his audience that Europe 
could not be imagined without the other continents, that the two world wars had started in 
Europe, and mentioned the importance of Asia to Georgia several times.549 
Some three quarters of the population of the EU consider themselves Christian.550 Many 
European leaders even view the Christian heritage as a main feature of the Union and 
heavily debated about including a reference to this in the European Constitution and later in 
the Lisbon Treaty. In addition, the majority of non-EU members in Europe are mainly 
Christian, with the exception of Albania and Kosovo. However, this does not imply that 
Europe and Christianity can indeed be equated and seen as synonyms. If being Christian 
would entail that one is European, then also the Copts in Egypt, the Christians in Lebanon 
and Iraq, or even the majority of the population of the Philippines or Chile could use the 
same logic to call themselves European. 
                                                      
544 Gideon Rachman, “Lunch with the FT: Mikheil Saakashvili,” The World Blog of Gideon Rachman, 28 April 
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Moreover, Christianity is not purely European as it is Middle Eastern in origin. Pope 
Urban II (ca. 1042 – 1099) admitted that ‘it was in Asia that Christendom first blossomed. It 
was in Asia, with two exceptions, that each of the Apostles met his death.’551 Georgia was 
Christianised when most of Europe still remained heathen or pagan. Thus, whereas Georgia 
may indeed by ‘ancient Christian’, most of Europe definitely is not. The Georgian clergy 
choose to be part of the Eastern or Orthodox Christian Church, which had its centre in 
Constantinople and did not recognize the authority of the Pope. There was clearly no unity 
but rather rivalry among the different Christian churches and the Pope was as dismissive of 
the Orthodox Church doctrines as those of the Muslims.552 Constantinople was even 
conquered in 1204 by Latin Europe during the Fourth Crusade and a ‘Latin Empire’ existed 
for 57 years on the seized Byzantine lands. 
Around the fourteenth century, Europe came to be identified with Christendom553 and 
Pope Pius II (1458-64) used the terms ‘Respublica Christiana’ and ‘Europe’ as 
interchangeable synonyms. He is also credited for being the first to use the adjective 
‘europeus’.554 This was already after the last Crusade had taken place, after the real schism 
between Eastern and Western Christianity, and at a time when Georgia was under Ottoman 
influence. Clearly, this Respublica Christiana only included those Christian states that 
recognized the authority of the Pope. With the Enlightenment, the Christian connotation of 
the concept of Europe again disappeared. 
It can therefore be concluded that although Christianity indeed played a prominent role 
in shaping the concept of Europe in the late Middle Ages, the terms ‘Christianity’ and 
‘Europe’ should not be used as synonyms. Furthermore, Georgia was never considered part 
of this entity, since this ‘Europe’ referred only to the Latin Christian world. 
 
Europe as a civilization and cultural entity 
President Saakashvili has often linked the wish for integration with Europe to the ‘European 
culture’ of the Georgians and to the argument that Georgians are an indivisible part of the 
European civilization555 and not just distant relatives connected by force.556 In his view 
‘Georgia is a representative of an ancient European culture; it is one of the cradles of 
European civilization.’557 He has even claimed that two of the biggest achievements of the 
European civilisation come from Georgia: wine and medicine, which was invented by Queen 
                                                      
551 Den Boer, 28. 
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Medea.558 This civilisational and cultural argumentation may find its roots with the 
tsisperkhantselni, as Paolo Iashvili for example claimed Georgia had experienced strong 
cultural ties with the ancient Greek civilization.559 Still, most authors in the nineteenth and 
twentieth century highlighted the Asian aspects as well. It is also doubtable to what extent 
the Georgian population at large feels that their culture is European, as part of them fear 
that the European orientation could be a threat to the Georgian culture.560 
Cultural arguments for Georgia’s Europeanness are closely related to the religious and 
historical ones. Culture is complex to define and changes over time: although a lot is 
inherited from the ancestors, people absorb and copy from their neighbours and patrons. 
The European culture (or maybe better cultures in plural due to the vast regional diversity) 
is partially inspired and conditioned by Christian beliefs and traditions, just as is the case 
with the Georgian culture. It does not mean, however, that all Christians share the same 
culture. Georgian historians seem to agree that there was only limited influence of the 
Greeks and Romans on the Georgians, and even that primarily reached the higher classes.561 
In fact, regardless of the eastern and western influences, the Georgian culture mainly 
continued to develop based on its own centuries-long traditions.562 Latin or French were 
never used as a lingua franca, as was the case in Europe. Literature experienced marginal 
European influences and The Knight in the Panther’s Skin, the most important Georgian epic, 
is set in the East. Even most of the tsisperkhantselni admitted that Georgian literature was 
mainly ‘Asian’, but wanted to share their future with Europe. Also other aspects of Georgia’s 
culture share little resemblance or commonality to what can be found in Europe. To name 
just a few examples, the table and food culture is unlike what prevails in Europe563 and 
specific Georgian winemaking differs considerably from the methods used in Europe. The 
Georgian traditional music with its specific polyphony and sharp dissonant harmonies has no 
homologue in Europe and the typical musical instruments are closer to those used in the 
Middle East than in Europe. Moreover, Samuel Huntington clearly put Georgia as part of the 
Slavic-Orthodox civilisation and not of the Western one. 
Since the eighteenth century, many European cultural elements have been imported to 
Georgia, mainly via Russia. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Russian Governor-
General Vorontsov laid the foundations of many cultural enterprises including the opening 
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of an opera,564 Georgian intellectuals learned about Europe from Russian literature,565 and 
the Chavchavadzes brought the first piano to Georgia via Russia. 
Thus, the extremely rich and inspiring Georgian culture indeed contains a number of 
European elements through the influence of Classical Greece, the Roman Empire, the 
Byzantine Empire, the Russian Empire and some direct contacts with Europe. At the same 
time, there are many similarities and influences from Ottoman, Persian and other Middle 
Eastern cultures. It is, however, very challenging to make a comparative analysis to examine 
which of these influences has the strongest lasting impact. A fundamental question, 
however, is whether it is practical and even possible to define the concept of ‘Europe’ based 
on a single cultural zone. Diversities between Swedish, Spanish and Bulgarian are so wide, 
that one could arguably claim they have no common culture. 
 
Europe and contemporary geopolitics 
As mentioned above, the membership of the Council of Europe, participation in the 
Eurovision Song Contest, and playing in the UEFA are used as indicators that Georgia is part 
of the European structure in contemporary global politics and geopolitics. 
Furthermore, the idea of including the entire South Caucasus in Europe out of political 
reasons emerged in the first half of the twentieth century. Certain Soviet publications put 
the dividing line at the border with Turkey and Iran, i.e. along the Arax River.566 However, 
not many followed this logic and this version never became really popular.567 
If we use UEFA as evidence for being part of Europe, Kazakhstan would also be entitled 
to call itself part of Europe. When looking at membership of some European structures, we 
see that Armenia and Azerbaijan are members of the Council of Europe and that Central 
Asian countries like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are part of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In the case of the Eurovision Song Contest, then this should 
also apply to Israel or Morocco. However, one can wonder to what extent the Georgian 
authorities take this contest serious themselves. The Eurovision Song Contest was set up in 
1956 with clear apolitical goals and is now often perceived as a symbol of European 
friendship and cooperation. Still, in 2009 Georgia wanted to send the ‘protest-song’568 ‘We 
don't Wanna Put In’ making a clear reference to Russia’s Prime Minister. After being 
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disqualified and not submitting a new song,569 President Saakashvili called it ‘a shame for 
Eurovision organizers’570 and Culture Minister Rurua said that the organizers had caved in to 
‘unprecedented and absolutely outrageous pressure which was in all likelihood encouraged 
and conditioned by Russia's financial levers.’571 Two years later, President Saakashvili further 
politicised the Eurovision Song Contest, admitting that ‘points are given based on attitudes 
that other countries have towards your country.’572 Although this statement probably 
reflects the feeling of many people, it is not common for a Head of State to attack the 
symbolism of brotherly relations among the European people in such a manner. 
 
An ethnographic boundary and the anthropological background of the Europeans 
Although nowadays anthropologic and racial arguments for determining Europeanness are 
not in line with contemporary approaches in the field of science, they have been more 
popular in the past, especially in relation to alleged superiority. Nevertheless, some 
Georgians may still believe in such arguments without speaking about it too publicly, and 
therefore also this way of thinking should be analysed. According to the Japhetic theory 
developed by Nicolas Marr – who actually focused on language groups and not on racial 
issues – and based on biblical tradition and Flavius Josephus’ Antiquities of the Jews, the 
Georgians are descendants of Noah’s son Japeth, just like the European nations. The 
descendants of Ham live in Africa and the descendants of Shem in Asia. Although few 
Georgians have openly used the term ‘dominant European race,’573 several made indirect 
references to it. Grigol Robakidze asserted that the Georgian ‘racial temperament could not 
put up with the East’s dormant condition.’574 Mikheil Javakhishvili was proud that 
Blumenbach saw the Caucasian nation among the highest of the Indo-European races and 
he claimed that ‘the best, ideal and unreachable – turns out to be a Georgian woman’.575 
Even after the defeat of fascism, in the mid-1950s the ideas of the superiority of the 
European race had not vanished. For example, in 1990 President Gamsakhurdia still 
defended the theory of the ‘Japhetic race’576 and in 1995 writer Malhaz Abdushelishvili 
referred to the ‘European race’ which had generated the ‘world’s most creative 
civilisation.’577 
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As early as the mid-eighteenth century, some European authors indeed brought in 
human factors defining Europe’s borders.578 For example, Johann Matthias Haas and César-
François Cassini drew this line between the Slavs and the Tatars.579 This might have been 
inspired by the civilizational definition of Europe which emerged during the Enlightenment, 
where the free Europe was juxtaposed to the political enslavement of Asia. 
There is no scientific basis for such ‘racial’ or anthropological Georgian claims, but 
genetic research has been instrumental in classifying people according to anthropological 
groups. Genetic research on the Georgians indicates a strong West Asian paternal influence 
(i.e. Haplogroups G and J2 are the most prevalent among Georgians, whereas the core 
European population is rather R1a, R1b and I)580 and a complex interaction of European and 
West Asian influences on the maternal line.581 Thus, according to the research of Ivan 
Nasidze and his colleagues, this brings the Georgians genetically closer to the Middle 
Eastern Lebanese, Syrians and Turks than to the European Czechs, Greeks or French.582 
 
Europe as a concept of common democratic values and political culture 
The Saakashvili administration was convinced that Georgia and its population shared the 
European values583 and that the desire to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic structures was 
conditioned by the perception that the EU and NATO are bearers of the same values as 
those shared by the Georgians.584 Not only the values but also the behaviour, especially with 
regards to the political culture, was seen as profoundly European. For example, the 
Georgian leadership considered the Rose Revolution a ‘real triumph of the European values 
of the Georgians’585 and the ending of the Ajara crisis a few months later to be evidence for 
the Georgians to be European ‘by nature’586 and ‘by political behaviour.’587 However, Ghia 
Nodia claimed in the late 1990s that the intrinsic Westernness of the Georgians is put into 
question by many.588 As he explained in a publication in 1998: ‘Yet given Georgia's actual 
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isolation from the modern Western political tradition, recent Georgian political behaviour 
has not surprisingly shown a closer affinity to medieval customs of personal and clan fealty 
than to modern standards of impersonal legalism and "civic-ness”.’589 
The West undoubtedly encourages the development of a European-style political culture 
and has initially reacted very positively after the Rose Revolution. U.S. President Bush called 
Georgia ‘a beacon of liberty’590 and Latvian President Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga similarly referred 
to the country as ‘a beacon of hope and of democracy.’591 At the same time, other leading 
figures from the Euro-Atlantic space were less enthusiastic. President of the Venice 
Commission Gianni Buquicchio complained there was ‘a lack of political culture in 
Georgia’592 and NATO Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer commented that ‘the imposition 
of emergency rule, and the closure of media outlets in Georgia, a partner with which the 
alliance has an intensified dialogue, are of particular concern and not in line with Euro-
Atlantic values.’593 Over the years, Western leaders and organisations consistently stressed 
that although progress had been made in several fields, Georgia was required to continue its 
democratic reform efforts and consolidation of democratic institutions. 
The Georgian leadership often referred to the ‘European values’ as if it were a well-
defined set of principles with specific criteria or parameters. Indeed, one can find many 
studies on European values594 and even the European Commission’s Eurobarometer has 
looked at ‘common European values’.595 However, academic literature does not often use 
this term and speaks of ‘universal values’ instead. At the same time, think thanks and 
journalistic articles have referred to differences and gaps between American and (Western) 
European values.596 The issue is indeed very complicated, as shown by the comprehensive 
statistical studies looking at a complex structure of value factors, such as the European 
Value Survey, the World Value Survey, or the UNDP Gender inequality index. 
As the European values are not clearly defined, it is not possible to assess the extent of 
how Georgians embrace them. Still, it is possible to see to what extent the commonly 
accepted values in Georgia correspond to those in Europe and in other parts of the world. 
The European Values Study provides a good set of global data that are valuable for this 
question.597 Georgians indeed support the democratic principles, but that does not make 
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them European since these values are shared by people across all continents. However, 
having some two thirds of the population not seeing a major problem in interference of 
religious leaders in politics is not very much in line with democratic principles and is not 
shared to such an extent in Europe. Acceptance levels of abortion, divorce or euthanasia are 
not comparable with those in Europe. Homosexuality is seen as completely unacceptable in 
Georgia, and some two fifths of the Georgian population would not wish to live next to a 
Muslim.598 A map created by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel on the basis of European 
Value Study illustrates in a comprehensive manner how Georgia is part of a cluster of post-
Soviet countries and closely linked to values in South Asia, and only tangent to the rest of 
Europe.599 
It is important to understand whether this respect for ‘European values’ really guides 
the reform agenda or is only nominal. Furthermore, whereas the population of a country 
may feel that universal values of human rights, freedom or rule of law are indeed the most 
desirable, it does not mean that these rights are actually guaranteed. Many international 
organisations have published reports on issues related to human rights and the rule of law, 
some of which have been positive and others negative. As a general rule, one could say that 
although progress has been made, a lot needs to be done in order to achieve a situation 
which is comparable to that in Europe. 
The Georgian leadership has often referred to the 'political culture' (in their view mainly 
referring to the Rose Revolution) as an example of Georgia's adherence to European values. 
The reality, however, is not always as positive. First of all, a government leadership is 
normally re-elected or ‘punished’ at the end of a legislature, but in Georgia such decisions 
seem to be made. Zviad Gamsakhurdia was ousted, Eduard Shevardnadze was forced to 
resign after massive street protests, and also in the years following the Rose Revolution 
there were numerous demonstrations calling for the resignation of Mikheil Saakashvili. Still, 
the recent democratic transfer of power gives hope for the future. In addition, whereas 
most European states will appoint people with a certain proven track record or experience 
to a ministerial post, the Georgian government was sometimes referred to as a pedocracy or 
kindergarten government.600 Several ministers were appointed without prior experience in 
public administration and others did not have a good image in terms of human rights. This 
can lead to situations where a quote of Hitler is used to promote the reserve troops.601 The 
authorities’ reaction when Bidzina Ivanishvili expressed his political ambitions also raised 
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doubts whether democratic values or the wish for power were the most important for the 
ruling elite. Also the church still plays a role in the political life, with the Patriarch speaking 
in parliament, mediating between government and opposition, and asking the population to 
end street protests. The political culture is almost exclusively based on personalities and not 
on ideologies; hence the large number of parties. The same applies to the government 
administration, where decisions are taken by a small group of people and no responsibility is 
trickled down to lower levels. Furthermore, in terms of reforms there is a complete absence 
of social dialogue, and in most cases the US model is taken as an example instead of the 
European one.602 
In this regard, one should not forget to examine how ‘European’ the Europeans are and 
how this impacts the Georgian self-perception of Europeanness. Many European politicians 
have also been caught while using uncensored language and racist remarks. It is a matter of 
a high degree of commonalities between the different constituting parts, but it does not 
mean that they are equal or even similar in all aspects of Europeanness without any 
exception. So, to what extent do the European peoples and the European countries fulfil 
these ‘criteria’? Personalities also matter in European politics, xenophobia is high among the 
Danes, Berlusconi has flagrantly avoided the rule of law, Greece was dishonest towards the 
EU in terms of its financial situation and had to be bailed out by the other member states, 
demonstrations are sometimes violently crushed in different EU member states, France has 
evicted Roma, etc. The Georgian leadership is well aware of these situations in European 
and has referred to these examples to prove its own Europeanness, or being even better 
than Europe. 
Clearly, the Georgian rhetoric is focused on building a European-style democracy, but 
there is no recognition that they have yet reached a satisfactory level. Although 
improvements are undoubtedly noticeable, a plethora of reports have indicated a significant 
number of flaws. Furthermore, as democratic values are universal and not European, 
adhering to these values does not make one European. 
 
A perception or feeling of self-identification and self-localisation (Selbstverortung) 
The above-mentioned arguments are predominately EU-centric in nature and there is no 
justification why the European Union should have a monopolist position in defining ‘Europe’ 
or ‘European identity.’ Instead of looking at specific criteria and parameters, one could 
argue that the mere feeling of being European and the fact one places his geographical 
belonging inside Europe should be enough to ‘be European’. If the alleged Europeanness is a 
determining parameter of the Georgian identity, one can cogently argue that it does not 
matter whether it is true or only a perception. After all, perceptions are more important 
than realities in matters of identity, as they are mainly social constructs. 
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Thus, one should look at the general feeling of Europeanness among the population at 
large. According to President Saakashvili, ‘all Georgians regard themselves as Europeans’.603 
Opinion polls, however, provide us with a picture which further complicates understanding 
the self-perception of Europeanness instead of clarifying it. Some 54% of Georgian citizens 
participating in a 2009 poll agreed with Zurab Zhvania’s statement ‘I am Georgian, therefore 
I am European.’604 At the same time barely 2% identified themselves as ‘only European’ and 
13% as ‘their own ethnicity and European’.605 Although these figures give the impression of 
being in conflict, there may be a rational explanation. According to political sociologist 
Marina Muskhelishvili, there is a strong socialisation process within the family teaching that 
Georgians are only Georgians and do not want their identity to be destroyed. Therefore, 
they do not feel themselves to be European in terms of national or cultural identity. The 
statement ‘I am Georgian, therefore I am European’ does not refer to a feeling of identity, 
but rather to an orientation.606 Such a differentiation was already suggested by Ghia Nodia 
in 1995, when he argued that political development in the country had shown the difference 
between being ‘European-oriented’ and being ‘European’.607 He also concluded that the 
‘pro-Western intellectual elite's presumption that Georgians were somehow inherently 
Western turned out to be a delusion.’608 Gia Tarkhan-Mouravi offers a different explanation 
for the conflicting results of the opinion poll. In his view, Zhvania’s authority is imposed and 
most people will not express their view about their Europeanness but rather about their 
agreement with Zhvania’s ideas.609 Another possibility may be linked to the methodology of 
the survey. People sometimes consciously and sometimes unconsciously present different 
faces in their interaction with others,610 i.e. identity is ‘situational’ or ‘contextual’ and the 
way the question is asked or who asks it can have a major impact. 
Although there are no concrete studies that may give an answer, it is also relevant to 
question to what extent the Georgian population at large actually has an understanding of 
Europe or the West. The fact that words and concepts likes ‘Europe’, ‘West’ and 
‘democracy’ are used interchangeably and that most Georgians do not know there is a 
difference between the political systems and understanding of the concept of democracy in 
the US and EU, there are ample reasons to believe that knowledge and understanding about 
the West is indeed limited. It should therefore not be excluded that some of those who feel 
themselves to be ‘European’ have based themselves on an incorrect image of Europe, 
largely created by TV and movies. 
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We can conclude from the above that a majority of the Georgian population does not 
feel itself European or does not consider its identity to be European. This strongly differs 
from the rhetoric of the Georgian leadership. Whereas popular feelings and political 
discourse on the European orientation and political identity are somewhat similar and 
related, this is definitely not the case with regards to cultural identity. So how come public 
discourse is so different, moreover, who are these who actually feel European? Given the 
personal background of the core of the Georgian leadership, it is probably safe to assume 
that these people indeed identify themselves with the West and Western values. Just like 
many of the tergdaleulni had been educated in Russia and the tsisperkhantselni in Western 
Europe, a considerable contingent of the current political elite studied in the US or Europe, 
such as former Prime Minister Nika Gilauri, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Gela 
Bezhuashvili, Ambassador to the US and former State Minister for Reintegration Temuri 
Yakobashvili as well as President Mikheil Saakashvili.611 Stephen Jones even called them the 
Mississippdaleulni – clearly referring to the tergdaleulni – as many of them had graduated 
from American universities.612 Some even grew up in the West and went back to their roots 
in Georgia to take up a high-level post, such as Salome Zourabichvili,613 Vera Kobalia,614 or 
Thornike Gordadze.615 In such cases, one may even question to what extent the mindset of 
these people has been conditioned by their Georgian roots or by the Western environment 
they grew up and were educated in and to what extent they are representative for the 
Georgian people. One may also question to what extent this elite is indeed European or 
wants to be seen as European.616 Finally, it is interesting to see to what extent these 
‘European-minded’ government officials are indeed guided by European principles, or more 
by American ideals. 
Therefore, it is probably fair to believe that the ruling elite indeed has a feeling of 
Europeanness or at least a wish to be European and that they project and extrapolate this 
feeling on the entire Georgian population, especially during their discussions with western 
interlocutors. 
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THE NON-EUROPEAN ‘OTHER’ 
The Georgian elite have not only highlighted their Europeanness, but have often situated it 
in relation to characteristics they do not have. Indeed, the differentiation of ‘us’ versus 
‘them’ is central, because identity is not only about what is specific to the group but also 
about what it is not. Very often, positive in-group characteristics are portrayed as superior 
over the out-group.617Although there is not a single or specific counter-concept of ‘Europe,’ 
especially the words ‘Russia’ and ‘Asia’ have served this purpose, and references are made 
to freedom of speech, lack of opposition, lack of free media, et cetera.618 This is not a new 
phenomenon as the tsisperkhantselni not only pointed out the similarities with Europe, but 
also the differences from the Muslim neighbours and Russia. Also the European orientation 
is put in contrast with a counter-concept, e.g. Saakashvili once claimed that they had a 
choice between remaining a modern European state or becoming like Afghanistan or 
Chechnya.619 In recent years the Georgian elite has been most sensitive in terms of 
distancing the Georgian identity and not wishing to be lumped together with Russia. 
Whereas Saakashvili as late as 2006 still claimed that Russia is a European country with the 
same values as much of Europe,620 he changed his mind when relations with the northern 
neighbour completely soured. In his speeches and interviews, he often juxtaposed the 
European values of the Georgians to those of the Russians, ‘who detain thirteen year old 
children in Tskhinvali’621 or who want to implant a ‘slave mentality’ and portray the 
Georgians as ‘most retarded and losers.’622 In order to be entirely delinked from Russia and 
the Russian language, the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs even asked to refer to the 
country as ‘Georgia’ and not with the Russian version ‘Gruziya’.623 Also the fact that 
allegedly more Georgians were using Facebook than Odnoklassniki was evidence that 
Georgians are no longer ‘a post-Soviet nation in their mentality anymore.’624 
Although most of the elite do not want the Georgian identity to be lumped together 
with that of their neighbours, many commonalities are undeniable. The long history of 
intensive political and cultural ties with the Russian, Persian, and Ottoman Empires as well 
as the close contacts with the neighbouring nations of the Caucasus has led to mutual 
influences and similarities. Indeed, in the presence of ‘eastern’ friends and colleagues or 
when it is in their interest, the Georgian leadership is indeed speaking of these 
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commonalities. For example, President Saakashvili said ‘Our harbour is Europe. At the same 
time we have much in common with the East.’625 
The non-European counter-concept goes hand in hand with the perception of European 
superiority. The Georgian intellectuals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
saw the European civilization as an entanglement of the finest images and layers of the past 
(Greco-Roman antiquity, the Byzantine and Christian heritages, and the Enlightenment) and 
considered Europe’s present to be supreme with its modern mentalities, literature and 
art.626 For example, Geronti Kikodze thought that ‘it could decidedly be said that European 
culture proved strongly its superiority’.627 A number of intellectuals of that time spoke of the 
East as being ‘barbarian’.628 This idea of European superiority was, however, not a specific 
Georgian phenomenon as it had emerged already more than a century earlier in Europe 
together with the ideas of Enlightenment. Although this feeling of European superiority may 
not be that explicitly mentioned anymore, the idea still appears to be alive. When talking 
about the constitutional reforms, President Saakashvili said ‘I want to tell you that we will 
never be Bantustan where constitution and laws are tailored on personalities.’629 Another 
example was when Saakashvili was displeased when he heard of tourists waiting in line in 
the heat for a long time at a customs point. After two officials answered they had never 
been needlessly stopped and their bags inspected by customs while entering European 
countries, the President asked: ‘So are we negroes? Why are we behaving like wild 
people?’630 
The East-West dichotomy has also been used to create an image of Russia as an inferior 
nation and state, and some even feel that ‘Russia is against the Western civilization.’631 
When Saakashvili came to power, he initially proposed that Russia and Georgia should join 
Europe together, but gradually moved towards rhetoric that labelled Russia as Asian. The 
Saakashvili administration often referred to Russia, its leadership and its actions as 
'barbarian'.632 For example, during the opening of the resort of Anaklia, he said about the 
Russian forces just a few kilometres away: ‘there are barbarians and here is civilization, 
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there is Mongoloid brutality and here is real Kolkhida Europe, ancient civilization.’633 It 
seems that nobody wants to be reminded of the fact that it is thanks to Russia that Georgia 
established close contacts with Europe and that it started a first wave of Europeanisation as 
early as the eighteenth century. Although nineteenth century intellectuals and creators of 
national identity, such as Chavchavadze, were outspokenly in favour of getting closer to 
Europe as part of the Russian Empire, there is no more support for such views now. Their 
literature is now read and used selectively in order to fit the modern-day anti-Russian 
sentiment, and writing anything that is not anti-Russian will be perceived as treason. One 
could indeed argue that as these intellectuals had been educated in and by Russia, they had 
a feeling of loyalty towards that empire. However, the same argument could be used for 
some of the intellectuals of the early twentieth century or the current leadership which 
received its education in Western Europe and the US respectively and as a result have 
another loyalty. 
Based on this perceived European superiority and the accompanying Asian inferiority, it 
is unsurprising that Georgia strives to be part of Europe, and any hint at Asian or Middle 
Eastern characteristics is even perceived as an insult by many. There is nothing 
irreconcilable between the two, and being a proud Caucasian at the intersection of ‘East’ 
and ‘West’ is not good enough. Whereas an outsider may question whether or not it is 
important to be considered a European, for the Georgian elite it is significant. Moreover, 
one may get the impression there is a certain fear not to be European. 
                                                      
633 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 24 August 2011, Caucasus Press. 
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CHAPTER IV – EURO-ATLANTIC DISCOURSE AS A 
LEGITIMACY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
 
For this research, a distinction was made between holding power and exercising power. The 
former refers to the legitimacy of those who govern, and the latter to the legitimacy of the 
actions that are undertaken by the ruling elite. Obviously the two are closely connected and 
have a direct influence on each other. Although overlaps cannot be avoided due to the 
multifaceted nature of legitimacy, they have been reduced to the minimum possible. 
 
LEGITIMACY OF EXERCISING POWER 
Legitimation mechanisms 
Pattern I – The Euro-Atlantic community speaking of legitimate action 
The Euro-Atlantic structures ‘radiate trust’634 and enjoy a high degree of credibility and 
respect among the Georgian population. Official opinions and recommendations by the EU, 
Council of Europe, OSCE or NATO regarding reforms, draft legislation or events are, 
therefore, generally perceived to be just, correct and accurate. President Saakashvili and his 
government often referred to positive assessments to prove that a specific action is 
consistent with the country’s Euro-Atlantic orientation, indirectly urging the population to 
accept it as legitimate. However, as illustrated in the following pages, there have been 
numerous cases of manipulation by politicians and media. James Appathurai, NATO’s Special 
Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, has complained that the Georgian Public 
Broadcaster aired an interview with him but dubbed his words in such a way that it reflected 
‘almost the polar opposite’ of what he had said in reality. As a result, he was convinced that 
this was not a mistranslation but pure fiction which ‘served a particular political interest but 
which of course undermined others and had the potential to cause more tension.’635 
The Euro-Atlantic institutions have often voluntarily come up with their judgment.636 
The violent dispersal of a rally demanding the resignation of President Saakashvili in the 
night of 25-26 May 2011 left four people dead and resulted in a number of complaints by 
                                                      
634 Interview with Merab Pachulia (Managing Director of Georgian Opinion Research Business International), 
30 August 2012. 
635 James Appathurai in an interview available on http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zsLQj6thzYI 
636 See for example the Council of Europe supporting the idea of introducing the post of prime minister 
(Director of the Council of Europe Directorate for the Strategic Planning Jean-Louis Laurent, 16 January 2004, 
Caucasus Press) or judging that the legislative amendment on the status of religious minorities is ‘an important 
and progressive step’ (Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe Maud de Boer-Buquicchio, 11 July 
2011, Civil Ge), as well as EU Ambassador Dimitrov confirming that the new constitution is similar to the ones 
in EU member states (EU Ambassador to Georgia Philip Dimitrov, 14 June 2011, Maestro TV) and hailing 
legislative amendments on the status of religious minorities (EU Ambassador to Georgia Philip Dimitrov, 14 
July 2011, Civil Ge). 
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the opposition and civil society groups, citing excessive use of force. EU Ambassador to 
Georgia Philip Dimitrov, however, called the dispersal ‘well-organised and lawful.’637 In an 
interview by Euronews, President Saakashvili underlined that ‘the EU Ambassador clearly 
said here that the government’s actions were legitimate’638 and did not make any reference 
to other diplomats, who in great numbers questioned these events and demanded an 
objective investigation.639 
In other cases, an assessment is given upon the request of the Georgian authorities. 
Especially in the fields of human rights and democracy, the administration frequently sought 
the approval of the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Here, the specific case of the European 
Commission for Democracy through Law (better known as the Venice Commission), merits 
mention. The primary task of this advisory body on constitutional matters under the Council 
of Europe is to give legal advice to individual countries on laws that are important for the 
democratic functioning of their institutions. The Georgian authorities have frequently 
approached the Venice Commission. For example, in 2010 it elicited three opinions with 
regards to the constitutional amendments and a new Election Code.640 Although the new 
constitution was not yet complete, Saakashvili proudly stated: ‘This draft, as far as I know, 
has been approved by the Council of Europe and by an international conference in 
Germany. […] I heard today that some people are saying that it is good to have a European 
constitution.’641 Once the law was voted, Saakashvili claimed that the Venice Commission 
had expressed the view that the new constitution was in ‘full compliance’ with European 
traditions.642 However, the final opinion of the Venice Commission was released only a few 
days later and considered ‘nevertheless that it would be desirable to further strengthen the 
powers of parliament. In this respect, the provisions on the formation of the government 
and especially those on the motion of non-confidence, as well as those about the 
parliament’s powers in budget matters, should be reconsidered.’643 As several changes were 
made to the final text of the new law, it is not clear on which version of the draft law the 
Venice Commission gave its opinion. Such a situation was even more apparent with respect 
to an additional law regarding the financing of political parties, as Secretary General of the 
Venice Commission Thomas Markert openly said that the text adopted by parliament was 
different from the proposal assessed by them.644 
                                                      
637 EU Ambassador to Georgia Philip Dimitrov, 26 May 2011, Rustavi-2. 
638 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 1 June 2011, Euronews. 
639 See for example the EU statement to the OSCE Permanent Council on the demonstrations in Georgia of 2 
June 2011. 
640 Opinions CDL-AD(2010)008, CDL-AD(2010)013 and CDL-AD(2010)028 can be found on 
http://www.venice.coe.int/site/dynamics/N_Series_ef.asp?Y=2010&S=1&L=E 
641 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 19 July 2010, Rustavi-2. 
642 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 15 October 2010, Caucasus Press. 
643 CDL-AD(2010)028: Final opinion on the draft constitutional law on amendments and changes to the 
constitution of Georgia - Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 84th Plenary Session (Venice, 15-16 October 
2010), 16. 
644 Olesya Vartanyan, “Povtornoj ekspertizoj ne budet?,” Ekhokavkaza, 1 February 2012. 
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A third possibility is that there is no evidence of the direct support from the Euro-
Atlantic structures but the Georgian leadership refers to what has been said but for which 
no proof can be provided. As there is little possibility for verification, the information can 
potentially be manipulated. For example, with regards to criticism on the growing military 
spending, in mid 2006 Deputy Defence Minister Kudava claimed that a visiting NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly delegation considered the Georgian arguments and deemed the 
increase in spending justified.645 It is, however, difficult to find any evidence of such claims. 
Another example relates to Georgian media reports on 9 April 2009 alleging that citizens 
from the provinces were unable to travel to the capital to attend a major anti-government 
demonstration. Deputy Interior Minister Eka Zghuladze referred to observers of the 
European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) who followed the situation and allegedly said 
there were no restrictions.646 Likewise, there existed no official statement from the EUMM 
which supported or rejected Zghuladze’s statement. 
 
Pattern II – Euro-Atlanticism as an explanation and blame-taker 
The considerable popular support for the Euro-Atlantic orientation implies that any reform 
carried out in this spirit should be considered legitimate. This logic was often applied in 
relation to NATO in the early 2000s, but subsequently it appeared more frequently in the 
context of the relations with the EU. Thus, the Euro-Atlantic orientation was referred to as 
an explanation or justification for specific reforms or events, for example when General 
Tevzadze was dismissed from his post as the Georgian Ambassador to NATO,647 when the 
Defence Ministry’s budget was increased,648 when the visa regime was toughened,649 or 
when the changes were made to a new anti-monopoly law and its adoption postponed.650 
However, it is not always clear to the population what the reform truly entails, why it is 
needed, and whether its consequences are negative or positive.651 Thus, at times the link 
between the reform and the Euro-Atlantic orientation is not obvious. One illustration is how 
President Saakashvili depicted the cabinet reshuffle in late 2008: ‘The new appointments in 
the government mean that we, as a government and as a country, must get much closer to 
                                                      
645 Deputy Defense Minister Mamuka Kudava, 15 June 2006, Caucasus Press. 
646 Deputy Minister of Interior Eka Zghuladze, 9 April 2009, Caucasus Press. 
647 General Tevzadze was dismissed from his post of Ambassador to NATO with the motivation that according 
to NATO rules the military cannot deal with political issues (Minister of Foreign Affairs Salome Zourabichvili, 1 
July 2004, Caucasus Press). Although this is indeed true, it is interesting that no objections were made five 
month earlier when this former Minister of Defence was appointed to the post. 
648 Deputy Defence Minister Kudava described the increase of the Defence Ministry's budget as another step 
on the path towards integration into NATO (Deputy Defence Minister Mamuka Kudava, 13 June 2006, Imedi 
TV). 
649 Georgian Parliament’s press service, 13 February 2008, Caucasus Press. 
650 Ministry of Economic Development, 15 February 2010, Caucasus Press and Government’s Parliamentary 
Secretary Gia Khuroshvili, 20 December 2010, Caucasus Press. 
651 Then again, some of these changes may be so technical that only few would understand, e.g. when 
constitutional amendmends were made to transform the military General Staff into a Joint Staff upon a 
demand from NATO. (Ministry of Defence, 12 June 2006, Imedi TV.) 
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European institutions and to Europe, ensure that there is peace in our country and proceed 
on the right path as we build and reform our armed forces.’652 
The Euro-Atlantic course entails unpleasant and difficult reforms for certain groups of 
people or the population at large. In such cases, referring to the Euro-Atlantic course and its 
longer-term benefits may make this mal nécessaire more acceptable without the authorities 
seeing their legitimacy being challenged. Similar to what often happens in its member 
states, the EU has been used as a scapegoat or blame taker. In many cases there is indeed 
strong EU pressure, but in many other cases government action is based on a gentle request 
or recommendation from the Euro-Atlantic community, but portrayed to the domestic 
audience as a formal imposition. Especially the issue of relations with Russia is sensitive, 
where public opinion is animated. Therefore, referring to a request from the Euro-Atlantic 
community partially relieves the leadership of responsibility. For example, when four 
Russian officers accused of espionage were handed over to the Russian Federation via the 
OSCE Chairman-in-Office, President Saakashvili said that this was done at the request of the 
international community.653 Similar situations occurred when Tbilisi came to an agreement 
with Moscow regarding Russia’s WTO accession, following pressure from the EU.654 
Additionally, excise taxes on imported and domestic tobacco products were equalised 
against the dissatisfaction of certain business circles but under pressure from the EU.655 
Moreover, a demand for the withdrawal of the Russian peacemaking troops was shelved in 
June 2008,656 and gas delivery to the Tskhinvali region was resumed on the request of the 
EU and OSCE.657 
Whereas the blame-shifting approach may frequently have been benign or justifiable, 
cases of manipulation – albeit difficult to trace – are evident. For example, concerns over 
proposed amendments to the food safety regulations affecting slaughterhouse 
infrastructure which were put in place in 2011. As a result, the slaughterhouse in 
Natakhtari658 became almost a monopolist and by June 2011, meat prices in the capital had 
increased by 80%. Vice Premier Baramidze put the full blame on the EU: 
                                                      
652 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 10 December 2008, Imedi TV. 
653 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 2 October 2006, Rustavi-2. 
654 See for example Gunnar Wiegand from the European External Action Service speaking about the 
importance of Russia’s WTO membership for the EU and the need for Georgia to find a compromise on 22 
September 2011 as reported by Caucasus Press, or President Barroso thanking both Georgia and Russia for 
their flexibility to find a compromise on 4 November 2011 as reported by Civil Ge. 
655 Finance Minister Kakha Baindurashvili, 30 October 2009, Caucasus Press. 
656 At a time of serious tensions just six weeks before the August 2008 War broke out, Tbilisi agreed to shelve a 
plan to demand the withdrawal of the Russian Peacemaking troops, because the ‘American and European 
colleagues asked us straightforwardly to give them the chance to work with the Russians’ (National Security 
Council Secretary Kakha Lomaia, 23 June 2008, Rustavi-2.) 
657 Five months after the war, ‘The Georgian government, on the basis of the request of the EU and OSCE, has 
approved the motion submitted by the company Itera-Georgia [Russian-owned gas distributor] on obtaining 
consent for conducting activities in the occupied territories - in this case the supply of natural gas to the 
Tskhinvali region’ (Deputy Energy Minister Nino Enukidze, 22 January 2009, Imedi TV). 
658 Although it is impossible to establish concrete facts, there are rumours that the owner of the 
slaughterhouse in Natakhtari has close ties to the government. 
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It is a serious problem to the population and for the government as well. I do not think it is 
within the interests of the EU, though we carried it out as it is important for us to meet 
international standards, though it would have been better to do it step by step, at least in a year, 
which would have been less painful. […] We are not complaining, but it is better to carry out 
such changes gradually. We were forced and we did it as it was in the interest of the country, but 
it would have been better to do it step by step.659 
Although publicly available information does not prove this is a case of manipulation, 
arguments in favour of such claims are very strong. There is little evidence of such a demand 
from the EU, and it is unlikely the EU would have insisted on this as there was no Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary strategy in place at the time of the Natakhtari case. Secondly, it is not 
clear why the government suddenly instigated this reform, although it already undertook to 
move forward in 2005 but did not follow through on this promise. Moreover, the EU 
simultaneously demands that free and fair competition be guaranteed when food safety 
measures are put in place. Finally, not everyone in the Georgian government agreed this 
measure had been pushed for by the EU.660 
 
Pattern III – The Euro-Atlantic community as a benchmark and point of reference 
According to Marina Muskhelishvili, the West is generally seen as ‘the good life which 
Georgians would like to achieve.’661 This implies that common practices or standards in the 
Euro-Atlantic region can serve as a benchmark for the country, especially if it entails an 
improvement of the domestic situation. Conversely, it implies that if something is allowed or 
considered normal in Europe, then it should be considered acceptable in Georgia, even if it 
should conflict with Georgian traditions and values, such as with regards to sexual 
minorities. Accordingly, such references to common practices and standards in Europe have 
been employed as a justification, often without giving an explanation of substance or 
consequence of such benchmarks. This has been the case with regards to the position and 
power of the ruling elite. For example, in connection with the proposed amendments to the 
constitution, Saakashvili declared that Georgia would introduce a ‘European model’662 of 
democracy and would ‘satisfy all the constitutional requirements of a modern European 
country.’663 When it came to a proposal from the opposition to appoint a non-party 
president in the country, ruling party members reacted sceptically, using the argument that 
there is no constitution in Europe stipulating that the president cannot be a member of a 
political party.664 Examples can be found in many other spheres as well, such as the 
governor of Mtskheta-Tianeti allowing wolf-hunting by using the argument that the 
                                                      
659 Vice Prime Minister Baramidze, 23 June 2011, Interpressnews. 
660 For example, during the conference "Eastern Links: Connecting for the EU future" on 4 July 2011 in Tbilisi, 
Advisor to the Prime Minister Vakhtang Lejava denied there was any pressure from the EU on this. 
661 Marina Muskhelishvili, “Georgia in a new wave of transformation,” The Caucasus and Globalization, Vol. 4, 
No. 1-2 (2010): 37. 
662 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 26 August 2010, Ekho Moskvy. 
663 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 11 May 2009, Rustavi-2. 
664 As reported on 19 May 2009 by Caucasus Press. 
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population of wolves in Georgia exceeded that in Europe665 and the Tbilisi Mayor reasoning 
that the installation of CCTV cameras in major thoroughfares, public places and schools in 
Tbilisi meant joining ‘those civilized standards, which have been adopted by the European 
community.’666 Another example is when Deputy Minister of Finances Papuna Petriashvili 
proclaimed that Georgian national debt (standing at approx. 30% of GDP) had not reached a 
dangerous limit yet, referring to the Netherlands with 57% and Italy with 110%.667 
The reference to Europe may not be fully accurate and the West also has its flaws and 
weaknesses. The Georgian leadership has instrumentalised and manipulated such cases to 
justify and legitimize its own actions. For example, on the dispersal of the 7 November 2007 
anti-government rally, Saakashvili spoke about the use of tear gas, truncheons and rubber 
bullets as ‘a normal part of democracy’668 and said: ‘Rubber bullets were used in Tbilisi, but 
you remember that real bullets were used against protesters in Amsterdam.’669 In addition, 
when experts claimed that some harmful Indian and African meat was banned in other 
countries but imported and consumed in Georgia, the national food safety agency denied 
this information and claimed that the same two Indian plants also supply several European 
countries and was thus safe for human consumption.670 However, it did not specify if the 
production line for export to the EU and to Georgia was one and the same, and working 
according to the same standards. 
In this context it is worth highlighting the standard-paradox. From one side, the ruling 
elite claimed to follow the European and EU standards in whatever they were doing. As a 
matter of fact, it is not clear, however, what 'European standards' are. More fundamentally, 
neo-liberal and libertarian forces in the government were not keen on approximating to the 
EU’s regulatory standards as part of the negotiations of a DCFTA. Basically, the Georgian 
leadership claimed to work according to EU standards, but renounced the EU’s system of 
standards. 
 
Pattern IV – Europeanness and Euro-Atlantic aspirations as a ‘moraliser’ 
A pattern where identity plays a prominent role is when the Euro-Atlantic speech is 
employed in a moralising manner, by appealing to the Georgians to act like Europeans and 
comply with ‘European’ moral and ethical values. The logic is very simple: if one wants to 
live like Europeans, one should behave like them. When at the opening of the new Tbilisi 
airport, President Saakashvili implored baggage handlers and taxi drivers to end their 
dishonest practices by underlining ‘this is Europe now,’671 he gave a strong signal that not 
                                                      
665 Governor of Mtsekhta-Tianeti Basil Maglaperidze, 2 August 2005, Caucasus Press. 
666 Tbilisi Mayor Gigi Ugulava, 20 March 2007, Caucasus Press. 
667 Deputy Minister of Finances Papuna Petriashvili, 18 June 2009, Caucasus Press. 
668 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 25 November 2007, Rustavi-2. 
669 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 24 January 2008, Caucasus Press. 
670 National Service of Food Safety, Veterinary and Plant Protection, 5 May 2010, Caucasus Press. 
671 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 8 February 2007, Imedi TV. 
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only state structures but also the population at large needs to change its behaviour. This 
approach has been especially useful in attempts to create unity and calmness. For example, 
when suggesting a possible departure from the CIS in mid 2006, President Saakashvili said 
that ‘in order to establish ourselves as a European country, we should be a united 
country.’672 Acting President Burjanadze similarly called for calm and stability in the weeks 
before the January 2008 presidential elections so that the country could continue its ‘move 
towards Euro-Atlantic and democratic values’.673 
Finally, ‘Europe’ can serve as a moral argument why people should accept the difficult 
conditions they are facing. When Russia doubled gas prices in late 2005, Saakashvili said this 
was ‘a reaction to the fact that for the first time Ukraine and Georgia have a chance of 
becoming truly European states.’674 Some four years later he said about the high energy 
prices: ‘it's much better to pay a market price to fly to Moscow and go there as free 
Europeans, than to pay a low price and have the status of a provincial vassal.’675 
 
De-legitimation mechanisms 
Not only did the ruling elite refer to the Euro-Atlantic path, but also the opposition 
employed similar patterns in condemning reforms. Reference was made to opinions or 
statements of the Euro-Atlantic Community. For example, Kakha Kukava demanded the Law 
on Assembly and Manifestations to be annulled by using the opinion of the Venice 
Commission that the draft law failed to guarantee the freedom of assembly and 
manifestations676 and claimed that if the Council of Europe would study the cases of 
opposition activists, they would ‘definitely recognise those detainees as political 
prisoners.’677 Furthermore, Labour Party leader Natelashvili used a verdict of the ECHR as an 
‘acknowledgement’ that Saakashvili was a ‘falsifier of the parliamentary elections in 
2004.’678 Even more examples of the pattern of referring to the Euro-Atlantic community as 
a benchmark can be found. Opposition politicians claimed that a new Code of 
Imprisonment,679 the reorganisation of the Ministry of Environment,680 energy tariffs,681 or 
elections682 failed to comply with European standards and that the judiciary and prison 
                                                      
672 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 2 May 2006, Public TV. 
673 Acting President Nino Burjanadze, 26 November 2007, Mze TV. 
674 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 30 December 2005, Caucasus Press. 
675 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 26 February 2010, Caucasus Press. 
676 Kakha Kukava (Free Georgia movement), 28 December 2010, Caucasus Press. 
677 Kakha Kukava, 7 October 2009, Civil Ge. 
678 Labour Party Leader Shalva Natelashvili, 22 July 2008, Caucasus Press. 
679 Tea Tsulukiani (Our Georgia - Free Democrats), 29 September 2010, Rustavi2. 
680 The Georgian Green Movement, 8 February 2011, Caucasus Press. 
681 Labour Party political secretary Giorgi Gugava asked for a fact-finding commission to look at the ‘illegal 
manipulations’ of government officials and their family in the energy sector, as the power tariff in Georgia 
exceeded the European tariff (4 February 2008, Caucasus Press). 
682 Levan Berdzenishvili, Republican Party, 26 March 2008, Public TV. 
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conditions were ‘a shame for a country wishing to have a European-style democracy and is 
humiliating for the Georgian nation.’683 
 
LEGITIMACY OF HOLDING POWER 
Gaining and maintaining legitimacy by making promises 
In order to create and maintain legitimacy, the declaratory action of making promises can 
be a powerful tool. Such populist discourse is not typical for Georgia but is common practice 
throughout the world and especially in pre-election times. Promising to bring Georgia up to 
par with European standards sounds very appealing to the electorate, as most Georgians 
would desire comparable living standards and democracy. Examples include Mikheil 
Saakashvili’s commitments to engineer ‘a European democracy,’684 Ajaria and Batumi would 
be ‘among the most beautiful places in Europe,’685 a new ski resort in Mestia would become 
‘one of the best if not the best ski resort in Europe,’686 Bolnisi would be turned into a 
‘European town’687 and Telavi into ‘a real European class city.’688 References were even 
made directly to the prosperity associated with Europe,689 such as promising that by 2009 
life in Georgia would be as prosperous as in Europe690 or that Georgia would ‘catch up with 
the Netherlands and go even further.’691 More often than not such promises merely voiced 
the administrations aspirations, but not the content or consequences, and sometimes there 
is little or no linkage to the event and the Euro-Atlantic integration process.692 
                                                      
683 Memorandum signed by the New Rights, Republican, Conservative, Industrialist, National-Democratic, 
Georgia’s Way, Freedom and Labor parties, as well as IDP advocacy group On Our Own, on 3 August 2007 as 
quoted by Civil Ge. 
684 Presidential candidate Mikheil Saakashvili, 6 December 2007, Civil Ge. 
685 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 3 August 2006, Rustavi-2. 
686 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 18 January 2010, Rustavi-2. 
687 Presidential candidate Mikheil Saakashvili, 11 December 2007, Caucasus Press. 
688 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 11 September 2007, Caucasus Press. 
689 See also how Saakashvili during the presidential election campaign in December 2007 explained how 
Romania had become much richer thanks to its EU membership and created the impression he will make sure 
the same will happen to Georgia (10 December 2007, Caucasus Press). With regards to the Eastern Partnership 
two years later, he presented a positive picture for the future: ‘Institutional relations between Georgia and the 
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690 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 7 May 2006, Rustavi-2. 
691 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 29 August 2011, Interpressnews. 
692 For example, in 2004 Chairman of the State Border Guard Department Badri Bitsadze spoke about 
transforming the Border Police according to the German model, which would be ‘another step towards 
integration into the European structures’ (5 April 2004, Caucasus Press). Adopting such a model may indeed be 
appropriate and enable border management structures to deal with their ambitious tasks. However, Bitsadze 
did not elaborate on what this reform entails or how this helps Georgia’s integration into Europe. In 2010, 
Giorgi Vashadze, Chairman of the Agency of Public Register, claimed that the promised introduction of 
biometrical passports would enable its holder ‘to travel to EU countries without any problems’ (15 April 2010, 
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The Georgian leadership did not only promise to elevate the country to the European 
level, but aspired to exceed it. Examples of such rhetoric include promises that the new tax 
system would be ‘similar to the European one but rates should be lower,’693 that the new air 
traffic control tower in Batumi would be ‘the tallest building of its kind in Europe’ and come 
to be known as a landmark ‘on par with the Eiffel Tower,’694 that the boulevard in Batumi 
would become ‘the most beautiful boulevard in Europe,’695 that Tbilisi would become the 
‘most comfortable city in Europe’696 and Kutaisi ‘the most beautiful town in Europe.’697 
Superlatives and hyperbolic statements are, therefore, frequently found in this context. 
Moreover, promises concerning the Euro-Atlantic integration are commonly linked to highly 
ambitious and overly optimistic timelines, such as the pledge to implement the ENP Action 
Plan in three years instead of the foreseen five years.698 Another example is how in March 
2007 President Saakashvili said there would be a Free Trade Agreement with the EU before 
the end of the same year,699 and in May 2010 he promised to achieve visa free access to 
Europe in two years time.700 However, at the end of 2013, only the Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement was initialled, as part of the Association Agreement. 
 
Gaining and maintaining legitimacy by boosting national pride 
Comparable to any other country that is gaining or regaining independence, Georgia must 
establish itself in the international arena. Giving confidence to the population through 
national pride may lead to a more optimistic feeling and expectations for the future, which 
can ultimately result in support for the ones who have created this feeling. Different 
patterns, often with a symbolic aspect, can be recognised. A notable side-effect, however, is 
that this pride may create a feeling of an entitlement of support. If Georgia is indeed so 
important and centre stage for the Western world, then people may consider their country 
deserves any type of assistance it needs. This idea is core to the second hypothesis of this 
research and is explained in greater detail in the following chapter. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Caucasus Press). Indeed, some countries may demand any visitor to hold a biometric passport, but this in itself 
does not make it any easier to obtain a visa. In another example, being named as host city for the 2015 Youth 
Olympic Festival would bring ‘many millions in investment, new jobs, infrastructure development and cultural 
integration into Europe’ (Tbilisi Mayor Gigi Ugulava, 27 November 2010, Rustavi-2). Indeed, such event may 
stimulate the economy but it is not clear how this will lead to a cultural integration into Europe. 
693 Minister of Economy Kakha Bendukidze, 9 June 2004, Rustavi-2. 
694 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 26 May 2009, Rustavi-2. 
695 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 23 August 2010, Rustavi-2. 
696 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 1 December 2009, Caucasus Press. 
697 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 31 October 2007, Rustavi-2. 
698 See for example State Minister Giorgi Baramidze, 25 January and 23 April 2007, Caucasus Press or Georgian 
government, 18 May 2007, Caucasus Press. 
699 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 1 March 2007, Civil Ge. 
700 See for example President Mikheil Saakashvili, 25 May 2010, Caucasus Press. 
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Pattern I – Georgia establishing itself as a new European player in the global system 
A key aspect of boosting national self-confidence is to create the feeling of playing an 
important role in the international system. As a small country, Georgia cannot pretend to be 
centre stage in global politics, but it can seek to be recognised as a valuable part of Europe. 
The feeling of Europeanness as part of the Georgian identity can definitely lay the 
foundations for creating this sense of being part of Europe. One example is how Foreign 
Minister Tqeshelashvili declared that ‘Europe is starting an active rapprochement with 
Georgia in order to clearly show that Georgia is part of Europe.’701 On another occasion, 
President Saakashvili was speaking of the achievement of becoming part of Europe: ‘We 
used to say that we wanted to become part of Europe and were knocking on its door. Now 
there are people behind that door who want to open that door from the inside. This is much 
more important than knocking on the doors of various European bodies. This is 
important.’702 Also less political issues can boost the ego of the Georgian political elite. 
When Russia imposed an embargo on several Georgian products, European markets not 
only replaced them but also created the impression that Georgia had found its place in the 
world economy. Saakashvili spoke about this: ‘Our traditional consumers lost the 
opportunity of receiving Georgian vegetables. Instead, we have found a new market for this 
product in Europe. From now on, we will supply our vegetables to Europe. [...] If the 
Europeans taste our Georgian vegetables, I doubt that we will have enough vegetables for 
any other markets.’703 On a more global level, the participation of the Georgian president in 
international events is used as proof of Georgia’s role in the world. For example, the 
invitation for the Georgian President to a conference marking the 25th anniversary of 
[Polish] Solidarity proved ‘that the events in Georgia truly are historic events of worldwide 
importance, not just for Georgia but also for Europe’704 and the Prime Minister of Sweden 
interrupting his holidays to meet President Saakashvili who was in Stockholm for a 
conference demonstrated ‘Georgia’s role in Europe.’705 
By alluding to the exclusivity of the country, the Georgian population may feel that they 
have something to offer to the world. For example, in terms of tourism potential, Saakashvili 
told about the Svanetian mountains that ‘without any exaggeration, there is no place like 
this anywhere else in Europe’706 and that Georgia is ‘the only place in Europe where one can 
enjoy beaches and winter sports in the same day.’707 In terms of culture, ‘Europe’s best 
opera house’ is in Batumi708 and ‘Samegrelo is the highest class of Europe I have ever 
seen.’709 Also infrastructure works are something to be proud about: ‘Kutaisi is the best 
                                                      
701 Minister of Foreign Affairs Eka Tqeshelashvili, 23 October 2008, Imedi TV. 
702 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 15 May 2004, Rustavi-2. 
703 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 13 December 2006, Rustavi-2. 
704 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 31 August 2005, Caucasus Press. 
705 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 1 August 2005, Imedi TV. 
706 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 8 January 2011, Civil Ge. 
707 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 3 August 2010, Rustavi-2. 
708 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 11 May 2009, Civil Ge. 
709 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 22 August 2011, Civil Ge. 
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Europe in Europe [sic],’710 Saakashvili claimed that he had never seen any project of such a 
scale in Europe as the reconstruction of Aghmashenebeli Avenue,711 the city of Batumi was 
better than Nice in terms of public spaces, cultural centres or green spaces712 and the 
bungalows built in Ganmukhuri after the August 2008 War were better than those in Ibiza or 
Monaco.713 
Finally, the role of Georgia in the ‘second wave of European liberation’ may also have an 
effect on national pride. The elite have commonly spoken of Georgia’s role in bringing a new 
wave of Europeanisation to Ukraine, Belarus or Moldova.714 They clearly pride themselves 
that, ‘In many political research papers our great movement has been described as the 
second wave of Europe's liberation, the first one being the velvet revolutions in Prague and 
Warsaw. President Bush has described it as one of the most powerful moments in world 
history.’715 
 
Pattern II – Underlining Georgia’s importance for Europe 
The Georgian authorities actively propounded Georgia’s significance for Europe, but 
remained vague or gave simplistic explanations of what this importance really is.716 This was 
poignant especially with regards to the energy and transport corridors, of which President 
Saakashvili said his predecessor had only blocked717 but would bring ‘tens or hundreds of 
billions of dollars’ of revenues.718 The hyperbolic and inflated statements almost created the 
impression that Europe cannot survive without Georgia, such as when President Saakashvili 
said with regards to the August 2008 War that the fate of Europe was decided in Georgia.719 
At the occasion of the signing of an agreement on the construction of a railway from 
Kars in Turkey to Baku via Georgia in February 2007 the Georgian President said: 
Whereas now Georgia is cut off because the Russian railway has been closed, by 2010 Georgian 
railways will turn from a dead-end into a component of the European rail network. […] This is an 
alternative for Europe, this is a road for oil and gas for Europe as well as a railway and a normal 
highway, because we are building lots of roads. This is a completely new dimension for our 
European partners. These are the achievements that are happening now and this is why we are 
calling this a historic day. We were a region that had almost turned into a dead-end but now we 
                                                      
710 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 29 August 2011, Interpressnews. 
711 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 20 November 2011, Rustavi-2. 
712 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 20 July 2011, Civil Ge. 
713 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 31 August 2009, Caucasus Press. 
714 This issue, which was very strong in 2005, is described in greater detail in the Chapter V. 
715 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 20 November 2005, Rustavi-2. 
716 The expression of the country’s importance goes back to the early 1990s and has mainly been prominent 
with regards to the energy and transport corridors. President Shevardnadze was even at the cradle of many 
initiatives and his discourse focused on making the Caucasus the heart of a new Silk Road. 
717 See for example President Mikheil Saakashvili, 15 May 2004, Imedi TV. 
718 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 7 February 2007, Public TV. 
719 See for example President Mikheil Saakashvili, 9 June and 20 August 2008, Rustavi-2 or 1 September 2008, 
Caucasus Press. 
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are a region that is needed not just by us but also by others, and that is our special, historic, 
political, geographic and economic mission.720 
Two years later, he added: 
Georgia is the only route to Europe for six landlocked states in the Central and Caspian region 
and the shortest route from north China to most of the European destination. Goods should 
either move in the direction of the north - via Russia, and this road is risky, corruption is rife 
there, and political risks are high too, or take the other road, which is a direct line across 
Georgia.721 
The government promoted Georgia as ‘a strategic partner of the EU’ in the field of 
energy.722 Such rhetoric was particularly strong in the aftermath of the 2006 energy crisis in 
Europe: 'Europe woke up this winter and now is paying great attention to the Caspian 
energy carriers, which may be transited via Georgia's territory.’723 Given Georgia’s own 
winter challenges with regards to gas and electricity up to 2005, the idea that the country 
was suddenly important to the 'alternative energy corridor that we are naturally offering [to 
Europe and the US]'724 and ‘helping Europe to resolve its problems’725 is perhaps appealing 
to the Georgian population, but largely overestimated. President Saakashvili asserted that 
his country was ‘stepping up efforts to help the whole of Europe consider using Georgian 
infrastructure to get supplies from the region for their own consumption.’726 The 
government also claimed that the EU considered Spain, Switzerland and Georgia as reserve 
suppliers of electricity to Europe727 and that Georgia would 'become one of the main 
suppliers of energy for Eastern Europe in the future’728 and establish itself as ‘the first large-
scale renewable energy exporter to Europe.’729 The president was speaking of an electricity 
transmission line to deliver electricity generated in Georgia to Turkey and probably further 
to Europe.730 However, the technical aspect, implying that there cannot be a direct export 
from Georgia to Europe, but rather a swap with intermediary Turkey, was not raised. 
Undoubtedly, exaggerations and inaccuracies may create huge enthusiasm and pride, but 
could as well lead to a feeling of deception in the longer term. Although the proposed but 
still not confirmed Nabucco pipeline will provide only 5% of the total European gas demand, 
Saakashvili claimed that ‘Georgia has really become the main transit component for the gas 
delivered to Europe.’731 
 
                                                      
720 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 7 February 2007, Public TV. 
721 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 24 October 2009, Imedi TV. 
722 Prime Minister Nika Gilauri, 8 November 2010, Black Sea Press. 
723 Energy Minister Nika Gilauri, 16 March 2006, Sarke. 
724 Minister of Foreign Affairs Gela Bezhuashvili, 6 July 2006, Imedi TV. 
725 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 26 June 2007, Mze TV. 
726 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 30 January 2006, Rustavi-2. 
727 Prime Minister Nika Gilauri, 22 March 2011, Civil Ge. 
728 Prime Minister Nika Gilauri, 14 June 2011, Caucasus Press. 
729 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 9 December 2010, Civil Ge. 
730 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 24 February 2011, Rustavi-2. 
731 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 8 May 2009, Caucasus Press. 
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Pattern III – Portraying sympathy as support and depicting Georgia as a top priority for the 
Euro-Atlantic Community 
In an article published in August 2011, James Wertsch raised the ambiguity and confusion 
between the concepts of support and sympathy from the West towards Georgia. He 
elaborated on the example of how the Georgian media presented a discussion on Georgia’s 
territorial integrity at the U.S. Senate as a ‘major debate’ or an ‘issue of national 
importance’ for Americans.732 Wertsch also identified the difference between interests 
being at stake and mere sympathy, with a misinterpretation between the two potentially 
resulting in tragic consequences. In the specific case of Georgia, he argues one better speaks 
of sympathy. 
Every time Georgia’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic community was discussed with 
European leaders, this Western sympathy was portrayed to the domestic audience as being 
a proof of strong and unconditional support for becoming a member of the EU or NATO. 
Many European leaders have indeed expressed their support for such goals and their 
countries have provided assistance in this regards, but it does not mean that there is 
political support for membership. For example, when the Lithuanian speaker of parliament 
in 2005 expressed support for Georgia’s aspiration to join NATO and EU733 or when NATO 
Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer a year later confirmed NATO support for Georgia's 
integration with the alliance and European bodies,734 this did not imply that they felt 
Georgia was ready for membership. It is not clear whether diplomatic language is not clearly 
understood and interpreted or if it is rephrased differently on purpose. At the same time, 
perhaps the responsibility should also be on Western politicians to avoid using ambiguous 
words like ‘support’ and be more concrete of how they see their engagement. 
This reasoning is further contaminated by a dichotomy-thinking of Russia versus 
Georgia. In the mind of the Georgian leadership, the West has to choose sides and pursue a 
principled foreign policy. Balanced thinking, middle alternatives or pursuing positive 
relations with both countries are perceived as inappropriate and have led to angry criticism 
towards countries like Germany, France and Italy.735 
When engaging the rhetoric of the Georgian leadership, one could get the impression 
that Georgia is at the centre of world politics and that the situation in the country is of key 
importance and the priority agenda point for the West. Examples include when President 
Saakashvili proclaimed that the 2004 NATO summit had proven that Georgia had come 
                                                      
732 James Wertsch, “U.S. interest or sympathy in Georgia,” available on http://stlbeacon.org/voices/in-the-
news/112074-interest-or-sympathy-for-georgia, 7 August 2011. 
733 Lithuanian Seimas Chairman Artūras Paulauskas, 7 June 2005, Rustavi-2. 
734 NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 25 July 2006, Imedi TV. 
735 For example, unhappy about some remarks from Italian prime minister Berlusconi on the August 2008 War, 
President Saakashvili said in an ambiguous way: 'I understand that my friend Silvio Berlusconi has friendly, 
almost intimate relations with Vladimir Putin' (1 October 2010, Rustavi-2); during the course of 2009 and 2010 
several Georgian officials made strong statements against French plans to sell a Mistral helicopter carrier to 
Russia. 
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‘under the primary focus of NATO.’736 Another is how Saakashvili claimed that the reason for 
Walter Schwimmer not being re-elected as Secretary General of the Council of Europe was 
because of his ‘grave mistake with respect to Georgia’.737 
The feeling is created, sometimes correctly and sometimes exaggerated, that Georgia is 
the ‘main topic’738 or the ‘focus’739 of debates in the West. In early 2009, Chairman of 
Parliamentary Committee on European Integration David Darchiashvili from the then ruling 
United National Movement party even thought that the country was so important that the 
European Parliament could set up a special committee dealing with Georgian affairs.740 One 
might even start to believe that EU foreign policy is Georgia-centric. According to President 
Saakashvili, the Eastern Partnership is ‘Europe’s very dignified response to the August War, 
although it might be a little bit late a response.’741 However, it denies the fact that it was 
already presented at the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 26 May 2008, i.e. 
more than a month before the August War, and that Georgia is only one of the six countries 
being part of this initiative. In another example, the visit of Catherine Ashton to Georgia 
testified ‘a special interest of the EU to Georgia.’742 However, the High Representative also 
visited Armenia and Azerbaijan during her trip. 
 
Maintaining legitimacy by highlighting success 
Pattern I – Repetition of achievements 
The Georgian leadership has repeated certain achievements and progress, especially on 
issues where the impact on the population can be portrayed to be important. The visibility 
given to the visa facilitation agreement with the EU serves as an excellent example. 
Although this agreement does not mean that all Georgians can easily obtain a visa to travel 
to Schengen states or that no visa is required at all, the Georgian authorities used it for 
almost five years as a major proof of the success of European integration. As early as 2006, 
the upcoming success of a simplification of visa regulations was proposed743 and a year 
later, Saakashvili promised that such an agreement would be in force in 2008.744 At frequent 
                                                      
736 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 30 June 2004, Imedi TV. 
737 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 26 June 2004, Rustavi-2. 
738 For example Georgia was the ‘main topic’ of discussion at the OSCE Summit in Astana as reported on 1 
December 2010 by Rustavi-2. 
739 For example Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Nino Kalandadze said that the official Ministerial session at 
the Council of Europe will ‘focus on actions taken by the Council of Europe following the 2008 August invasion 
and ongoing occupation of the Georgian territories by the Russian Federation’ as reported on 10 May 2010 by 
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740 Chairman of Parliamentary Committee on European Integration David Darchiashvili, 3 February 2009, 
Caucasus Press. 
741 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 7 May 2009, Civil Ge. 
742 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Nino Kalandadze, 14 November 2011, Black Sea Press. 
743 See for example State Minister for European Integration Giorgi Baramidze, 6 April 2006, Imedi TV. 
744 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 1 March 2007, Public TV. 
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intervals over the following months and years the leadership constantly marked progress.745 
When the visa facilitation agreement was finally signed in June 2010, it was one of the main 
news items on in the media746 and in the following months officials from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs continued to refer to this achievement in the media.747 
 
Pattern II – Vagueness and exaggerations of success 
The authorities give notable visibility to their accomplishments and to the point of declaring 
them a success, yet many of their loudly lauded accomplishments remained deeply 
ambiguous. The opposition took advantage of the absence of openness and subjected it to 
acerbic criticism.748 As a result, one can easily procure a distorted and overly positive 
perception. For example, although the negotiation and signing of a visa facilitation 
agreement received notable attention as explained above, little detail was released 
concerning the real content and implications. In the rare cases that adequate information 
was given, the message that it would only apply to certain categories of people was not 
adequately highlighted.749 Due to this constructed ambiguity, many Georgians might get the 
impression that getting a visa has become a small and simple formality. 
In some cases, it is arguable to what extent the alleged success is actually an important 
achievement at all. One example is about the government of Georgia being given the 
‘Political Entrepreneurship Award 2005’ from the European Enterprising Institute and the 
European Union for Tax Reform. The EU-sceptic Minister for Coordination of Economic 
Reforms Kakha Bendukidze said this ‘means that the European Community acknowledges 
the reforms carried out in Georgia’750 but he failed to disclose that these two rather 
unknown NGOs have no ties to the official EU institutions and definitely do not represent 
them. Another example was how the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated: 
                                                      
745 See for example Minister of Foreign Affairs Gela Bezhuashvili, 3 July 2007, Caucasus Press; Prime Minister 
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750 Minister for Coordination of Economic Reforms Kakha Bendukidze, 15 July 2005, Black Sea Press. 
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The EU has granted Georgia the right to align itself with political declarations adopted in the 
framework of the EU’s CFSP. […] This brings Georgia even closer to Europe and is of particular 
importance in terms of the further development of Georgia’s political co-operation with the 
European Union. Georgia is now involved in carrying out the EU’s CFSP, and afforded the 
opportunity to voice its own position alongside the European Union’s 27 member states on the 
ongoing political developments in the world.751 
Although this statement is factually correct, individuals with a limited knowledge of politics 
and international relations can easily misinterpret the assertion and interpret it out of 
context. It may offer the impression that Georgia has become a player possessing a voice 
within EU foreign policy. However, this opportunity is given to all Eastern Partnership 
countries – with the exception of Belarus – and only means that these countries can align 
themselves to CFSP declarations upon invitation. It does not imply any participation in policy 
making. Furthermore, as Georgia has aligned to less than 70%, with a declining trend over 
the years, of declarations to which it was invited to join,752 it is clear its foreign policy does 
not fully align with the EU.753  
Most agreements are a matter of giving and taking. While taking pride and credit with 
the achieved success – which may indeed bring the integration with the Euro-Atlantic 
community to a next level – the downside fails to receive the same level of visibility, if any. 
Even if it is mentioned, hardly any explanation of content and implications is provided. A 
good illustration is the bilateral agreement between Georgia and the EU for the protection 
of their respective geographical indications, which would ‘regulate mutual recognition and 
protection of geographical indications and names of origin of wine products, which will 
minimize cases of falsification of Georgian wine on the European market.’754 Indeed, the 
twenty seven Georgian geographical indications included in the agreement (such as 
Khvanchkara, Kindzmarauli, Saperavi, or Mukuzani) are part of the national pride and there 
had been cases of falsification of Georgian wines on the European market. However, most 
Georgian wines do not meet the necessary food safety standards and are too expensive with 
the result that only very little Georgian wine is sold in Europe. Not much was said about the 
3,000-odd registered products in Europe, which had an impact on the Georgian producers 
who suddenly could no longer produce Champagne or Cognac. Thus, concluding an 
agreement where mainly European producers would be protected was presented as a 
success for Georgia. Another example refers again to the Visa Facilitation Agreement which 
was conditional to an Agreement on Re-admission.755 
                                                      
751 Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 June 2007, Civil Ge. 
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755 Although this second agreement was indeed mentioned by the countr’s leadership, it was hardly ever 
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Finally, the Georgian leadership frequently employed a tailored vocabulary, suggestive in 
nature but without a concrete basis. The use of incorrect terminology was clearly the case 
with regards to the status of the country vis-à-vis the EU. Although membership was a 
distant prospect, the authorities seemed to wish to capitalise on their promises and prove 
that a high degree of integration had been achieved. In November 2008, President 
Saakashvili proclaimed that Georgia would be granted the ‘status of EU’s privileged 
partner,’756 although there is officially no such status.757 Moreover, the Georgian 
administration has voiced on a number of occasions, the prospect of becoming an 
‘associated member of the EU,’758 despite the fact that such a status does not exist. The fact 
that the notion of an associate membership is only used in domestic discourse and not with 
international interlocutors suggests that there is a very conscious act of semantic 
manipulation. 
 
Pattern III – Success exceeding expectations 
President Saakashvili and his administration set forward a number of ambitious objectives, 
and in their opinion the results and successes frequently exceeded the promises and 
expectations. In April 2005 Parliamentary Speaker Burjanadze stated the country could 
transition into the Membership Action Plan ‘earlier than expected’759 and two years later 
President Saakashvili claimed that the NATO Secretary General's visit to Georgia was ‘much 
more successful than I expected.’760 Even stronger, many events surpass President 
Saakashvili’s dreams, such as when he said that ‘the Euro-Atlantic Alliance is stating loud 
and clear that Georgia will inevitably become a member of NATO; previously it was 
impossible to even dream about this.’761 He spoke similarly a few weeks before signing on 
the Eastern Partnership: ‘This means that for the first time we will, in an organised manner, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
return of people who have no identification or hide their identities, so-called illegals’ (Head of the 
parliamentary foreign affairs committee Konstantine Gabashvili, 28 February 2007, Rustavi-2). The opposition 
only seems to have given attention to the contents of the readmission agreement once it had been signed and 
sent for ratification to parliament. Saying that ‘we cannot permit the deportation of 500,000 of our citizens 
without giving them certain time’ (Labour Party ideological secretary Dzagania, 16 December 2010, Caucasus 
Press) or that such ‘readmission process may entail the creation of camps for refugees in the country’ 
(Opposition Member of Parliament Dimitri Lordkipanidze, 9 March 2011, Caucasus Press) were exaggerations, 
but they show that some opposition politicians have understood that not all agreements are necessarily a 
success. 
756 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 14 November 2008, Civil Ge. 
757 The idea of a ‘privileged partnership’ was raised by the German conservative party CDU in order to move 
ahead with the EU’s relationship with Turkey, but without giving it membership. This idea was later supported 
by some other EU member states, but completely rejected by Turkey. 
758 See for example Parliamentary Speaker Nino Burjanadze, 2 November 2004, RIA and 13 September 2005, 
Georgian Radio; or Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigol Vashadze, 23 May 2009, Rustavi-2. 
759 Parliament speaker Nino Burjanadze, 11 April 2005, Rustavi-2. 
760 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 4 October 2007, Civil Ge. 
761 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 31 December 2008, Civil Ge. 
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establish close relations with the EU. This is something we could not even have dreamt of a 
year ago.’762 
 
Pattern IV – From European standards to Georgia as a benchmark 
The Georgian leadership seemed not fully satisfied with achieving European norms in its 
reforms and construction efforts. Whereas Georgia used to look at Europe as a benchmark 
of quality and standards, the roles later appeared to have changed in some fields. Although 
some of these claims may indeed have been true, most are likely overstatements, but the 
Georgian population lacks the adequate access to the relevant sources of information to 
crosscheck such declarations. Nevertheless, there have been notable cases where experts 
raised their concern regarding such ‘inadequate’ statements.763 
Saakashvili’s boasting expeditiously commenced in the first months subsequent to his 
2004 election victory. Initially comparisons were only made to Eastern Europe, but gradually 
with Europe as a whole.764 For example, soon after the first government since the Rose 
Revolution was created, Saakashvili declared that the new Georgian cabinet was the ‘most 
progressive and interesting government in Eastern Europe’.765 At the inauguration of the 
new airport in Tbilisi a few years later, Saakashvili claimed that ‘this airport is better than 
Brussels airport. This airport is better than Munich airport. This airport is better than many 
other airports that operate in Europe at present.’766 Ironically, the next day some customs 
officials had to be fired from this exemplary airport for extorting money from foreigners.767 
This pattern became increasingly common after 2008.768 It is not clear whether it was 
purely aimed at promoting the successes of the Georgian authorities, or if it was motivated 
by the frustration of failing to secure NATO membership, or direct military support in the 
August 2008 War. The latter suspicion arises, when one looks at the patronising attitude of 
                                                      
762 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 14 April 2009, Rustavi-2. 
763 See for example expert Soso Tsiskarishvili claiming in Akhali Taoba that Mikheil Saakashvili’s ‘inadequate’ 
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claimed that Georgian Eurobonds are better than the European ones (18 July 2011, Caucasus Press). 
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the Georgian leadership. Saakashvili’s dissatisfaction and frustration with Europe was very 
clear when he said ‘Georgia, unlike the majority of the European countries, managed to 
ensure that Georgia has gas, and Georgia has electricity’769 and ‘Georgia fell victim to 
Russian aggression in summer and the same has happened to the whole of Eastern and 
Central Europe now. This is the result of the policy of turning a deaf ear for many years.’770 
The comment that ‘unlike some of the European states, our contingent [in Afghanistan] has 
no restrictions in respect of engagement in combat operations’771 was probably not just 
aimed at stating a fact about the operability of the Georgian troops, but rather to show its 
contribution to ISAF is stronger than that of the NATO-members that blocked Georgia’s 
accession to the alliance. 
Such rhetoric has also been employed to promote a counter-argument to the Euro-
Atlantic community in case of criticism. For example, when the opposition was holding 
demonstrations in the centre of Tbilisi and blocking the entrance to the parliament building, 
Parliamentary Speaker Bakradze told the ambassadors: ‘For the sake of democracy and 
political pluralism in this country, the government is probably tolerating many processes, 
which governments in Western European countries would not have tolerated.’772 Similarly, 
in an interview with CNN, Saakashvili said: ‘I think we have a politicized society at that level, 
what you will not find in most countries of Eastern and Central Europe and we welcome 
it.’773 
As if it was not yet enough to exceed European standards, Europe even appeared to take 
the example of Georgia. According to President Saakashvili claimed that Javier Solana 
described Georgia as ‘a model for the whole of Europe’774 and that Georgia was ‘becoming a 
country creating new standards for other countries.’775 Without any doubt, many reforms 
carried out in Georgia have been remarkable and could indeed serve as a model or a source 
of inspiration for other countries, even for those that have a higher living standard. This, 
however, should not be overrated either. Whereas in the past, Georgians would often tell 
foreigners that the mountains in their country are comparable to Switzerland, now 
‘Switzerland should aspire to be the Georgia of Europe.’776 Within the sphere of economic 
reforms, where the EU and its member states have cast doubts about the neo-liberal 
approach, Georgia claims to have become an example: ‘The economy of most of the 
European countries is in a far worse situation than the Georgian economy’777 and ‘despite 
excise increase it [excise duty on alcoholic beverages] remains the lowest among other 
                                                      
769 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 7 January 2009, Rustavi-2. 
770 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 9 January 2009, Rustavi-2. 
771 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 4 December 2011, Civil Ge. 
772 Parliamentary Speaker David Bakradze, 25 April 2009, Rustavi-2. 
773 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 15 October 2009, CNN. 
774 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 14 March 2005, Rustavi-2. 
775 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 25 February 2011, Civil Ge. 
776 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 3 August 2010, Rustavi-2. 
777 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 29 July 2009, Civil Ge. 
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European countries.’778 Thus, ‘today Europe itself is saying no to what we also might be 
afraid of – high taxes, broad expenses, excessive regulations and bureaucracy is gradually 
becoming past,’779 therewith hinting at Europe taking the example of Georgia. 
 
Pattern V – Underlining the hard work of the authorities 
The leadership often underlined that the progress and success achieved were the direct 
result of its efforts and hard work, clearly with the aim of reaping political capital. For 
example, about having Georgia on the CNN and Euronews weather map Saakashvili 
commented: ‘It is true that it took a lot of effort and asking, but they have finally done 
this.’780 Furthermore, the US administration’s support for Georgia’s territorial integrity and 
the fact that the NATO Secretary General said the country would enter the alliance with 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia are ‘the result of hard work and labour.’781 Underlining that 
these successes were happening ‘during times when Europe is so busy with its own 
problems’782 and ‘despite the global economic crisis and occupation of Georgian 
territories’783 is clearly aimed at highlighting the relevance of this hard work. 
 
Maintaining and repairing legitimacy by tackling setbacks and criticism from the West 
Whereas the Georgian authorities boasted about their progress and success on the path of 
Euro-Atlantic integration, they were also confronted with setbacks and criticism from the 
Western partners. Such situations may have a negative legitimating effect and can be 
instrumentalised by the opposition. 
 
Pattern I – Selective hearing and reading 
It is impossible to react every single time criticism is voiced, especially if the wording is not 
too strong and the impact not very significant. In such cases, criticism is at best formally 
taken note of and later simply ignored, probably in the hope it will be quickly forgotten. 
Georgian TV and other media outlets, especially those with close ties to the government,784 
often failed to report on negative aspects of reports, statements or meetings. As a result, 
the population at large was seldom aware of the criticism. When NATO Secretary-General 
de Hoop Scheffer expressed a strong opinion through the words ‘You are a democracy; start 
                                                      
778 Finance Minister Kakha Baindurashvili, 21 June 2010, Black Sea Press. 
779 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 21 September 2010, Tabula. 
780 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 29 September 2004, Caucasus Press. 
781 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 6 April 2009, Rustavi-2. 
782 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 29 May 2009, Caucasus Press. 
783 State Minister Giorgi Baramidze, 4 March 2011, Caucasus Press. 
784 For example, Paul Rimple gives a good account of the TV industry in pp. 10-51 of Who owned Georgia 2003-
2012 (Tbilisi: Transparency International, 2012). 
  121 
acting like one’785 this hardly made the news headlines, and failed to elicit a reaction from 
the Georgian leadership. Moreover, the authorities have frequently been accused of 
‘selective reading’ both by the opposition as by some European leaders. The Swedish 
Foreign Minister said after the publication of the Tagliavini Report: ‘The report must be read 
completely to make corresponding conclusions. […] There have been obvious attempts of 
selective reading.’786 
The combination of wishful thinking with the apparent lack of understanding of 
diplomatic language has been an instrumental ingredient for this selective reading and 
hearing. The world of diplomacy employs its own native vocabulary replete with vague 
niceties. Even when minor or even no progress has been achieved, diplomats and politicians 
may still express their satisfaction with the ongoing efforts and reforms but simultaneously 
urge a continuation along this path of transformation and development. The same applies 
to official reports and assessments. Indeed, such an approach may stimulate positive 
dialogue, and be more productive than if blunt and direct accusations are made. Thus, as 
these diplomatic statements fail to accurately quantify and qualify specific 
accomplishments, they can easily be taken out of proportion and be reproduced in a 
different way. Examples can be found by comparing the interpretation from the Georgian 
authorities with the official and public text or speech of the Western official.787 Whereas 
resolution 1827(2011) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe mentions 
that reforms are ongoing in Georgia and that the leadership should continue to work on a 
new electoral code and setting up a dialogue with the opposition,788 a statement by the 
Georgian MFA did not refer to the recommendations at all: ‘The Report recognizes the 
significant achievements in Georgia's effort to comply with accepted commitments and 
                                                      
785 Statement by NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 
Tbilisi on 15 September 2008 as quoted in http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/Post-
Conflict%20Georgia.pdf 
786 Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt, 27 October 2009, Caucasus Press. 
787 See also other examples. After a meeting with NATO Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer, Foreign Minister 
David Bakradze could be seen on the Rustavi-2 TV channel claiming: ‘The secretary-general confirmed once 
again that Georgia has completed its homework, if you will, in a practically flawless manner and that the 
country has no problems whatsoever in terms of implementing reforms’ (5 March 2008, Rustavi-2). The view 
of NATO Spokesman James Appathurai was different though: ‘The Secretary General did point out that further 
work is required in the areas such as judicial reform and [NATO] also look forward the upcoming parliamentary 
elections and urged the Georgian officials to ensure that these elections are conducted in a free and fair 
manner with the minimum of technical complications’ (5 March 2008, Civil Ge ). Another illustration is how 
Parliamentary Speaker Burjanadze claimed in April 2005: ‘The Council of Europe commended the reforms in 
Georgia and this increases our responsibility for honouring our obligations’ (14 April 2005, Caucasus Press). 
Two days later, the message of Council of Europe Secretary General Terry Davis was less ambiguous, as he said 
he had called on the Georgian government to honour the obligations, assumed by Georgia when joining the 
Council of Europe and immediately ratify the three main European documents: European Charter for Regional 
or Minority Languages; Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities; European Social 
Charter (16 April 2005, Caucasus Press). 
788 Resolution 1827(2011) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe; 
http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta11/FRES1827.htm 
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obligations.’789 Another related method for ‘forgetting’ the critical remarks is by putting it in 
a wider context and focussing on the positive messages. For example, when European 
Commission President Barroso said that ‘Georgia needs more efforts on its implementation 
to launch talks on a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU,’ the 
Georgian politicians and media focused solely on the fact that the European leader had used 
the term ‘occupation’ in his statement.790 In the preceding months the Georgian authorities 
had lobbied the international community for referring to the separatist regions as territories 
‘occupied’ by Russia.791 
 
Pattern II – Downplaying and gently disagreeing 
Certain criticism is gently opposed or mildly accepted but simultaneously downplayed.792 
For example, following the publication of the OSCE's final report on the January 2008 
presidential elections Parliamentary Speaker Burjanadze said: ‘The whole world has 
assessed the presidential election as normal and democratic and in compliance with 
international and OSCE standards. Naturally, there were critical remarks, which is not new 
for us. […] But there is nothing in these remarks that would place the presidential election in 
doubt or question.’793 Another illustration is how Defence Minister Okruashvili, after a 
discussion at NATO headquarters on the implementation of the IPAP, told the press: 
This naturally does not mean that everything is ideal. There were certain criticisms and some of 
those we will take into account, others we do not agree with. Several criticisms were made 
about frequent staff changes in the Defence Ministry and the General Staff. We would say that 
                                                      
789 Statement of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the PACE’s recent resolution on Georgia, 
28 June 2011, Caucasus Press. 
790 As reported on 18 November 2010 by Civil Ge. Immediately after this press conference, the website of the 
President of Georgia mentioned that finally the EU had taken over this official term. It noted that this was the 
result of the resignation of the French Foreign Minister, who had always been against using that term. 
791 The Georgian authorities have tried to seek international support for using the terminology ‘occupation’ 
and have given a lot of attention to their successes. See for example referring to ‘occupation’ by the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly (26 May 2009, Caucasus Press and 16 November 2010, Civil Ge) or by the Foreign 
Affairs (AFET) Committee in the European Parliament (20 October 2011, Rustavi-2) and the European 
Parliament plenary (17 November 2011, Civil Ge). 
792 See other examples. After the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights that the investigation into the 
high-profile murder case of Sandro Girgvliani ‘manifestly lacked the requisite independence, impartiality, 
objectivity and thoroughness,’ Deputy Justice Minister Burjaliani clearly downplayed this verdict, saying that 
Georgia is ‘only’ obliged is to pay compensation for mistakes in the investigation (26 April 2011, Civil Ge). 
When presidential candidate Saakashvili was reminded at the end of November 2007 that the NATO Secretary-
General had told that the imposition of emergency rule and the closure of media outlets were not in line with 
Euro-Atlantic values, Saakashvili answered that all of it had been largely solved because there will be elections 
(25 November 2007, Rustavi-2). Prime Minister Zhvania in a moderate expression disagreed with the view of 
the Council of Europe on the tense situation in Ajara in early 2005 (16 January 2005, Rustavi-2), and 
Parliamentary Speaker Burjanadze told that there was nothing tragic or alarming in the report and that the 
Georgian government is not going to take into consideration the recommendations on the status of 
Autonomous Republic of Ajara (18 January 2005, Caucasus Press). 
793 Parliamentary Speaker Nino Burjanadze, 5 March 2008, Rustavi-2. 
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these changes took place for specific reasons and, naturally, no radical changes are expected in 
the near future.794 
The argument of a misunderstanding is often conveniently employed. Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Bezhuashvili reacted to some negative comments from NATO: ‘As regards 
the criticism related to the progress of IPAP, part of it is subjective. Georgia will explain to 
NATO that some of the issues have been misunderstood. This is a dialogue. We do not have 
any problems Georgia and its government cannot resolve.’795 In another example following 
some aggressive reactions and insults from the Georgian leadership after the President of 
the Council of Europe had voiced some concern, Foreign Minister Zourabishvili said: 
There were declarations by both sides, and there indeed was a certain misunderstanding. I 
explained what our position was; that the Georgian people could not understand why during 
those very difficult days the Council of Europe failed to make an objective statement on the 
developments in Ajara which our people had expected.796 
 
Pattern III – Justifying by putting it in the Georgian context 
In 2011, Tbilisi Mayor Ugulava said that ‘simply copy-pasting good European laws would not 
help if it is not tailored to the situation on the ground.’797 Anyone dealing with development 
cooperation will agree that reforms should be tailored to the country in question, but 
similarly, this logic can easily be abused for cherry-picking reforms. As Zurab Davitashvili 
rightfully pointed out, nobody explains what this ‘local specificity’ actually is.798 When the 
opposition was calling for a European-style constitution in 2009, the authorities could not 
arrive at an agreement, and argued that the country should have a constitution ‘relevant to 
the Georgian reality and with a democratic and European spirit.’799 Similarly, Saakashvili 
defended a number of controversial constitutional reforms: ‘We should understand that it 
will be very difficult to run Georgia without a strong president, particularly during a crisis. 
Therefore, we cannot fully share European experts' recommendations on this issue.’800 This 
is consistent with the Georgian assertion of ‘too much democracy is also not good’.801 
Referring to national interests is a similar approach. Following criticism from NATO on 
imposing the Emergency Rule and closing media outlets,802 the President justified this as 
dealing with extra-constitutional threats, putting national security directly at risk.803 The 
economic liberalisation, often criticised by the EU, had been defended by highlighting the 
                                                      
794 Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili, 18 May 2005, Rustavi-2. 
795 Minister of Foreign Affairs Gela Bezhuashvili, 24 October 2005, Caucasus Press. 
796 Minister of Foreign Affairs Salome Zourabichvili, 12 May 2004, Imedi TV. 
797 Tbilisi Mayor Gigi Ugulava, 9 June 2011, Civil Ge. 
798 Zurab Davitashvili, “Gruzia: Nejtralitet ili zapadnaja orientatsia?”, Tsentraljnaja Aziya i Kavkaz, Vol. 5, No. 23 
(2002): 113. 
799 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 4 June 2009, Public TV. 
800 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 3 September 2010, Rustavi-2. 
801 The Georgian leadership has tried to convince its Western partners that in order to make sure the reforms 
are sustainable and even more ambitious reforms are carried out, there is a need for a strong executive. 
802 NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 8 November 2007, Caucasus Press. 
803 Presidential candidate Mikheil Saakashvili, 6 December 2007, Wall Street Journal. 
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economic interests. For example, the Parliamentary Committee on Sectoral Economy said 
that this policy proved to help in overcoming the crisis and that free trade with the EU was 
of great importance for Georgia, but economic development should be prioritized.804 In a 
similar manner the Premier’s Chief Economic Adviser said: ‘On the one hand we attempt to 
take into account their recommendations, but on the other hand we also try not to do 
create any danger for our country and private sector as well.’805 
 
Pattern IV – Portraying failure and criticism as success 
One of the more intriguing patterns is the portrayal of setbacks and criticism as major 
successes. The best example occurred when Georgia, against the expectations of many, did 
not receive the Membership Action Plan at the Bucharest Summit, but was told that one day 
it may be able to join.806 President Saakashvili, who had made NATO membership one of his 
main foreign and security policy goals, said that the summit marked ‘a geopolitical 
revolution’ and that his country had received ‘more than we had hoped for’807 because the 
Alliance had taken the ‘direct obligation’ that Georgia would one day become a NATO 
member (without mentioning the conditions).808 Similarly, State Minister Iakobashvili 
thought the Tagliavini report on the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Conflict in Georgia was ‘overall positive for Georgia […] especially against the background 
that three experts working for the commission were biased against Georgia’809 and in the 
eyes of the Georgian president it was even a ‘great diplomatic victory’ and telling ‘more of 
the truth than I could have imagined.’810  
Other events with a potential delegitimising effect can also give a positive swing by 
making references to Europe. One day after the 9 April 2009 demonstrations in Tbilisi 
demanding major reforms and the resignation of the Saakashvili, the latter attempted to 
turn the events in a different direction by reiterating the readiness to engage in a dialogue 
with the opposition but also by saying: ‘I think yesterday was a very important day for our 
democracy; one part of our society has expressed its will as it should correspond to a 
country with high-level culture and a country, which is in the process of becoming a 
European democracy.’811 Similarly, Saakashvili once referred to criticism saying: ‘We have 
                                                      
804 Statement of the Parliamentary Committee on Sectoral Economy, 14 May 2010, Caucasus Press. 
805 Chief Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister Tamar Kovziridze, 14 December 2009, Caucasus Press. 
806 This should not be seen as something really new, because on after the Riga summit in 2006, Parliamentary 
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807 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 3 April 2008, Mze TV. 
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811 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 10 April 2009, Civil Ge. 
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been told, among others by some Europeans, that we have been too radical. We will be 
radical when it comes to freedom, democracy and independence in the post-Soviet 
countries.’812 
 
Pattern V – ‘Attack is the best defense’ 
On several occasions, the Georgian leadership claimed it neither needed nor appreciated 
advice from Europe. In April 2010 Interior Minister Merabishvili was quoted explaining that 
Georgia almost never listens to Europeans and gave concrete examples for it.813 Even 
President Saakashvili once told: ‘One should think twice before saying that Europe should 
lecture us; our people have more talent to do more interesting things, than many of the 
wealthier nations; that’s reality.’814 In another case, the president shared his feelings about 
criticism from the Council of Europe for appointing and not electing mayors: 
We do not need anyone else's recommendations. What did the leader of the free world 
[President Bush] say? Georgia is an example to everyone, a beacon. Let us stop being provincial, 
living according to someone else's recommendations. Second, our democratic system is 
developing. We are currently one of the most democratic states in the region, the most 
democratic in the region and one of the most democratic in the world. As regards local self-
government, we will have one of the best systems in Europe.815 
This dissatisfaction with criticism, especially from Europe, led to a more aggressive 
pattern, i.e. fighting back and discrediting the source of criticism. Frequently this included a 
noticeable amount of undiplomatic and emotional reactions, characterised by irony, insults 
and references to experts and politicians allegedly paid and influenced by Russia.816 For 
example, Saakashvili spoke of the Council of Europe staff as ‘overpaid bureaucrats’ who 
have no right to criticize the Georgian leadership which pays their salaries,817 but failed to 
mention Tbilisi still owed 1.2 million Euros in membership fees to the Council of Europe.818 
In another case, the president was unhappy with a report of the Council of Europe, voicing 
criticism on the abolition of the Ajarian autonomy and on the plea bargaining system where 
pay off deals had been made between the Georgian government and corruption suspects. 
He called politicians who create a fuss over such a report ‘extremely backward’ and further 
                                                      
812 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 9 November 2005, Channel 1. 
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claimed: ‘The sort of provincial, ludicrous idle talk that has followed some sort of 
recommendations is shameful.’819 
Although one may find the ‘attack is the best defence’ approach at times to be shocking 
and utterly disrespectful, the frequency by which this method has been used shows that it 
apparently is not an inefficient tactic. Indeed, as the ‘soft power’ of Europe is well-known 
and easy to manipulate, there was hardly ever a reaction to this in public. EU Special 
Representative Talvitie was a clear exception when he said that the EU was one of Georgia’s 
main donors and as a result Georgia should not speak in such a tone.820 This, however, does 
not exclude the possibility that accusations and insults at the address of Europe are 
discussed behind closed doors or that such situations have no impact on relations. 
A prominent example of this pattern is the official reaction to the Tagliavini Report. As 
the Georgian authorities knew this report would come out one day, they had several 
months to prepare and act pre-emptively and pro-actively. Understanding the report would 
not put the blame entirely on Russia, they put in doubt the conclusions before they were 
made, by discrediting some members of the independent fact finding mission and even by 
obstructing the work by not authorizing these specific experts go to Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. Three of the nineteen experts of the team were accused of being ‘Gazprom-
financed experts.’821 Expressing hope for an ‘unbiased’ and ‘objective’ report822 meant that 
the report could be acceptable, but simultaneously left the door open in case Tbilisi would 
disagree with some of the conclusions. Once the report was published, President Saakashvili 
voiced major criticism: 
It was a fact-finding mission. Drawing conclusions was not the function of this mission. But the 
mission nonetheless took it upon itself to make conclusions and said: this is all the case, it is true 
that the Russian army had already entered Georgia but still it was Georgia that fired the first 
shot and this was a violation of certain norms. […] Even a first-year student of international law 
would know that when a foreign country's army - a foreign country which has been openly 
threatening war for many years and which in reality was waging war [...] when its paratroopers 
enter Georgia, this is called a foreign country's direct external aggression. Either that or the 
paratroopers came to pick daisies; they missed seeing Mount Tliaqana in the Liakhvi Gorge. But 
if they [the Tagliavini report] were to have said that, then they would have to simply handcuff 
them [the Russians] and arrest them. And they are not up to this. And even some of our 
countrymen do not have the self-respect to admit that this is the case. […] I want to ask the 
people who do not want to look the truth in the eye: how would France have behaved in this 
situation, how would Germany have behaved?823 
 
                                                      
819 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 17 January 2005, Imedi TV. 
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821 State Minister Temuri Iakobashvili, 10 February 2009, Civil Ge. 
822 See for example Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 June 2009, Caucasus Press and Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs David Jalagania, 28 September 2009, Caucasus Press. 
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The connection between legitimation and de-legitimation 
The Rose Revolution serves as an appropriate illustration for the interaction between 
legitimation and delegitimation. In the early 2000s, some of Shevardnadze’s former allies 
and friends actively turned against him and subsequently became the driving force behind 
the Rose Revolution. Although their main criticism was the lack of democracy and real 
reforms as well as rampant corruption, they additionally directed harsh criticism at the 
absence of efforts to integrate with Europe and NATO which served as arguments to 
discredit and delegitimize the incumbent government. For example, in 2002 David 
Saganelidze from the New Rights faction in Parliament heavily criticized the authorities, 
claiming that statements about integration into the European structures ‘had been made so 
far for gathering political capital alone, not having any serious intentions in terms of their 
realization.’824 In spring 2003, the authorities and the opposition could not reach an 
agreement on the composition of the Central Election Committee for the upcoming 
parliamentary elections, as it would mainly be composed of representatives from the ruling 
elite. Therefore, the opposition suggested that international experts from the OSCE and 
Council of Europe should staff this body.825 The authorities did not agree to invite foreign 
experts and also the OSCE and Council of Europe were not enthusiastic about interfering in 
the internal affairs of an independent country.826 The massive fraud committed during the 
elections led to street protests which culminated in the Rose Revolution. 
Still, President Shevardnadze claimed that Georgia was becoming an ‘important 
component of the Euro-Atlantic system of peace and stability’827 and that the country was 
going to become a NATO member ‘in a historically short period of time’828 as nearly 80 
percent of the requirements had allegedly been fulfilled.829 Especially with regards to the 
mounting opposition, he said he was worried that a new leadership might change the 
balanced foreign policy aimed at integration into NATO, drawing closer to Europe and 
simultaneously having good relations with Russia and other neighbours.830 Furthermore, he 
wanted to hold the elections in such a manner that they would become ‘an example for the 
whole of new Europe.’831 Nevertheless, Shevardnadze’s image had undoubtedly crumbled in 
the West, which no longer wanted to associate itself with the corrupted system governing 
the country. 
At the same time, the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the opposition were one of the main 
arguments in seeking popular support. For example, Leader of the National Movement 
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Mikheil Saakashvili said he would show to ‘Europe that economic sanctions against Georgia 
are necessary if the authorities of the country refuse to follow the way of democracy’832 and 
Nino Burjanadze spoke about the importance of ‘building democratic institutions and 
respecting European values.’833 Several other politicians spoke about the imminent NATO 
and EU membership, if they were to get to power.834 Significantly, the Shevardnadze 
government used the Euro-Atlantic commitment of its opponents as one of the means to 
delegitimize them. When some dangerous criminals escaped in June 2003, President 
Shevardnadze blamed it on the reforms carried out a few years earlier by then Minister of 
Justice Mikheil Saakashvili: 
Sadly, because of persistent demands by some, we had to transfer the penitentiary system from 
one government agency, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to another, which had had no 
experience in this respect. We have to admit that it was a hasty decision. I tried to warn my 
colleagues but the issue was linked to Georgia's joining various European organizations.835 
In a similar move, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Parliament Zviad 
Mukbaniani, described a Council of Europe demand on the repatriation of the Meskhetians 
as absurd as it was ‘inexecutable’ from the very beginning. According to him, ‘this 
commitment was made by Zurab Zhvania and Mikheil Saakashvili who are currently 
championing an utterly different concept.’836 
 
Pattern I – Accusing each other of not being committed or successful with regards to the 
Euro-Atlantic integration and aspirations 
The promise to achieve 'European standards' and to bring the related wealth and stability to 
Georgia was clearly used by the ruling elite to obtain and maintain popular support, as 
elaborated above. Whereas the government emphasized the progress it was making, the 
opposition pointed to the failures of the government and to actions which were allegedly 
not in line with the aspirations.837 As a result, they claimed that no integration with Europe 
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and NATO was possible under the circumstances of that time. For example, Alasania said 
that Georgia could not become a member of the European family if the government 
maintained its 'antagonistic relations with Russia'838 and that although Saakashvili spoke of 
NATO, he only 'distanced Georgia from the Alliance.'839 Similarly, Usupashvili asserted that 
Georgia’s membership in NATO would be impossible as long as Mikheil Saakashvili’s team 
remained in power,840 and Bidzina Ivanishvili thought chances to join NATO had been 
wasted by Saakashvili841 and thus the country would not join the Alliance anytime soon.842 
More fundamentally, some opposition politicians claimed that the government was not 
even committed and ‘refused’ the integration with the EU.843 Therefore, the government in 
some instances was labelled as ‘pseudo-European.’844 Rumours appeared in February 2008, 
hinting at a lack of real commitment to the Euro-Atlantic orientation on the part of the 
leadership. Some opposition groups claimed that Saakashvili wanted to get to a trade-off 
with Putin and no longer struggle actively for Georgia's accession into NATO.845 Although 
this was denied by the authorities846 (but later admitted by Saaskashvili on the fifth 
anniversary of the August 2008 War),847 it was a clear example of how the opposition tried 
to discredit the incumbent president. 
Georgia’s failure to secure the Membership Action Plan at the Bucharest Summit in April 
2008 provided a platform to criticise the authorities with regards to their success in terms of 
the Euro-Atlantic integration. Opposition leaders claimed this was the result of the ‘mistakes 
made by the government’848 or the ‘failure of Saakashvili's foreign policy.’849 The August 
2008 war with Russia added fuel to this debate and Kakha Kukava claimed that Saakashvili 
actually hindered the country’s integration with Europe and NATO as ‘Europe would not 
admit a country whose president’s name is associated with a war.’850 
This pattern also includes the opposition claiming they are the real committed ones. 
Some similarities can be found in the attempts of the ruling elite and the opposition to 
obtain legitimacy. Several politicians made promises using the same European discourse as 
                                                                                                                                                                     
taxable and gives good opportunity for money laundering’ which would ‘contribute to the enrichment of 
Saakashvili’s clan’ (16 April 2008, as Caucasus Press). As a final example, in 2009 Jibladze said that President 
Saakashvili had lied when he said that the electricity tariff in Georgia was lower than in European countries (16 
September 2009, Caucasus Press). 
838 Irakli Alasania, 16 July 2011, Caucasus Press. 
839 Irakli Alasania, 15 November 2011, Caucasus Press. 
840 Republican Davit Usupashvili, 10 November 2011, Caucasus Press. 
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the ruling elite. When Zourabichvili addressed her supporters in October 2005 after being 
sacked from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, she claimed that the people who 
gathered are ‘those people in Georgia who want democracy, who want a civilized European 
system.’851 Less than two weeks later, her new public organisation was inaugurated with the 
slogan ‘Together we will build a real, modern, truly European yet Georgian state.’852 During 
the pre-election campaign for the 2008 presidential elections, candidate Gamkrelidze said 
he would ‘reduce defence spending to a level in line with NATO standards.’853 
Patarkatsishvili would establish a ‘European-style party’ aiming at creating a state based on 
justice and welfare.854 In May 2011, Kote Gogelia claimed that he would go into politics and 
that with his experience and contacts, he would make sure that there would be no 
unemployed people in the country in three to four years and that living standards would be 
better than the European ones.855 
However, at the same time the ruling elite used the attitude towards the Euro-Atlantic 
aspirations of the opposition in their attempts to discredit them. First of all, they criticised 
those who indeed wanted to revise the country’s NATO ambitions and preferred neutrality 
instead, by calling them ‘foolish’ and ‘dishonest’.856 Secondly, they tried to show that the 
opposition was not committed to the Euro-Atlantic orientation and goals. For example, 
during the electoral campaign in 2007, State Minister Baramidze announced that special 
services had been able to expose the ‘dirty plan’ of presidential candidate Patarkatsishvili 
and thus Georgia would be able to ‘disentangle itself from this difficult position and this will 
become the foundation for building a strong and united state that will become a NATO 
member in the near future.’857 
Finally, it merits mention that the Euro-Atlantic discourse does not always bear a 
positive legitimating effect among the entire Georgian society as some people are not in 
favour of the Euro-Atlantic course. Whereas the majority of political forces in Georgia were 
aiming to raise political capital through their close association with the West, a limited 
group of others is speaking about Euro-Atlantic integration in a negative manner. This is 
clearly the case with the Labour party and contrary to most of their competitors, they never 
claim to have support from the West and even give a negative connotation to the West. At 
the same time, they actively try to present a negative picture of the government to the 
West.858 
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Pattern II – Claiming the other is not European and does not respect European values 
The mutual accusation of an absence of European values and a deteriorating level of 
democracy is closely related to the previous pattern, because it was often given as a reason 
why EU or NATO membership would not be obtained. They claimed that the country would 
not achieve any closer integration with NATO or the EU as long as Saakashvili would be in 
power, as ‘neither NATO nor the EU need a country whose government is strangling the 
freedom of speech.’859 Other reasons cited are ‘the monopolistic rule that Saakashvili has 
created,’860 'his behaviour on 7 November, thanks to the raid on Imedi,’861 the ‘authoritarian 
rule’ in Georgia and the alleged decline of the level of democracy,862 the 'present level of 
democracy,'863 'political repressions' including 'the forceful dispersal of opposition rallies in 
November 2007 or the falsified January 2008 elections,'864 or 'the failure to fulfil 
commitments in terms of democratic development.'865 On the contrary, opposition leaders 
viewed themselves as real supporters of the Western values and Bidzina Ivanishvili even 
hoped to ‘astonish Europe with the level of democracy’ that he would create in Georgia.866 
Gachechiladze promised to build a ‘European-style democracy’ if elected.867 
Following the publication of the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation 
Mission following the 2008 presidential election, Davitashvili declared that ‘from now on, 
Saakashvili is not a legitimate president of this country in the eyes of the entire world too’ as 
in 35 per cent of precincts, electoral commissions did not count votes in accordance with 
the established rules.868 The opposition tried to demonstrate that the government was not 
acting according to the European values, labelling Saakashvili a ‘new and bloody dictator in 
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Europe’869 and claiming that Georgian officials put companies set up by European investors 
in trouble.870 Such discourse was not only used to discredit the ruling elite domestically, but 
equally and maybe even more commonly to draw the attention of the West. For example, 
leader of the Georgian Party Sozar Subari sent an appeal to the diplomatic corps stating: 
President Saakashvili speaks much about freedom, democracy and modernization on 
international arenas, foreign newspapers or in interviews. He is often mentioned as a reformer 
leader trying to turn the retarded country into a European one. But to my mind the European 
orientation must be first of all expressed in the attitude towards citizens, loyalty to the rule of 
law, respect of human rights and freedom.871 
In addition, the ruling elite have blamed their opponents for not being European. For 
example, when Patarkatsishvili ran for the 2008 presidential elections, Speaker of the 
Election Headquarters of Saakashvili Davit Bakradze claimed that Patarkatsishvili still owned 
Imedi broadcasting and that most European countries consider such practice 
inadmissible.872 Three weeks before the NATO Bucharest Summit, Saakashvili addressed the 
opposition from Brussels saying that the country’s integration with NATO and European 
structures is dependent on internal political stability.873 This way he not only painted the 
opposition in bad light, highlighting the sterling efforts and conciliatory approach from his 
own side. Moreover, he also found a scapegoat in case the country would not be admitted 
to the alliance. In a similar way, he criticised hunger strikers in his country for their ‘un-
Christian form of political struggle’ at a time the future of Georgia is decided.874 
Fascinatingly, allegations of a non-European behaviour even occur among ministers of 
the same government. For example, in January 2005, new Defence Minister Irakli 
Okruashvili spoke of corruption in his ministry. His predecessor Giorgi Baramidze disagreed 
and argued: ’Okruashvili has no right to don a prosecutor's robe and say that he wants to 
see some people in prison within a month. Who gave him this right? Seeing all this, how can 
we talk about joining the EU or European integration or civilization?’875 Especially sacked 
state officials seemed to accuse their former colleagues. Sacked state minister Khaindrava 
claimed that Okruashvili had no interest in what 'the European friends' think of his approach 
to settling the conflicts.876 Lasha Zhvania claimed that one the main reasons why he was 
dismissed as Minister of Economy was that the Prime Minister disagreed with the need ‘to 
speed up comprehensive free trade agreement with the European Union.’877 One year later, 
the dismissed deputy minister of economy Uruzmag Karkusov complained that his minister 
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did not agree with the need to increase economic functions of the ministry and create a 
structure for a small business support as Georgia is the only country in Europe which has no 
such structures.878 
 
Pattern III – Claiming the other has no European support 
The opposition has frequently claimed that the West has lost confidence in the Georgian 
leadership and no longer wishes to support Saakashvili and his team. Such statements are 
very common after opposition leaders meet the diplomatic community in Tbilisi or after a 
visit to Europe or the US. Although this type of de-legitimation mechanism was not 
encountered very much during the first few years after the Rose Revolution, there were 
some isolated cases. For example, in March 2006 Levan Berdzenishvili in a slightly 
exaggerated analysis of the situation in his country said: ‘The diplomatic corps, just like the 
Georgian population and the public, is concerned about the current developments in the 
country. Naturally, foreign diplomats would be concerned in any country where senior 
police officers, police colonels, are chasing people to kill them.’879 
This pattern of action aimed at delegitimating the authorities accelerated in late 2007 
when ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs Salome Zourabichvili made use of her old contacts and 
acquaintances for this purpose. She contended that the European leaders were ‘shocked’ 
about the unrest in the country in November 2007, that they had dramatically changed their 
opinion of Saakashvili whom they once regarded as a democrat but had turned into a 
‘monster’, and that they were ‘almost ready to give up’ on the Georgians.880 In the following 
months, many other opposition leaders travelled to the West with the aim of slandering the 
authorities and simultaneously seeking support for themselves. Upon their return, they 
explained that the West had ‘decided to change the power in Georgia,’881 that the West was 
already looking at ‘the future of Georgia instead of at Saakashvili’882 and that ‘European 
countries and USA are in anticipation of [the] post-Saakashvili period in Georgia.’883 Even 
stronger, Nino Burjanadze argued after a meeting with OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Lithuanian 
Foreign Minister Ažubalis, that in case a revolution were to emerge in Georgia again, this 
would be supported by the West.884 Although the opposition leaders appeared convincing 
when making such statements, they hardly ever referred to their source and did not provide 
any evidence for such claims. In the rare cases they did, it was done in an indirect manner, 
such as referring to negative reports from the Euro-Atlantic community, e.g. the Tagliavini 
Report was used to show that Saakashvili is an ‘international criminal’885 or a ‘weak leader, 
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who is a threat to this country's stability’886 and thus does not enjoy Western support 
anymore. Burjanadze claimed that President Saakashvili had lost the international 
community’s confidence and that no government in the world trusted Saakashvili.887 On 
another occasion she claimed that the European countries would soon express their real 
attitude to the Georgian authorities soon,888 hinting at negative consequences for the 
Georgian President. Returning from Europe, Shalva Natelashvili said that Europeans no 
longer defended Saakashvili.889 
As it is not mentioned who exactly these people are they met, there are no ways of 
verifying whether or not the information is correct, nor could any European leader refute 
this. Still, foreign analysts may notice that many of these statements are hyperbolic, full of 
exaggerations and wishful thinking, very similar to the rhetoric of Saakashvili. As European 
leaders hardly react in such cases, it is difficult to prove that either side is intentionally 
manipulating statement or facts. One of the rare examples where this did occur was in July 
2009, when rumours spread through the local media that the EU had reduced its assistance 
to Georgia, as the country failed to fulfil its international commitments. The EU Delegation, 
however, denied these reports and attempted to bring clarity by providing an overview of 
its commitments.890 In another occasion one year later, Tinatin Khidasheli from the 
Republican Party, claimed that after the party had handed over some materials related to 
the illegal eviction of Internally Displaced Persons, Head of the EU Delegation Eklund had 
met Premier Gilauri and warned him that an aid allocation of EUR 23 million would be 
suspended if unlawfulness were not stopped.891 The EU Head of Delegation in Tbilisi denied 
also these allegations in a statement: 
I have had no recent contacts with the Republican Party, nor have I received any letter from 
them on the IDP issue. If Ms. Tina Khidasheli is correctly quoted, I find it regrettable that the 
Republican Party is trying to score political points where they have no point to score.892 
The Saakashvili government used the same pattern, claiming the opposition did not 
enjoy Western support. For example, although it may not have originated in the 
government, rumours spread through the media that Salome Zourabichvili had been fired as 
Foreign Minister on the request of Western powers. She defended herself saying this was a 
domestic game in the post-Communist style and that ‘neither America nor Europe pay so 
much attention to Georgia’ that they would have come up with a strategy for her 
removal.893 In December 2007, Georgia’s Ambassador in Brussels said that presidential 
candidate Badri Patarkatsishvili had been refused a visa to visit Belgium, hinting that he 
would not be welcome in the country. Representatives from the latter’s election campaign 
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office denied this information and said that Patarkatsishvili was not intending to go to 
Brussels and would not need to apply for a Schengen visa as he already had one.894 Finally, 
linkages with Russia are easily found or fabricated, and pro-government MPs Givi 
Targamadze and Giga Bokeria claimed these opposition groups were just echoing Russian 
calls for Georgia to be ‘neutral’ and taking part in an ‘anti-NATO’ programme, clearly 
sponsored by the Kremlin.895 When opposition leaders Kakha Kukava and Koba Davitashvili 
had meetings with the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, information was disseminated 
through some media channels that they had been invited there by the Russian delegation.896 
 
Pattern IV – The Euro-Atlantic institutions as an intermediary 
The opposition frequently asked Euro-Atlantic organisations and institutions to act as an 
intermediary for settling disputes with the government. Although they wanted this 
intermediary to be independent, they still expected that this involvement would be to their 
own benefit. 
One form of intermediary is for the Euro-Atlantic institutions to be requested to act as 
an observer, monitor or investigator, i.e. an independent but credible source for providing 
an objective and accurate picture of a challenging situation. This was the case when the 
OSCE was requested to send a special team of international experts to the March 2004 
elections897 or the EU to send observers to the 2008 legislative elections.898 Georgia’s 
Conservative Party asked European leaders to look into the arrest of 30 opposition activists 
over criminal and administrative offenses and over 100 cases of assaults on other 
supporters.899 In a comparable situation, Nino Burjanadze during a visit to Brussels asked 
the creation of a special fact-finding commission to investigate the actions of the authorities 
during the May 2011 demonstrations in which four people died.900 In another case, the 
Labour Party asked to send a monitoring mission from the Council of Europe to investigate 
facts of expropriation of private property by law enforcement agencies.901 
Another type of intermediary is that of a mediator. Major disagreements about the 
electoral code arose in the months before the May 2008 parliamentary elections. Eight 
opposition parties appealed to the Euro-Atlantic partners for international mediation with 
the authorities in order to ‘get back on the path toward democracy.’902 The Georgian 
opposition called particularly upon EU Special Representative Peter Semneby, but also on 
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U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza, to act as mediators with the 
authorities.903 In a different example one year later, EUSR Semneby was requested to 
mediate as authorities and opposition were in a deadlock after the latter had requested the 
resignation of President Saakashvili and staged a huge demonstration in the centre of Tbilisi. 
Semneby initially responded positively,904 but this was denied a few weeks later by the 
Ambassador of the Czech Republic to Georgia Ivan Jestřáb in his capacity of holding the local 
EU presidency among EU Heads of Missions.905 With regards to this situation, Salome 
Zourabichvili asked for the EU’s mediation to have her appointed as deputy interior 
minister.906 
On several occasions, the Euro-Atlantic community was asked to act as a referee. The 
high number of cases brought at the European Court of Human Rights is only one indicator 
for this.907 However, there are also other examples, such as the Labour Party asking to set 
up a new European court to deal exclusively with appeals against apparently undemocratic 
election practices908 or requesting the EU to set up a special commission to protect Labour 
Party members from political persecution on the part of the Georgian authorities.909 
Finally, the West can be used as a proxy for raising demands if the opposition feels their 
voice is not heard. This was the case when the Labour Party asked the European Union to 
give the authorities the recommendation to hold early presidential elections910 or NATO for 
exercising pressure on the Georgian government in order to hold impartial elections.911 In 
some cases they went even further and asked the West to actively interfere and act against 
the government, such as the request of Natelashvili to stop supporting Saakashvili912 or to 
declare him ‘persona non grata’.913 Political parties often used their colleagues in Europe to 
give weight to their demands. For example, the Green Party together with the European 
Green Party sent a letter to President Saakashvili when they were deprived of their office.914 
The European Green Party also issued a statement condemning the decision of the Tbilisi 
municipality.915 
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THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN SYMBOLISM 
A number of scholars have discussed the role of symbolism in domestic politics as well as in 
international relations.916 Such political symbolism does not only have to take the form of 
official symbols, but can also consist of the use of norms and images. According to Murray 
Edelman, they evoke attitudes and impressions, which can be manipulated.917 
 
Pattern I – The European flag and hymn 
During his inauguration as president in January 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili raised the EU flag 
next to the new national one – of which he said it was a ‘European flag’918 – while a chorus 
sang Beethoven’s ninth Symphony, better known to many as the European anthem. 
Afterwards the new president said: ‘The flag of the European Union flutters besides 
Georgia’s national flag, because we consider Georgia as a part of Europe. It is also our 
flag.’919 Later that day he continued that ‘this flag is also Georgia's flag because it 
demonstrates the essence of our civilization, our culture, our history and the horizons and 
views of our future.’920 European flags were hoisted throughout the country in the following 
months and in April 2004 the government decided to officially fly them over all 
governmental buildings as ‘a sign of its willingness to carry out policy in compliance with EU 
standards.’921 Whenever government officials spoke in an official or formal setting, there 
was invariably a European flag positioned next to the Georgian flag, which could create the 
impression that Europe is somehow associated with these words. In an even more 
interesting example, Dmitri Sanakoev took the oath as ‘alternative’ president of South 
Ossetia in 2006 with the Georgian, the EU and even the US flag behind him.922 Also the 
hymn was used at different occasions: Beethoven’s Ode to Joy was played at a gathering of 
some one million people in the centre of Tbilisi two weeks after the end of the August 2008 
War.923 This was repeated during a televised address on 7 August 2009 from Gori, the city 
which had been occupied by Russian forces one year before.924 
It is quite unusual that state authorities use official symbols of an organisation or entity 
the country does not belong to. The Georgian President, who holds a law degree, and his 
administration are undoubtedly aware of the fact that non-member states are only 
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authorized to use the EU flag upon receiving prior approval. It is, therefore, interesting to 
observe how the Georgian leadership initially spoke of the EU flag and later referred to it as 
the flag of the Council of Europe. Indeed, the flag was actually designed in 1955 as an official 
symbol for the Council of Europe, which entitles Georgia to use it since 1999. This confusing 
situation may be one of the factors explaining why most people may not realise that the 
Council of Europe and the European Union are different structures. According to a survey 
from 2009, some 10% (and even 14% in the capital) of the Georgian population were of the 
idea that their country is already an EU member. At the same time, only 33% where aware 
of the fact that their country is a member of the Council of Europe with 39% thinking it was 
not.925 
This abundance of European flags throughout the country and their use during key 
moments in Georgia’s history has not only led to an ambiguous understanding among the 
population, but has also evoked different reactions. Whereas Swedish Prime Minister Göran 
Persson saw it as a ‘signal of Georgia’s ambition for the future,’926 analysts Balázs Jarábik 
and Tornike Sharashenidze half-mockingly concluded ‘Tbilisi has only sought to wave the 
European flag rather than adopting European values in a deep-rooted fashion.’927 Giulietto 
Chiesa, an Italian Member of the European Parliament, reacted fiercely against this 
continuous use of the European flag, especially with regards to the August War. According 
to article 2 of the Administrative agreement with the Council of Europe regarding the use of 
the European emblem, there are three conditions of use that are not allowed: 
(a) the use creates the incorrect impression or assumption that there is a connection between 
the user and any of the institutions, bodies, offices, agencies and organs of the European 
Union or the Council of Europe; 
(b) the use leads the public to believe erroneously that the user benefits from the support, 
sponsorship, approval or consent of any of the institutions, bodies, offices, agencies and 
organs of the European Union or the Council of Europe; 
(c) the use is in connection with any objective or activity which is incompatible with the aims 
and principles of the European Union or of the Council of Europe, or which would be 
otherwise unlawful.928 
Chiesa complained that President Saakashvili is in the exact position of a man who plays 
with the ‘confusion’ of a flag representing two institutions and that the emblem was used in 
connection with objectives which are incompatible with the aims and principles of the 
European Community. He furthermore elaborated that although the Russian Federation is 
                                                      
925 Knowledge and attitudes to the EU in Georgia, August 2009, CRRC. 
926 Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson, 24 January 2006, Imedi TV. 
927 Balázs Jarábik and Tornike Sharashenidze, The EU and Georgia’s turmoil, FRIDE policy brief No. 12, june 
2009, 1. 
928 Administrative agreement with the Council of Europe regarding the use of the European emblem by third 
parties (2012/C 271/04). This agreement dates from 2012, i.e. after the August 2008 War. Still, the previous 
conditions of use stipulated the flag can only be used where ‘there is no likelihood of the user of the emblem 
being confused with the European Community or the Council of Europe’ and that ‘the emblem is not used in 
connection with objectives or activities which are incompatible with the aims and principles of the European 
Community or of the Council of Europe.’ 
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also a member of the Council of Europe, he ‘never saw the President of Russia using the 
European flag to add authority to his decisions.’929 
 
Pattern II – High-level Western visits and meetings 
In the first months of 2004, President Saakashvili often held public speeches with Western 
ambassadors sitting in the back,930 creating the impression that he enjoyed their full support 
on everything he was saying. After a few months, this practice stopped, but one can only 
speculate why. 
Even more important are the high number of Western leaders and high-ranked officials 
who, following the success of the Rose Revolution, flooded to the country which aspired to 
become a European democracy. In just a couple of months, Tbilisi played host to NATO 
Secretary-General Javier Solana, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, US Secretary of 
State Colin Powell, French Senate Chairman Christian Poncelet, and many others. President 
Saakashvili even directly mentioned this symbolism by referring to the visit of Solana as a 
‘proof of Europe’s interest and trust in the new authorities.’931 When a delegation of the 
European Parliament visited Georgia in November 2004 for a meeting of the EU-Georgia 
Parliamentary Committee, Parliamentary Speaker Burjanadze highlighted the symbolic 
meaning of the fact that this coincided with the anniversary of the Rose Revolution.932 Also 
the symbolic value and strength of the visits of a high number of European leaders to Tbilisi 
during and immediately after the August 2008 War should be highlighted. Having the 
presidents of Poland, Estonia, Lithuania and Ukraine as well as the prime minister of Latvia 
joining a rally on 12 August was perceived as a symbolic sign of European support to the 
country and its leadership. Similarly, visits from the Georgian leadership to the West can be 
attributed a symbolic role. When Saakashvili gave a speech in the European Parliament, it 
was presented as ‘Georgia’s day in the European Parliament.’933 
The authorities made use of the visits of Western leaders to the country for their own 
legitimacy, but also the opposition sought to give visibility of its engagement with foreign 
politicians and officials. One method of seeking this symbolic proof of recognition and 
support from the Euro-Atlantic community was by meeting politicians and officials, including 
by travelling to Europe and the US. The mere fact someone is travelling there, regardless of 
the level of meetings, issues discussed, outcome and possible support, could already be 
portrayed and perceived as having support from the West and as evidence of the European 
                                                      
929 ''The European flag'' lettera del Sig. Bonerro, 12 August 2008, 
http://www.giuliettochiesa.it/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=1288:''the-european-flag''-lettera-
del-sig-bonerro&Itemid=8&tmpl=component&print=1 
930 See for example President Saakashvili hosting a meeting with ambassadors of the EU Member States in his 
newly renovated office at the state chancellery to report on his visit to Moscow on 13 February 2004 as 
broadcasted by Rustavi-2. 
931 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 15 January 2004, Rustavi-2. 
932 Parliamentary Speaker Nino Burjanadze, 22 November 2004, Caucasus Press. 
933 Member of Parliament David Bakradze, 15 November 2006, Caucasus Press. 
  140 
orientation. In order to raise the profile and importance of such travels, they claimed having 
met with ‘local officials in Western European countries,’934 with ‘business circles of leading 
European countries and structures,’935 with ‘rather influential political figures,’936 with ‘very 
serious European political leaders,’937 with the ‘president of one of the European 
countries’938 or with ‘high-ranking officials in Strasbourg and Brussels.’939 However, as 
concrete names were rarely mentioned, it is not clear who the real interlocutors may have 
been or why they do not wish to name them. In the cases where they mentioned 
beforehand they intended to meet specific people,940 it was not always clear whether or not 
they were indeed received by these European and American counterparts. Some politicians 
do not only travel to Europe to speak to local leaders. Levan Gachechiladze visited Europe 
‘to get money’ and got ‘very optimistic pledges’ to ‘continue the struggle’.941 He did not 
specify who he had met and what the source of the money was, but there may be a 
symbolic value in the fact he had received this positive news in Europe. The Georgian Party 
held some strategic sessions in Europe to discuss the party’s strategy and projects;942 also in 
this case the location of these meetings may have an important symbolic function. The 
ruling elite tried to use such travels to the West to discredit the opposition, by claiming they 
met Russian political and other pro-Kremlin forces. With the words of Tina Khidasheli, a 
leading member of the opposition Republican Party: ‘It seems that going to London is in 
itself something compromising in this country.’943 
 
Pattern III – Joining European organisations and structures 
The final goal of the Euro-Atlantic aspirations is undoubtedly to join NATO and EU, but 
becoming a member of other ‘European’ organizations is part of this policy objective in the 
medium term as well. Such milestones may indeed often help in paving the way for 
integration with Europe, but equally serve as a symbolic proof that progress is made and 
that Georgia is being accepted by ‘Europe’. For example, joining the European Civil Aviation 
Conference (ECAC) in April 2005 was said to help ‘promoting an effective and steady 
development of Georgia’s civil aviation and allowing Georgia to study European experience 
and using European standards and norms.’944 Other examples include joining the European 
Federation of National Academies of Sciences and Humanities (ALLEA), the European and 
                                                      
934 Salome Zourabichvili, 3 March 2008, Caucasus Press. 
935 Statement by the press service of the Labour Party, 2 February 2009, Caucasus Press. 
936 Nino Burjanadze, 17 December 2009, Caucasus Press. 
937 Nino Burjanadze, 14 December 2009, Rustavi-2. 
938 Statement by the press service of the Democratic Movement, 18 November 2010, Caucasus Press. 
939 Statement by the press service of the Democratic Movement, 4 July 2011, Interpressnews. 
940 See for example Ex- Minister of Foreign Affairs Salome Zourabichvili, 30 January 2006, Caucasus Press or, 
Davit Usupashvili and Konstantine Gamsakhurdia, 11 October 2007, Civil Ge. 
941 Levan Gachechiladze, 19 June 2009, Rustavi-2. 
942 See for example Erosi Kitsmarishvili, 19 October 2010, Caucasus Press or statement by the Georgian Party, 4 
December 2010, Caucasus Press. 
943 Tina Khidasheli (member of the Republican Party), 13 March 2008, Rustavi-2. 
944 Head of the Civil Aviation Administration Giorgi Mzhavanadze, 18 April 2005, Black Sea Press. 
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Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization (EPPO), the European Committee for 
Standardization (CEN), the European Organization for Probation (CEP), or Eurocontrol. Even 
though some of these European organizations may be rather unknown, the political 
leadership gave ample visibility and explained how this brings the country closer to the 
European structures, such as in the case of becoming an associate member of 
Eurogeographics,945 a rather unknown NGO. 
By joining European alliances, political parties can give proof of their European 
orientation. The Georgian Green Party was one of the 32 parties establishing the European 
Green Party in February 2004,946 the United National Movement being invited to join the 
European People’s Party was considered by its leadership ‘an achievement in terms of 
political integration with the EU,’947 the Republican Party joined the European Liberal 
Democrat and Reform Party in October 2007 and saw it as ‘a serious show of support from 
the West,’948 and several others tried to act similarly. Even further, a reference to Europe 
can be included in the name of the party, as is the case with the political movement ‘We 
Ourselves’ which in September 2011 turned into a political party and changed its name into 
‘European Democrats of Georgia’. According to party leader Paata Davitaia, this was done to 
demonstrate again that ‘Georgia is moving towards the EU and it wants to become a 
member of the European family.’949 Furthermore, the logo of the party is clearly inspired by 
the European flag.950 
 
Pattern IV – The map of Europe 
Being on the map of Europe can create the impression of being part of this entity. Although 
most international viewers may bear little interest in the weather forecast for Georgia, the 
symbolic value for the Georgian population that in late 2004 their country was included in 
the Euronews and CNN weather map should not be underestimated, and received extensive 
attention from the government.951 For President Saakashvili it meant: ‘Georgia has returned 
to the world arena. Georgia is back on the world map. CNN and Euronews have included 
Tbilisi in their weather forecasts for the first time. [...] That is to say, they have recognized us 
as part of the world and part of Europe.’952 Similarly, speaking of becoming part of 
‘European air space,’953 the ‘European educational space,’954 the ‘European rail network,’955 
                                                      
945 As reported on 12 October 2010 by Rustavi-2. 
946 As reported on 23 February 2004 by Caucasus Press. 
947 Statement by the office of Georgia’s ruling party United National Movement, 3 April 2006, Caucasus Press. 
948 Levan Berdzenishvili, 18 October 2007, Mze TV. 
949 European Democrats leader Paata Davitaia, 5 September 2011, Caucasus Press. 
950 See Annexure II. 
951 See for example Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Giorgi Gomiashvili, 2 and 28 September 2004, Caucasus 
Press. 
952 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 29 September 2004, Caucasus Press. 
953 Minister of Economy Vera Kobalia, 2 December 2010, Caucasus Press and 3 January 2011, Black Sea Press. 
954 Minister of Education Kakha Lomaia, 26 November 2004, Rustavi-2. 
955 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 7 February 2007, Public TV. 
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or the ‘European system of energy security’956 create the idea that Georgia is part of this 
mental map of Europe. 
                                                      
956 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 15 March 2007, Caucasus Press. 
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CHAPTER V – THE EURO-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY AS A 
NEW PATRON 
 
GEORGIA IN SEARCH FOR A PATRON AGAINST RUSSIAN DOMINATION 
Throughout history, the various forms of Georgian statehood have been threatened by 
belligerent neighbours. Therefore, Georgians have attempted to preserve their 
independence, or at least retain a high degree of autonomy, by bandwagoning with 
powerful patrons. According to Stephen Jones, ‘the expectation of a powerful patron has 
shaped Georgian foreign policy since the Middle Ages.’957 Frequently, the Georgian elite 
were co-opted by the administration and military of these patrons. The Byzantine, Persian 
and Russian Empires demonstrate episodes where Georgians held significant stakes and 
influence in the decision-making processes.958 Nevertheless, this does not mean that such 
alliances were stable and based on equal rights. Thus, allegiance to the patron was 
conditional, and Georgians took advantage of moments of weakness of the patron.959 As the 
balance of power fluctuated and patrons experienced a decline in influence, the Georgian 
elite adjusted their stance in order to maintain the highest level of control over their own 
territories. Some scholars have referred to this opportunism as treason,960 but the 
pragmatic attitude of shifting alliances has proven to be effective in the long run, and may 
well be one of the contributory factors why Georgia now exists as an independent country. 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Georgian leadership faced the challenging 
task of positioning the newly independent republic within a complex international system in 
a state of flux. Pragmatism, sensitive to the posture of Russia, has therefore been a key 
principle in developing a foreign policy template. In 1999, President Shevardnadze declared 
that it was not important if Georgia orientated towards the West or to Russia, but who can 
offer what.961 Some years later, business tycoon and presidential candidate Badri 
Patarkatsishvili similarly argued for a ‘policy of balancing’: 
Georgia has no friends, it has interests. Georgia’s foreign policy should meet the interests of only 
our country and our people. Georgia has two major foreign policy interests – Russia and the US. 
Whatever aggressive Russia might be, it is our neighbor. Whatever strong the US might be, it is 
                                                      
957 Stephen Jones, “The role of cultural paradigms in Georgian foreign policy,” in Journal of Communist Studies 
and Transition Politics, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2003): 102. 
958 For example, under Shah Abbas I (who actually even knew Georgian) military reforms were carried out by 
Alaverdi Khan (a Georgian whose family name was originally Undiladze). 
959 For example, when Latin Crusaders conquered Constantinople in 1204, the Georgia army took control over 
a long stretch of the Byzantine Black Sea coast and set up its own vassal state: the Empire of Trebizond. 
960 See for example, Andrey Epifantsev “Byla li Gruziya soyuznikom Rossii? Politicheskaya model vyzhivania 
gruzinskogo gosudarstva” http://www.apn.ru/publications/print21261.htm and a reaction to this Gulbaat 
Rtskhiladze and Georgiy Vekua, “Predateli li Gruziny?”, http://www.apn.ru/publications/print21305.htm 
961 Silke Kleinhanβ, Die Außenpolitik Georgiens: Ein 'Failing State’ zwischen internem Teilversagen und 
externen Chancen (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2008), 95. 
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beyond the ocean. The US is strong and friendly, but it is too far, while Russia is aggressive, but it 
is close to us.962 
Even Saakashvili, who later adopted a fastidious anti-Russian stance, initially spoke in favor 
of a balanced approach: 
We should not be asking the question of either America or Russia, either Europe or America. We 
want everything that is good for us. We want America, Russia and Europe, as well as the Middle 
East, if that is in the interests of Georgia. […] The main characteristics of our foreign policy 
should be pragmatism and dignity.963 
In 2007, Saakashvilli went as far as to propose to his Russian counterpart that Georgia 
abandon its plans for Euro-Atlantic integration, in exchange for the restoration of territorial 
integrity.964 This pragmatism poses an important question, i.e. is the Euro-Atlantic 
orientation really aimed at reforming the country according to a Western model and 
standards, or is it merely employed as an instrument to leverage independence and remain 
out of Russia’s grip? Although this dissertation does not seek to provide an answer, this 
question should be kept in mind throughout this chapter. 
The Russia-factor is one of the most significant aspects driving Georgia’s foreign policy. 
For more than two centuries, Georgians could count on its northern neighbour for 
protection against external threats, for reuniting the country, and for reintegrating some 
previously lost territories. However, at the same time it brought an end to Georgian 
independence, and arguments that it was a time of occupation are not unfounded. Based on 
its historic experience and current attitude of Russia, it is clear the Georgian leadership 
would not want to rely on Moscow as a guarantor of its independence. A group of Georgian 
experts wrote about this: 
Bandwagoning with Russia is not an alternative for Russia [...] not because we think that Georgia 
will cease to exist as a state […] but because bandwagoning with Russia means a return to the 
Georgia of the 1990s, when it was a failed, corrupt and criminal state, with no hopes of ever 
becoming a normal, modern and European state.965 
An example of how Saakashvili saw this need for a new and more reliable patron emerged in 
2005 when he declared: ‘Putin behaves as if Georgia were a Russian province. Europe and 
the US must interfere: an unprecedented tension is being formed in the region; the 
Caucasus may explode.’966 One year later, he also proclaimed that Russia had to realise that 
Georgia is a free and independent country rather than its ‘domestic servant.’967 The word 
‘Russia’ appears to have a toxic effect in the minds of the Georgian elite, and Russia has 
                                                      
962 Presidential candidate Badri Patarkatsishvili, 17 October 2007, Civil Ge. 
963 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 22 April 2004, Rustavi-2. 
964 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 20 July 2009, Caucasus Press. A similar statement from Tbilisi Mayor Gigi 
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965 Giorgi Gvalia, Bidzina Lebanidze Bidzina and Zurab Iashvili. Political elites, ideas and foreign policy: 
Explaining and understanding the international behavior of small state in the former Soviet Union (Tbilisi: Ilia 
State University, 2011), 43. 
966 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 3 March 2005, Caucasus Press (quoted from Italian newspaper La Republica). 
967 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 7 May 2006, Rustavi-2. 
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been accused of being behind ‘everything wrong that happens in Georgia.’968 However, the 
Georgian authorities have not always adequately demonstrated their diplomatic skills 
towards their northern neighbour, to the point of antagonising and challenging it, e.g. by 
asserting that ‘Georgia is not afraid of a war against Russia because Georgia is confident that 
Russia is doomed to lose.’969 
The West is already portrayed as a patron, given the level of ‘support’ Georgia receives 
from the EU, NATO, or the West.970 This is especially poignant with regards to the conflict 
regions, and their unavoidable links to foreign policy. Russia has been one of the principal 
stakeholders involved, and the Georgian leadership has tried to internationalise the conflicts 
for the purposes of securing Western support for its position. Georgia has consistently 
argued that the EU should be a guarantor in talks with the secessionist governments.971 Still, 
the West has traditionally been aprehensive to engage in such a process, most likely as it 
understands the danger of being dragged into a highly controversial issue. Nevertheless, the 
EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) has been used by the Georgian authorities to legitimise its 
position, e.g. by claiming that the EUMM confirms that no Georgian soldiers are stationed at 
the administrative borders or that there are no violations from the Georgian side.972 
 
THE EURO-ATLANTIC ENTITLEMENT 
As explained in previous chapters, the Georgian leadership propounds their country as a 
European nation and strives to maintain a Western path through a Euro-Atlantic orientation. 
There is clearly a desire for the country to ‘earn the place in Europe it deserves’973 and thus 
the European aspiration is very clear to President Saakashvili: ‘Georgia's choice is Europe, it 
has no other alternative. I hope that Europe will value this and they will treat Georgia not 
only as a partner, but as a full-fledged member of this wonderful union.’974 Such Euro-
Atlantic discourse undoubtedly sounds very appealing to Western politicians, who may not 
necessarily analyse such rhetoric, and may draw incorrect comparisons between Georgia 
                                                      
968 Parliamentary speaker Nino Burjanadze, 11 July 2005, Caucasus Press. 
969 Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili,16 October 2006, ITAR-TASS. 
970 See for example: ‘We have received a great deal of support from the European Union and the US State 
Department.’ (President Mikheil Saakashvili, 1 September 2004, Rustavi-2); ‘Georgia has elaborated an 
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971 See for example Foreign Minister Bezhuashvili, 14 September 2006 or Deputy Prime Minister Baramidze, 6 
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973 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 12 October 2004, Imedi TV. See similarly Prime Minister-designate Zurab 
Zhvania: ‘I am sure that Georgia and the Georgian people deserve to be in the EU, and to have as much 
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and the Baltic states. It may even have an impact on political and financial support as well as 
on Foreign Direct Investment flowing into Georgia to support the implementation of the 
reform agenda. Evident from the above quote from President Saakashvili, the Georgian 
administration has gone even one step further. In their view, the West is ‘morally obliged’975 
to give this support, and moreover, they ‘expect’976 something or demand in a rather 
arrogant fashion that the EU ‘should’ or ‘must’ act in a specific way to support Georgia.977 
By giving a sense of responsibility to the West, it may indeed be lured into providing the 
indispensable support for domestic issues, but even more importantly for maintaining its 
position vis-à-vis Russia. It also implies that unfortunate events can be blamed on the 
intransigence of the West. For example, the August 2008 War was portrayed by the 
Georgian leadership as a direct result of the ‘strategic mistake’978 of not granting NATO 
membership, implying that now the country is definitely entitled to it.979 
Different motives underpin this perceived entitlement, such as the historical feelings of 
Europeanness, the importance of Georgia to the entire Euro-Atlantic community, or the 
obligation to do something in return for Georgia’s assistance to NATO operations. Many of 
these arguments are interwoven, but one red thread flows through this thinking: Russia. In 
the minds of the Georgian political elite, it is the ‘moral obligation’980 of the democratic 
West to support the small independent democracy from the aggression of its big and 
aggressive northern neighbour. As David Darchiashvili claimed in the early 2000s: ‘The 
                                                      
975 For example, Ghia Nodia wrote that many Georgians thought the West had the ‘moral obligation’ to 
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President Saakashvili saying ’Europe and the US must interfere: an unprecedented tension is being formed in 
the region; the Caucasus may explode’ (3 March 2005, Caucasus Press) or ‘NATO should get more actively 
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‘the EU must participate in the resolution of conflicts in Georgia’ (24 November 2005, Caucasus Press). 
978 President Mikheil Saakashvili, 25 August 2008, Rustavi-2. 
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2008 Rustavi-2) 
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Georgian leadership, taking an example of some central European states, has good reason 
to assume that emphasizing the Russian threat is one of the best ways to get positive 
attention from the West.’981 While arguing for its entitlement for western support, the 
Georgian leadership has shown it masters the appropriate themes and vocabulary their 
Western interlocutors like to hear. Not only are they speaking of spreading democracy, they 
also flatter the Euro-Atlantic bodies by referring to NATO as the ‘most influential club’982 or 
saying that the peoples of the Caucasus will resolve their problems like the EU did.983 
 
Georgia is European and democratic 
The Georgian leadership consistently stressed in discussions with its Western partners that 
its foreign policy was identity-driven, i.e. that Georgia is European and that it therefore 
deserves to get support from the West. For example, while addressing the 62nd Session of 
the United Nations, President Saakashvili said: ‘This is not a new path for Georgia, but rather 
a return to our European home and our European vocation – which is so deeply enshrined in 
our national identity and history.’984 In April 2004, he even lectured the European 
Parliament by saying: ‘We are a member of the united European family and Europe should 
not deny Georgia the opportunity to develop, because if Europe forsakes Georgia it will 
forsake its own history.’985 Thus, Europe is not only obliged to support Georgia, it would also 
have to take the guilt if Georgia was not successful in its development. Referring to possible 
Georgian EU membership one year later, he told students at Columbia University that ‘every 
country, which is European proceeding from its history, culture, aspirations, self-perception 
and goals, will become part of every big European organization.’986 Clearly, the alleged 
Europeanness of Georgia and the Georgians is central in this discourse and the importance 
of using the European flag in order to strengthen this feeling of Europeanness should not be 
underestimated. For example, Saakashvili articulated at a joint briefing with five visiting EU 
foreign ministers amid tensions with Russia: ‘I think the EU should have an absolutely 
decisive role [in the peace process with Abkhazia and South Ossetia]. This is Europe. You 
have seen European flags in Georgia, and Europe cannot afford to leave this situation 
unchecked.’987 As in many other cases, the meaning of the word ‘European’ is often mind-
boggling, but still used in the context of deserving support from Europe. For example, when 
talking about a government programme to give laptops to children instead of schoolbooks 
and send native English-speaking teachers to Georgian schools, Saakashvili claimed: ‘If we're 
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talking about Europe, this is a very European initiative and a very European thing. And of 
course it would be good if the Europeans, our European friends, become a part of this.’988 
The Euro-Atlantic aspiration is not presented as a purely rational decision but rather as a 
continuation of the European history of the country: ‘Georgia’s aspiration to return to the 
European family is conditioned by historical reasons’989 and even more stronger Europe 
‘needs one of its historical component parts’.990 Also joining NATO is something ‘Georgia has 
dreamt of for centuries but which until now was never fortunate enough to achieve until 
now.’991 Referring to Georgia as part of ‘Ancient Europe’ has become one of Saakashvili’s 
mantras at meetings with European counterparts,992 few of which will know the place of 
Georgia in European history or the role of the Georgians in the Russian wars against 
European states. The Georgian leadership also feels that the mere fact that Georgians are or 
perceive themselves to be European is enough to be entitled to support from Europe. This 
thought is well embodied in the words of Saakashvili in 2005: 
This is Europe and Europe should be very active. […] The involvement of the EU is absolutely 
decisive, because we are not just talking about the EU's borders but about European countries. 
[…] There is old Europe and new Europe, but there is also ancient Europe. There are ancient 
Europeans across the street in the museum [reference to skulls unearthed in Dmanisi]. You can 
go and see for yourselves what Georgia's role was then. Of course, it is now necessary for the EU 
to become very actively involved in these processes.993 
Even stronger, Saakashvili feels that Europe should not repeat the same historical injustice 
and thus not ‘abandon’ Georgia as it had done in 1921, when Bolshevik forces took control 
over the country.994 
In the Georgian mindset, the buzz word ‘democracy’ is closely associated to Europe and 
the West and in the first years of independence they were almost used as synonyms. Similar 
to the moral obligation of Europe to support fellow-European countries, there is a 
conviction that the West should stand by a country that has tried to follow democratic 
values.995 Again in relation to Georgia’s struggle against Russia, President Saakashvili 
declared: ‘We are a part of the democratic world and the democratic world must fully clutch 
Georgia and the whole of Georgian society to its heart.’996 By repeating to the Western 
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interlocutors that Georgians chose the democratic path,997 that the Rose Revolution was a 
sign of the European values of the Georgians,998 that they share the same values as NATO,999 
and that they see NATO as a political organization which will help them in their 
democratization process,1000 they create the feeling that their aspirations should be 
supported. 
 
Georgia: leader of a new wave of European liberation 
Georgia is not only trying to profile itself as a supporter of European ideals and using them 
for its own development. The country seeks to play a leading role within a new wave of 
European liberation that will bring prosperity and democracy to other states of the post-
Soviet space.1001 This is mainly the case with regards to Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, but 
Saakashvili also invited the Russian president to come to Georgia ‘to understand how a post-
Soviet society can turn into a real European one.’1002 Clearly, the Georgian administration 
can comfortably refer to compliments made by Western leaders. For example, in 2005 U.S. 
President Bush called Georgia a ‘beacon of democracy’ and according to President 
Saakashvili, EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana described Georgia as ‘a model for the whole 
of Europe and around Europe’.1003 Although it is not stated openly, it is obvious that there is 
a link between taking a leading role in this ‘European liberation’ and the entitlement for 
support from the Euro-Atlantic community. 
When Ukraine went through its Orange Revolution, Kiev State University alumnus 
Saakashvili expressed strong support for demonstrators employing an outspoken pro-
European and anti-Russian rhetoric. He celebrated New Year 2005 with Viktor Yushchenko 
on Independence square in Kiev where the revolution had taken place and stated that 
‘Europe’s destiny’ was decided there.1004 A few days later, the two leaders signed a 
declaration depicting how the revolutions in their respective countries represented ‘the new 
wave of liberation of Europe, which will lead to the final victory of freedom and democracy 
on the continent of Europe.’1005 With respect to Moldova, Georgia shares the experience of 
dealing with a seceding entity from its territory. Saakashvili claimed that European 
integration is the key to solving such separatist problems.1006 Moreover, with respect to the 
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March 2005 parliamentary elections in Moldova, Saakashvili declared that his country had 
played a leading role and although he did ‘not want to overestimate,’ he claimed Georgia 
had ‘facilitated the creation of a Europe-oriented government in this country.’1007 
In mid-2005, Saakashvili evoked the contempt of the Belarusian authorities when he said 
that ‘another country is next in line to undergo a revolution,’1008 especially when he 
proclaimed: ‘We believe that Belarusian people have the right to freedom of choice, 
expression, speech and association. … [Belarusian people] have the right for European 
development.’1009 He called the Georgian support for democratisation in Belarus even a 
‘democratic, inner, spiritual mission.’1010 On the occasion of the visit of US President Bush to 
Tbilisi, Saakashvili even asserted that Georgians had the responsibility for spreading 
democracy throughout the world ‘starting with Belarus’.1011 As a consequence, bilateral 
relations soured,1012 and Saakashvili called upon the EU not to recognise the March 2006 
presidential elections but to impose stricter political and economic sanctions against the 
country's leadership.1013 In a message to opposition leader Alyaksandr Milinkevich he said 
he was ‘confident that the hard-working and talented Belarusian people will take its place in 
the free family of European nations based on common European values.’1014 This call for 
democratic justice dissappeared just a couple of years later and Saakashvili spoke more in 
favour of the Lukashenko regime in return for the non-recognition of Abkhaz and South 
Ossetian independence. Although the 2010 presidential elections in Belarus were marked by 
major shortcomings and the arrest of a number of opposition candidates, the Georgian 
leadership no longer preached the need for democratic reform and was only ‘concerned’ 
about the situation.1015 This indicates that the anti-Russian feelings and the desire to restore 
territorial integrity are clearly stronger than the European aspirations though. As a result, 
Georgians may not be fully consistent in their support for Europe and the European ideals 
and even act completely out of line with the EU. 
 
Georgia’s importance for the Euro-Atlantic Community 
The Georgian elite have not only attempted domestically to create the image that Georgia is 
of crucial importance to Europe and the West, but have equally done so in discussions with 
their Western interlocutors. As Saakashvili declared in 2007 at the opening of a NATO 
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Parliamentary Assembly seminar in Tbilisi: ‘we all understand well that not only does 
Georgia need NATO, but also that NATO needs Georgia,’ adding the same applies for 
Europe.1016 Similarly, Foreign Minister Bezhuashvili said a few months later that ‘Georgia's 
membership in NATO will raise the security level in Europe, the South Caucasus, and the 
Black Sea region.’1017 In addition to domestic discourse, the focus is on the demonization of 
Russia together with the importance of the transport and energy corridors. However, the 
use of hyperbolae is minimal, probably because Western leaders are much better informed 
than the Georgian population and will not find the Georgian leadership credible if they were 
to use too many blunt exaggerations. 
One of the main fields where Georgia could play a role is in the transit of energy 
resources, and the Georgian leadership made use of the energy crisis at the end of 2005 in 
Ukraine. For example, Saakashvili told his audience at an international security conference 
in Munich: ‘Georgia is ready to host, promote and protect these [energy] investments to 
help ensure that the rest of Europe does not find its schools, factories and citizens as 
vulnerable as we and Ukraine were last month.’1018 
Some commentators clearly link energy security to NATO membership. For example, 
editor-in-chief of the Resonansi newspaper Lasha Tughushi’s thinks that Georgia needs to 
become a member of NATO since the pipelines that are to deliver Caspian energy resources 
to Europe via Georgia ‘can only operate under the umbrella of a powerful international 
security system.’1019 
 
Georgia’s problems are Europe’s problems 
Presenting Georgian challenges as European challenges, or even as problems for the entire 
democratic world undoubtedly attracts the attention of European capitals, and if the 
argument is credible enough it may provide a convincing justification for Western 
involvement. Along this line of reasoning, Russia – as the external source of the problem and 
all evil – plays a prominent role as domestic roots or explanations for the difficult situation 
are hardly ever encountered. As Georgian relations with Russia progressively soured over 
gas and electricity problems in late 2005, the Europe-Russia dichotomy became stronger 
and the Saakashvili government searched for opportunities to demonise Russia and 
simultaneously secure further European support. Minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration 
Baramidze chimed, ‘Russia's policy is not only a problem for Georgia. This is also an issue of 
Europe's relations with the US and Russia. This is an issue of the entire Western world's 
security, as Russia is against the Western civilization.’1020 Thus, a new trend for justifying the 
European entitlement emerged. In a more positive wording, President Saakashvili once told 
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the European People's Party Congress: ‘Our success is your success and our security is your 
security. We need your help to join the EU and NATO.’1021 
A first field in which this logic has very often been applied is that of the energy security, 
linked to Georgia’s claimed importance for the Euro-Atlantic Community. For example, 
when Gazprom decided in December 2005 to increase gas tariffs, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Bezhuashvili said: ‘I am confident that this is not a Georgian problem, this is a European 
problem above all, for some of the European states depend on Russian energy carriers 
40%.’1022 In the following months, many more similar statements were voiced by other high 
level officials, especially as some parts of Eastern Europe suffered from a similar energy 
crisis in January 2006. Saakashvili saw these problems as a ‘wake up call for Europe’ and that 
the only possible solution was to seek alternative energy sources and use Georgia as a 
transit for the ‘reliable energy from the Caspian basin and Central Asia’.1023 
Another area where this reasoning has been frequently employed is that of the threat of 
a violent conflict. President Saakashvili positions the Georgian-Russian tensions as the 
‘biggest challenge Europe has faced since the Cold War’ and has warned that ‘Europe's 
future is at stake.’1024 Regarding the conflict regions in the country, he said they are ‘a 
problem for democracy and security in Europe’1025 and ‘have the potential to affect 
European security as long as they remain unresolved.’1026 In June 2006, State Minister 
Khaindrava told Western diplomats that ‘We have to explain to the world that if Russia is 
allowed to conquer Georgia by using force, it will be absolutely impossible to stop this 
process and this problem will then concern not only Georgia but Europe and the whole 
world as well.’1027 The feeling of entitlement to European support was explicitly broached in 
a statement by the permanent mission of Georgia to the OSCE one year later: ‘The 
Government of Georgia counts on the OSCE, whose principle focus is to ensure peace and 
security throughout the European continent and beyond, to express its resolute position on 
this issue and spare no efforts to prevent a dangerous escalation of events, which would 
pose a threat to Georgian and wider European security.’1028 After a Russian missile hit the 
village of Tsitelubani in August 2007, Foreign Minister Bezhuashvili stressed that Europe was 
‘obliged to react’ because this incident was an attack not only on Georgia, but on Europe in 
general.1029 Saakashvili went even further claiming that such aerial bombing by Russia ‘could 
happen tomorrow in any European country’1030 and that ‘the fate of Europe and the fate of 
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Russia depends on Georgia to a certain extent.’1031 At the rally on 12 August 2008 following 
the ending of the war, Saakashvili said that the reason the presidents of Lithuania and 
Estonia and the Prime Minister of Latvia were in Tbilisi was because ‘the freedom of the 
Baltic countries is being decided in Tbilisi.’1032 Moreover, in the aftermath of the war, many 
similar references emerged.1033 When finally Russia recognised Abkhaz and South Ossetian 
independence, this was not just a matter of territorial integrity for Georgia but a ‘problem 
between Russia and the civilized world.’1034 The Georgian administration has found support 
from non-Georgians in this argumentation as well, with Ukrainian President Yushchenko 
saying that ‘what happened in Georgia [in August 2008] is not a problem of Georgia, it is a 
problem of the EU’ and ‘Georgia’s loss of border integrity means the same may happen in 
Europe’1035 or U.S. Vice President Biden arguing that the August 2008 War reminded all that 
one cannot take security in Europe for granted or become complacent.1036 
A plethora of additional episodes of Georgian-Russian tensions are positioned as 
problems for Europe and the West in general. For example, when Georgia started openly 
deliberating its withdrawal from the CIS due to Russia’s dominance of the organization, 
Saakashvili said ‘Not just Georgia and Ukraine but the whole of Europe is facing this threat, 
and if there isn't appropriate support our 15-year-old fight will be in vain. The threat will 
increase if our democratic values are suppressed in Moscow. This is a challenge to Europe. It 
should wake up.’1037 Another instance, when ethnic discrimination against Georgians was 
peaking in late 2006, the Georgian parliament issued a statement stating that ‘The 
aforementioned developments also represent a test for the governments in all democratic 
countries, international organizations and human rights activists. Their position will be the 
best indicator of how important European values are for the international community.’1038 A 
final example to be raised in this section relates to the French satellite company Eutelsat, 
which suspended its broadcasting of Georgia’s public channel, First Caucasian. On this 
occasion, Presidential spokesperson Manjgaladze said that ‘such precedent of capitulation 
before Gazprom is dangerous first of all for the European democracies.’1039 
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Europe’s moral duty to help the victims and the weak 
The West has made it demonstrably clear that it aspires to spread the democratic norms 
and values and contribute to stability and security in the rest of the world. Very often, this 
may imply that victims are given assistance to overcome the negative consequences. The 
Georgian leadership depicted the country as a victim of Russian aggression in August 2008 
and counted on international support, including from the Euro-Atlantic community. 
President Saakashvili insisted on Georgia’s immediate admission to NATO and that his 
country should get a ‘special treatment, bypassing the existing procedures.’1040 This ‘moral 
duty’ of Europe to provide support to Georgia was called upon several times, including 
through nearly emotional statements that the country had no future if it is not a European 
state1041 or that Georgia has no alternative than Europe and hoped Europe would value 
this.1042 One might almost speak of moral blackmail when Saakashvili told the European 
Parliament: ‘I came here today, humbly, to tell you that we depend on you.’1043 
 
Quid pro quo 
Undoubtedly, the Georgians have carried out numerous reforms in compliance with 
Western recommendations and demands, and have contributed actively to NATO 
operations. Clearly, there is an expectation that these efforts be rewarded: ‘We are 
honouring our obligations. I hope that our partners too will appreciate that Georgia is a 
peaceful democratic country which is honouring its obligations to the international 
community.’1044 Similarly President Saakashvili said in early 2004 it was ‘time Europe finally 
saw and valued Georgia and took steps towards us’1045 as the country was heading a steady 
course towards European integration. This tit-for-tat reasoning applies mainly to the field of 
security, where both elite and wider population commonly believe their country was 
entitled to become a member of NATO in 2008 and found it unfair that NATO did not 
intervene in the August 2008 War with Russia. The need for reciprocity can be noticed in 
other areas too. For example, during a press conference with Barroso in February 2007, 
President Saakashvili asked for a visa free regime for Georgians visiting the EU, since EU 
citizens do not need a visa for Georgia.1046 
President Saakashvili openly stated that his country ‘expects support’ to find its ‘natural 
place’ (i.e. become a NATO member) as ‘Georgia has fulfilled the technical side with flying 
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colours.’1047 The Georgian leadership claims to have carried out all reforms in line with 
NATO requirements needed for membership and logically expected to receive such a status 
when all conditions are met.1048 The absence of such a reward has both puzzled and 
frustrated Saakashvili: ‘Everybody admits Georgia is the best pupil, however, it is not 
allowed to move to a higher grade. It is not good.’1049 The active participation of Georgia in 
NATO operations is even more obviously used than the reforms in expressing the 
expectations of NATO membership. During the first years of its cooperation with NATO, 
Georgia used to be mainly a security consumer but has turned into a security provider. As 
Georgia is making a ‘contribution to the overall Euro-Atlantic security’1050 by sending troops 
to Afghanistan and Iraq and ‘unlike some of the European states […] has no restrictions in 
respect of engagement in combat operations,’1051 the Georgian leadership feels they should 
sit at the same table and participate in the decision-making like the NATO members. The 
authorities have all too often explained that the participation in such missions is a 
manifestation of the country’s readiness to become a full-fledged member of the 
alliance.1052 Although certain NATO members, such as the US, use this argumentation to 
lobby in favour of Georgia,1053 NATO Secretary Generals have not supported such a ‘direct 
link’ between contributions to operations and future membership.1054 
Although the symbolic value of NATO membership should not be underestimated, the 
security guarantees of the alliance are undoubtedly more important. Domestically, the 
Georgian contribution to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is put in the context of securing 
guarantees ‘against the continuation of Russia's aggression’.1055 This may explain why many 
Georgians seem to feel that it is the duty of the West to stand side by side with Georgia in a 
military operation against Russia. This popular feeling is well captured in the propagandistic 
Hollywood-movie 5 days of August presenting a somewhat distorted view on the August 
2008 War. In the opening sequence Georgian military personnel save the lives of some 
American colleagues, and later questions why the West has failed to reciprocate. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
 
This dissertation seeks to establish as to what ends discourses of Euro-Atlanticism were 
instrumentalised in domestic and international affairs by the political elite in Georgia during 
the Saakashvili era. Although it has argued how this discourse was used domestically as a 
legitimacy management strategy and internationally to get Western support, this should not 
be interpreted as the full and complete answer. This research follows the constructivist 
approach, as the key concepts employed are discourse, legitimation, identity, and symbolic 
politics. 
Relations with Europe and the European discourse have a long history, but although 
contacts have existed for at least two thousand years, cooperation and trade were limited. 
At the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century, Georgia 
started to consider Europe as a model for its own modernisation effort, just as had been the 
case a century and a half earlier in Russia. The Soviet Union brought a temporary break in 
the direct relationship with Europe, which received new lease of life following the 
declaration of independence in 1991. Whereas President Shevardnadze attempted to 
balance his country between Russia and the West, his successor Mikheil Saakashvili opted 
for an outspoken Western orientation and broke all ties with the northern neighbour. 
Whereas this pro-European orientation may be portrayed as receiving full support by 
the entire population, closer scrutiny of public opinion and party politics presents a more 
complex picture. The population does not have a thorough understanding of the Euro-
Atlantic structures and their differences. Although they attach mainly positive associations 
to these structures and institutions, not everyone is in favour of closer integration. 
Interestingly, some of the staunchest adversaries can be found within the ranks of 
Saakashvili's United National Movement. The neo-liberal and libertarian ideologues of the 
party have reacted strongly against EU policies and have patronised the union at many 
occasions. 
Although there is no clear-cut definition of the concept of Europe and as many of its 
criteria are interpreted from an occidental and even EU-centric angle, there are a number of 
conclusions to be made with regards to the Europeanness of Georgia and the Georgians. 
Based on the different parameters of Europeanness and regardless of certain 
commonalities, there is little evidence or academic and scientific support to prove claims 
voiced by the Georgian political and intellectual elite that their country and nation was and 
is European. At the same time, although there are certain indications and similarities with 
the East, there is no incontestable proof either for allegations that Georgians are not 
European, or that they are or have been ‘Asian’ or ‘Middle Eastern’ – whatever these 
concepts may mean. The argumentation of the elite resembles that of the late 19th and early 
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20th century, and is often based on prejudices, a selective reading and misrepresentation of 
facts, a creative and biased interpretation of history, etc. It shows that this identity aspect is 
a social construction and that perceptions are more important than realities in identity 
discourse. 
The main argument speaking in favour of Georgia's Europeanness is its self-
determination and self-localisation. However, contrary to the rhetoric of the Saakashvili 
administration, Georgians do not feel that Europeanness is part of their national or cultural 
identity. Still, the majority of Georgians maintain that they are European-oriented. This 
distinction between being ‘European’ and ‘European-oriented’ may be crucial for the 
population at large but is not made by the country’s leadership, especially in their contacts 
with the West. 
The question whether or not Georgia and its nation is European is only secondary to the 
issue of why this matters so much. The two central hypotheses of this research link to the 
instrumentalist approach of identity; identity building is not an aim in itself but a tool used 
by the elite for domestic and international purposes. 
 
A subsequent chapter analysed how the Euro-Atlantic discourse, as part of a wider populist 
discourse, has been instrumentalised by the political elite (both those in power as those in 
the opposition) in Georgia as a domestic legitimacy management strategy. In itself, seeking 
legitimacy is not a negative thing, because it is a political reality and a precondition for any 
power to be held and exercised. Although in most cases this process of seeking legitimacy is 
benign, the Euro-Atlantic discourse has been manipulated at many occasions. Here the 
distinction was made between holding power (i.e. being in power) and exercising power. 
Significant academic debate has centred around whether or not socialisation works in 
the European Neighbourhood.1056 Four clear patterns of Euro-Atlantic discourse can be 
identified with regards to the exercising power and more concretely to carrying out reforms. 
Although their efficiency is not measured in this research, the patterns do speak in favour of 
such normative power of the EU. It seems that many of the impressive but difficult reforms 
could materialise and be accepted by the population thanks to the Euro-Atlantic discourse. 
First, government action or reforms are often legitimated by referring to an opinion 
given by one of the Euro-Atlantic bodies, either upon the request of the government or 
voluntarily. Furthermore, as the Euro-Atlantic course often entails unpleasant and difficult 
reforms for certain groups of people or the population at large, referring to the Euro-
Atlantic orientation and its institutions may make this mal nécessaire more acceptable 
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without the authorities seeing their legitimacy being challenged. Similar to what often 
happens in its member states, the EU has been used as a scapegoat or blame taker. 
In many cases strong EU pressure has been evident, conversely other cases demonstrate 
that government action is based on a gentle request or recommendation from the Euro-
Atlantic community, but portrayed to the domestic audience as a formal imposition. 
Especially the issue of relations with Russia is sensitive, where public opinion is animated. 
Therefore, referring to a request from the Euro-Atlantic community partially relieves the 
leadership of responsibility. Thirdly, the West is generally seen as ‘the good life which 
Georgians would like to achieve,’1057 which implies that common practices or standards in 
the Euro-Atlantic region can serve as a benchmark for the country, especially if it entails an 
improvement of the domestic situation. Conversely, it implies that if something is allowed or 
considered normal in Europe, then it should be considered acceptable in Georgia, even if it 
should conflict with Georgian traditions and values, such as with regards to sexual 
minorities. Accordingly, such references to common practices and standards in Europe have 
been employed as a justification, often without giving an explanation of substance or 
consequence of such benchmarks. There is, however, an interesting paradox. From one side, 
the Saakashvili administration has claimed to follow the European and EU standards in 
whatever they were doing, but on the other hand vehemently renounced the EU’s system of 
standards. Finally, Europeanness and the Euro-Atlantic aspirations can also be applied in a 
moralising manner, by appealing to the Georgians to act like Europeans and comply with 
‘European’ moral and ethical values, or to attempt to create unity and calmness. 
Clearly, there have been a high number of manipulations – which is easy due to the 
unclear concept of 'Europe' – in all four patterns, whereby the authorities attempted to 
justify their actions by shifting the blame ungroundedly on the Euro-Atlantic institutions. 
Often, such actions even countered principles of Western societies (i.e. related to 
democracy, transparency, equal treatment). 
Also in terms of legitimacy of holding power, many different groups of patterns can be 
identified, whether they aim to gain, maintain or restore legitimacy. Making promises is part 
of a populist discourse which can be found throughout the world, especially in pre-election 
times, throughout the world. The Georgian political elite have promised to bring their 
country up to par with European standards or even exceed that. A second group of patterns 
relates to the boosting of national pride, as it creates a more optimistic feeling and 
expectations for the future and as a result gives confidence to the population, which may be 
positively inclined towards one who raises this feeling of pride. Thus, one can often notice 
how the ruling elite stress Georgia’s exclusive and significant position, as well as its 
importance in the spheres of transport and energy in Europe. All too often the sympathy 
displayed by the Euro-Atlantic community to the country is depicted as unconditional 
support and would even create the impression that Georgia is at the centre of world politics 
                                                      
1057 Marina Muskhelishvili, “Georgia in a new wave of transformation,” The Caucasus and Globalization, Vol. 4, 
No. 1-2 (2010): 37. 
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and that the situation in the country is a priority agenda point for the West. Third, ‘Europe’ 
regularly recurs when the government is boasting with its success, underlining the hard 
work it has done to achieve it. The achievements are frequently repeated, but in most cases 
their substance and consequences are not explained. These accomplishments are often 
exaggerated and allegedly exceed expectations, and the Saakashvili administration has on 
several occasions told that Europe has taken Georgia as an example for its own reforms. Not 
only success can impact the image of the government, as setbacks or criticism from the 
West could have a negative effect on legitimacy. Thus, European discourse can also aim at 
restoring this legitimacy, through a selective reading and hearing of the criticism, by 
downplaying it, by putting it in the Georgian context, or more interestingly portray the 
failure as a success. In this context, the EU-scepticism is very visible, as very often the 
Saakashvili administration criticised the EU and its member states in return. 
There is a well-defined interplay between legitimation and de-legitimation as also the 
opposition has used the Euro-Atlantic discourse. All sides have criticised the other for not 
being committed or successful with regards to the Euro-Atlantic orientation and aspirations, 
have claimed the other is not European and does not respect European values or does not 
have any European support. They all have called upon the Euro-Atlantic institutions to act as 
an intermediary, under the form of a monitor, mediator, or referee. 
The Euro-Atlantic discourse has been supported and strengthened through symbolism. 
This is not only the case by using symbols, i.e. displaying the European flag or using the 
European hymn at important occasions, but also in other ways. For example, the symbolic 
value of having meetings in Europe of with European leaders can give the impression of 
having Western support and joining European organisations and structures can be used as 
an argument, most often exaggerated, about success of the Euro-Atlantic integration. 
Finally, Georgia’s appearance on the 'mental map' of Europe has been used, e.g. by being 
part of the European air, educational, or energy space. 
 
The last chapter argues that the Euro-Atlantic discourse is instrumentalised by the Georgian 
political elite to promote international legitimacy and to reinforce the country’s entitlement 
to patronage of the Euro-Atlantic community. 
Throughout history, Georgian rulers have adopted a pragmatic approach to foreign 
policy in order to guarantee the existence of their statehood. Appreciating their scale 
compared to neighbouring empires, they have managed to bandwagon with powerful 
patrons and to play a role in the decision making of these patrons. This historical paradigm 
is also at the basis of the foreign policy of modern-day Georgia. The Saakashvili 
administration presented the Western orientation and integration into the Euro-Atlantic 
structures as the only possible foreign policy option for Georgia. In order to lure the West 
into providing this security and support, the Georgian elite has focused on the Georgian 
entitlement for this assistance. This feeling of entitlement is very clear when analysing the 
  160 
rhetoric of a ‘moral obligation,’ where the Georgians ‘expect’ support and that the Euro-
Atlantic community ‘should’ or ‘must’ act in a specific way. Several patterns and arguments 
justifying this entitlement can be found in the Euro-Atlantic discourse of the political elite, 
which clearly masters the appropriate terms and vocabulary that flatter their Western 
interlocutors. 
First of all, the identity-argument refers to the Europeanness of Georgia and the 
Georgians and is mainly substantiated by historical reasons and the buzzword ‘democracy’ 
which is closely associated with the values of the West. Closely related to this, the 
Saakashvili administration has called itself a leader of a new wave of ‘European liberation’ 
that would bring prosperity and democracy to other states of the post-Soviet space. Still, as 
Georgian-Belarusian relations demonstrate, anti-Russian feelings and the desire to restore 
territorial integrity are clearly stronger than the call for leading this European liberation. 
Thirdly, Georgia’s importance for the Euro-Atlantic community has been highlighted 
frequently, and has focused on energy issues. Furthermore, the Saakashvili administration 
has tried to explain that Georgia’s problems are actually Europe’s problems. When listening 
to their statements, one would believe that Georgia has the key to all problems in Europe 
and that Europe signs its own death warrant if it does not help Georgia. The self-
victimisation of Georgia and the alleged Russian threat are closely connected to this 
argument. As a ‘last resort’ the Georgian leadership, supported by the public opinion, 
referred to the country’s participation in NATO operations and the fact that it expects 
something in return. All of these ideas have been used at frequent intervals to give the 
feeling to the West it is supported to provide unconditional support to Georgia, and 
especially to its leadership. 
 
Irregardless, this does not mean that the Saakashvili administration was a specific case, and 
that such instrumentalisation does not take place elsewhere. The Georgian Dream 
movement, which took over power from the United National Movement, has adopted a 
similar stance, albeit in a less exaggerated manner. However, it is not clear if this is caused 
by the success this strategy had under Saakashvili, or if the new leadership does not want to 
break with some discourse of its predecessors. 
This practice of Euro-Atlantic discourse is by no means specific to Georgia, though the 
Caucasian nation may have been more outspoken than other countries. Therefore, the 
conclusions of the research may also be applicable in cases of other countries, irregardless 
of whether they are EU members, candidate countries, other Eastern Partnership countries 
or even countries further away.1058 
 
                                                      
1058 Examples can be found even in Central Asia, where Uzbek President Karimov sought domestic legitimacy 
by speaking of the European support he has the eve before visiting Brussels in 2011 or Tajik President Rahmon 
portraying he got a major award from the EU when he received the 'Leader of the 21st century Award' from the 
small Romanian NGO European Council on International Relations. 
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Whereas the research has looked at the role of Euro-Atlantic discourse in Georgia, it has not 
adequately scrutinised as to the extent these instrumentalisations and manipulations have 
been effective and efficient. Additional research would be needed to analyse this further, 
but the main challenge would be to demonstrate a causal link between the 
instrumentalisation of Euro-Atlantic discourse and legitimacy. There are undoubtedly 
numerous other sources of legitimacyand it is difficult to show which one leads to what 
effect. An additional topic for further research refers to the code-switching, as the domestic 
and international discourse of the elite shows some differences, but this would require 
proficient Georgian language skills. An obvious example to start with is how domestically the 
leadership spoke of an ‘associated membership’ with the EU, but never uses this term with 
the Western interlocutors and press. Another case study could relate to the alleged 
importance of Georgia for Europe, as the exaggerations that can be heard domestically are 
not as apparent outside of the country. Thirdly, for professional reasons, the author could 
not relate this manipulation to the attitude and reactions of the Euro-Atlantic community. 
Although a superficial analysis would give the impression Western politicians are easily lured 
into giving unconditional support, there are ample of examples of the contrary.1059 Here it 
would be crucial to put this matter in relation to the ‘soft power’ of the EU and the apparent 
lack of understanding of diplomatic language from the side of the Georgian elite. Moreover, 
as Euro-scepticism as a phenomenon inside EU member states has been well researched, 
not much can be found on this issue in countries neighbouring the EU. Finally, an in-depth 
study scrutinising the extent of the consistency between rhetoric and real actions or reforms 
would be an important aspect in assessing the success of the Europeanisation attempts. 
                                                      
1059 For example, in 2007 head of the PACE election observation mission Mátyás Eörsi complained that some 
presidential hopefuls were trying to get him involved in domestic processes in the country (6 December 2007, 
Caucasus Press). 
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ANNEXURE I – MAIN POLITICAL FIGURES 
 
Heads of State 
Zviad GAMSAKHURDIA (1991 – 1992) 
 Human rights activist in the Soviet era 
 Chairman of the Supreme Council of Georgia 
(1990 – 1991) 
 Died in unclear circumstances in 1993 
 
Eduard SHEVARDNADZE (1992 – 2003) 
 Minister of Internal Affairs of the Georgian SSR 
(1967 – 1972) 
 First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party 
(1972 – 1985) 
 Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs (1985 – 1991)  
Mikheil SAAKASVHILI (since 2004) 
 Member of Parliament (1995 – 2000) 
 Minister of Justice (2000 – 2001) 
 Mayor of Tbilisi (2002 – 2003) 
 
 
Other leading politicians 
Zurab ZHVANIA 
 Speaker of Parliament (1995 – 2001) 
 State Minister / Prime Minister (2003 – 2005) 
 Died under dubious circumstances in 2005 
 
Nino BURJANADZE 
 Member of Parliament (1995 – 2008) 
 Speaker of Parliament (2001 – 2008) 
 Acting president (2003 – 2004 and 2007 – 2008) 
 Founder and leader of the party ‘Democratic 
Movement – United Georgia’ (since 2008)  
Salome ZOURABICHVILI 
 Born and raised in France 
 French Ambassador to Georgia (2003 – 2004) 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs (2004 – 2005) 
 Founder and leader of the party ‘Georgia’s Way’ 
(2006 – 2010)  
Shalva NATELASHVILI 
 Member of Parliament since 1992 
 Founder and leader of the Georgian Labour Party 
since 1995 
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Irakli ALASANIA 
 Chairman of the Abkhazian government-in-exile 
(2004 – 2006) 
 Ambassador to the UN (2006 – 2008) 
 Founder and leader of the party ‘Our Georgia – 
Free Democrats’ since 2009 (part of Georgian 
Dream coalition since 2012) 
 
Bidzina IVANISHVILI 
 Philantropist oligarch (est. €5 billion) in Russia, 
but moved to Georgia in 2003 
 Founder and leader of opposition coalition 
‘Georgian Dream’ since 2012 
 Prime Minister since 2012  
Kakha BENDUKIDZE 
 Oligarch in Russia, but moved to Georgia in 2004 
 Minister of Economics (2004) 
 Minister for coordination of Economic Reforms 
(2004 – 2008) 
 Head of State Chancellery (2008 – 2009) 
 Back in private business since 2009 
 
Giorgi BARAMIDZE 
 Member of Parliament (1992 – 2003) 
 Minister of Internal Affairs (2003 – 2004) 
 Minister of Defence (2004) 
 State Minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration of 
Georgia (2004 – 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ANNEXURE II – EXAMPLES OF VISUAL EURO-ATLANTIC 
SYMBOLISM 
Logo of the tourism board 
 
Logo of the Department of Tourism and Resorts of 
Georgia, as used for example in a general 
brochure on Georgia in July 2009. 
 
At this time it mentions “Europe started here”. 
 
Logo of the new Georgian National Tourism 
Administration under the Ministry of Economy 
and Sustainable Development (replacing the 
Department of Tourism and Resorts of Georgia 
under the Ministry of Economic Development 
of Georgia), as used for example in the 
brochure « Georgia : your ski destination » in 
2011. 
Billboard in front of the Parliament building in Tbilisi 
 
Front side 
 
Back side 
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Logo of the political union ‘European Democrats of Georgia’ 
 
Pro-NATO commercial (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ki4loyaXQ2A) 
A farmer is working in his vineyard. He looks up and sees how the sky turns gray. 
 
Fearing the rain and hail will destoy his source of 
income, he runs around trying to protect the 
grapes with his jacket. 
 
Suddenly, a group of youngsters run into the 
field with a huge piece of cloth, covering the 
vines. 
As the youngsters are moving, it becomes clear 
that the piece of cloth is a NATO flag. 
 
The conclusion is that sometimes threats cannot 
be dealt with alone: 'NATO: 26 countries for one.' 
  
Pictures from the 1 September 2008 demonstration in Tbilisi 
 
Picture retrieved from 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/23866005@N07/3271067613/ 
 
Picture retrieved from http://www.dw.de/nato-chief-slams-russian-troop-positions-
on-visit-to-georgia/a-3645788-1 
 
Picture retrieved from http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/europe-to-review-
ties-with-russia/2008/09/02/1220121234698.html 
 
Picture retrieved from http://www.rferl.org/content/ 
NATO_Offers_Not_On_The_Cards_For_Georgia_Ukraine/1199901.html 
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ANNEXURE III – VALUES 
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Identity, nationality and patriotism                       
Very or quite proud of being a citizen of their country 91 75 91 88 92 88 96 84 86 80 96            
Ranking the country of residence as the first or 
second most important group to which they belong 
40 15 38 32 28 32 19 25 20 44 68            
People that think it is very or quite important to have 
been born in the country to be a true citizen of their 
country 
47 57 72 49 73 76 86 76 90 84 85            
                       
Politics                       
People that think having a democratic political system 
would be a very or fairly good idea 
91 91 86 94 96 97 86 82 84 80 96 78 90 92 90 89 94 97 88 92 98 96 
People that agree that our society must be gradually 
changed through reform 
72 77 76 91 82 85 79 76 82 81 88 83 49          
                       
Religion                       
People that say religion is very or quite important in 
their lives 
36 35 41 22 37 76 75 19 87 54 95 51 97 59 91 39 22 91 99 94 94 98 
People that say there is only one true religion 6 13 9 4 26 23 31 9 36 15 81            
People that agree or agree strongly with the 
statement that politicians who do not believe in God 
are unfit for public office 
8 19 8 4 14 17 16 10 48 32 80 28 66 17 49 13  49 59 55 49 53 
People that agree or agree strongly with the 
statement that religious leaders should not influence 
government decisions 
79 63 56 64 72 66 70 52 62 69 31 56 63 71 54 64  65 70 44 71 38 
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Society                       
Abortion can be justified 56 40 43 75 43 28 25 49 30 41 22 37 10 41 16 52 12 25 27 24 14 9 
Divorce can be justified 62 57 55 80 66 41 38 52 41 45 33 48 26 55 51 63 19 32 40 40 21 33 
Euthanasia can be justified 64 42 52 62 56 39 26 48 24 36 16 37 13 48 27 62 25 32 29 33 10 12 
Homosexuality can be justified 53 52 50 76 56 29 20 44 13 20 2 13 5 52 36 52 7 22 21 18 6  
Percentage of people that wouldn’t like to have 
Muslims as neighbours 
7 20 12 16 13 22 25 29 20 18 38 20 6 11 na        
Data retrieved from the World Values Survey (http://www.worldvaluesurvey.org). 
FR = France; DE = Germany; UK = United Kingdom; SE = Sweden; SP = Spain; IT = Italy; PL = Poland; CZ = Czech Republic; RO = Romania; BG = Bulgaria; GE = Georgia; RU = 
Russia; TR = Turkey; CA = Canada; BR = Brazil; AU = Australia; CN = China; IN = India; ML = Mali; GH = Ghana; ZM = Zimbabwe; ET = Ethiopia; MA = Morocco 
